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This thesis examines the politics of local governance in the Scottish Highlands, taking
the Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) network - made up of a central core and
10 Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) - as its institutional focus. It synthesises
regulationist approaches and neo-Marxist state theory to explain LECs as part of a
broader process of re-regulation under consecutive Conservative governments. LECs
are unelected, business-led agencies operating at the local level. The political
discourse through which LECs were established and promoted created expectations
of local autonomy among business representatives that clashed with the centralising
tendencies of Thatcherism. The thesis examines how the resultant tension between
local initiative and central control has been worked out within the HIE network. It
relies on data collected from seventy semi-structured interviews with representatives
ofHIE, LECs, local authorities, businesses and community groups.
The initial chapters introduce the research and consider key methodological issues,
set out the theoretical framework, and review the practices of the Highlands and
Islands Development Board (HIDB, HIE's successor). The thesis then explores the key
tension between local initiative and central control, explaining how it has been
mediated and resolved through routine institutional practices. It also examines HIE-
LECs relations with other key agencies, notably local authorities, through selected
examples of multi-agency partnerships and assesses LECs' local accountability and
representativeness. Finally, a concluding chapter sets out the main findings and
considers their implications.
While key managerial 'technologies' such as targeting, audit and financial controls
allow central government to monitor and steer the HIE network, the thesis argues that
the authoritative resources of the HIE core - grounded in the combination of local
knowledge and technical expertise inherited from the HIDB - enables it to adapt key
aspects of the operating regime to its own purposes. Local autonomy is limited by the
relative centralisation of the Network, and LECs operate in a system of structured
flexibility in which their scope to adapt policy to local conditions is constrained by
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state rules and procedures. In emphasising that local autonomy is limited by
hierarchical mechanisms of control, the thesis argues that local governance in the
Scottish Highlands continues to be underpinned by government. It also points to the
limits of the regulation approach and neo-Marxist state theory as theoretical
perspectives, suggesting that neo-Foucauldian writings on governmentality are useful
in providing stronger analytical purchase on the specific mechanisms and procedures
through which state regulation is practised.
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Chapter 1
Examining Local Governance in the Scottish Highlands: Research
Focus and Methodology
1.1 Introduction
In the early days particularly there was a lot of tension between LECs generally and HIE ...
There still is tension, but it was particularly marked in the early days ... between [the] doctrine
that business people are now in charge, they can do what they like ... which was ... typical
government rhetoric of the time... and the fact that on the other hand these were bodies that
were dishing out large sums of public money, and the ... constraints on all of that were very
marked.'
This thesis examines the politics of local governance in the Scottish
Highlands. It takes the Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) network - made up of
a central core and 10 Local Enterprise Companeis (LECs) (Fig 1.1) - as its
institutional focus. By stressing the crucial tension between the project of
incorporating business elites into state structures and established norms of public
accountability, the above quote locates HIE within a broader process of state
restructuring. The research uses the HIE example to explore wider contradictions and
tensions. It examines how local-central tensions have been worked out in practice, and
asks what this reveals about the broader dilemmas of state restructuring in a world in
which economic globalisation is confronting the nation state with new challenges.
Centralised power structures have been widely criticised and discredited since
the late 1970s (Morgan and Roberts, 1993). Under the intellectual and political
hegemony of the Conservative Right, many Western countries have experienced
programmes of reform aimed at dismantling the centralised structures of the
Keynesian Welfare State. In the United Kingdom, processes of decentralisation
assumed a distinctive form as consecutive Conservative governments established a
series of unelected business-led local agencies in the 1980s and early 1990s (Training
and Eneterprise Councils (TECs), LECs, Urban Development Corporations (UDCs),
Housing Action Trust (HATs), NHS Trusts, etc.). Much recent research has claimed
that these reforms have brought about a shift from traditional forms of local
government to a more complex and diverse system of local governance (see section
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1.3) (Jessop 1995b, 1997a, c; Painter and Goodwin, 1995, Goodwin and Painter 1996;
Rhodes, 1996; Jones, 1997a, b, 1998b; Stoker, 1998). The reforms were promoted and
justified through an anti-statist rhetoric which claimed that local bodies would restore
individual responsibility for the provision of key services and allow communities of
'active citizens' to manage their own affairs, thus ending the 'dependency culture'
created by the welfare state (Morgan and Roberts, 1993; Kearns, 1995). Against this,
critics have raised concerns about the accountability and democratic legitimacy of
unelected 'quangos' (Stewart, 1995; Weir, 1995).
This process of organisational reform suggests an underlying contradiction:
policies which ostensibly aimed to promote and extend market forces seem to require
distinct forms of institutional intervention (Peck, 1995). This thesis is informed by the
assumption, derived from regulation theory, that markets are not self-regulating.
Rather, expanded accumulation depends upon successful regulation. That is, sustained
periods of economic growth depend upon the parallel institutionalisation of a range of
social rules, practices and norms (see Section 2.5) (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1986,
1992; Boyer, 1990; Jessop, 1990a). While there is no dominant 'subject' of regulation,
the state has become a key site for the regulation of economic and social relations over
the course of the twentieth century (Painter and Goodwin, 1995).
After replacing the HIDB in April 1991, HIE took over responsibility for the
provision of economic development assistance and training in the Highlands. LECs
are local employer-led agencies which deliver services on the basis of an annual
contract with HIE. Although LECs were established as part of the general process of
decentralisation, in the Highlands these forces interacted with pre-existing
institutional forms. To adapt a metaphor from another context, the thesis focuses on
the combination of institutional 'layers',2 regarding the HIE Network as the product of
the interaction between underlying forces of state restructuring and the pre-existing
structure of local and regional organisations.
This introductory chapter introduces the research problem and outlines how
the research was undertaken. Section 1.2 lists the main aims of the research. Section
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1.3 considers how processes of state restructuring have led to the emergence of new
forms of governance. It outlines the structure of local governance in the Scottish
Highlands in relation to these wider changes. Section 1.4 focuses on the 'doing' of
the research, specifying the main methods and procedures adopted and discussing the
principal methodological issues encountered. Section 1.5 outlines the structure and
contents of the remainder of the thesis.
1.2 Research Objectives
The general aim of the thesis is to contribute towards a clearer understanding
of emerging fonns of local governance in Britain. Although this study focuses on
institutional relations in one particular region, the type of 'intensive' research
employed can generate insights into the nature of the underlying processes which also
affect other regions (Sayer, 1992a). The research addresses current issues in economic
and political geography, and examines which theoretical perspectives are best able to
account for and explain recent changes in the structure and orientation of the local
state. A number ofmore specific research objectives inform what follows:
1. To examine how processes of political decentralisation have been worked out in a
specific local/institutional context. By focusing on the HIE Network, the thesis aims
to explore how these processes have been conditioned and shaped by pre-established
features of the political system and the local/regional context. In this way, it will
provide insights into the nature of state restructuring in Britain at a time when
apparent shifts of power 'upwards' to supra-national political institutions and
'downwards' to regional and local organisations are raising profound questions about
the future of the nation state (Swyngedouw, 1992, 1997; Jessop, 1994; Amin and
Tomaney 1995);
2. To investigate how state institutions function within their local social and economic
environments, and assess the extent to which state agencies are open to local agendas
and community involvement. Adopting a view of the 'local' as fractured and contested
(Massey, 1991) and informed by the notion of'strategic selectivity' (Jessop, 1990b,
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1997b, 1998b), the thesis examines the accessibility of LECs to the claims of different
social groups. It raises crucial issues of accountability, representation and
participation as it assesses the capacity of state agencies to incorporate and integrate
different groups. In operationalising some of the key insights of'strategic-relational'
state theory in local research, the thesis contributes towards an emerging research
agenda (Jessop, 1997a, b, d, 1998 a, b; Collinge and Hall, 1997; Jones 1997a, b,
1998b; MacLeod 1997b, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998, 1999);
3. To develop an understanding of the role of state agencies in regulating local and
regional economies. This is informed by the regulationist principle that the 'objects' of
regulation are (re)constituted through the process of regulation itself (Jessop 1990a,
1997b, d; Painter and Goodwin, 1995), and can be seen as part of a broader research
agenda examining the discursive construction of economic space (Daly, 1991;
Leyshon and Tickell, 1994; Jessop, 1997b, d). The research focuses on the specific
practices and mechanism deployed by local state agencies and draws attention to the
importance of knowledge and expertise in framing and justifying intervention in local
economies (Painter, 1997b);
4. To examine which theoretical perspectives best inform accounts of local
governance and to show how empirical analysis can contribute to the development of
these perspectives. In this sense, the research seeks to be both theoretically informed
and theoretically informative, using empirical material and key findings to examine
underlying theoretical principles (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). It assesses the
relative merits of three main approaches - regulation theory, neo-Gramscian state
theory, and govemmentality theories.
1.3 Local Governance and State Restructuring
Although the term 'governance' has traditionally been used as synonym for
government, it has acquired a distinct meaning in recent years (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker,
1998). Governance is now used to refer to a new process of governing. This change
can be explained in relation to the distinction between markets, hierarchies and
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networks as modes of resource allocation and organisational co-ordination (Jessop,
1995a: 310-11; Rhodes, 1996: 653). In contrast to traditional hierarchical modes of
government, contemporary forms of governance rely on networks to a much greater
extent. They reflect a blurring of the distinctions between market, state and civil
society (Stoker, 1998). Governance refers to a complex process of governing which
requires that the activities of a diverse range of actors and agencies be co-ordinated.
This tends to be achieved through the steering of institutional networks that rely on
trust and processes of mutual adjustment rather than administrative fiat (Rhodes,
1996: 653). Both Jessop (1995a: 314, 319) and Rhodes (1996: 660) define governance
as the self-organisation of inter-organisational networks, suggesting a relative
autonomy from formal structures of government. This broad concern with a range of
actors drawn from and beyond the state distinguishes analyses of governance from
the traditional concern with government (Jessop, 1995a; Goodwin and Painter, 1996).
There is no a priori presumption that governance mechanisms are anchored primarily
in the sovereign state (Jessop, 1995a: 310-11).
The rise of local governance must be viewed in the context of national state
restructuring. It is often argued that economic 'globalisation' is leading to a
'hollowing-out' of the state as power shifts upwards to supra-national authorities and
downwards to local and regional institutions (Jessop, 1994, 1997b; Amin and Thrift,
1995; Stoiper, 1995). This is said to be associated with a relativisation ofscale as the
nation state loses the primacy that it enjoyed under Fordism as the key site for the
regulation of economic and social relations (Jessop, 1997c, d; Swyngedouw, 1997;
MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998, 1999; MacLeod, 1998b). The subsequent adjustment of
state capacities can be seen as the product of three inter-related processes (Jessop,
1997c, d). First, de-nationalisation refers to the process of 'hollowing-out' as
local/regional and supra-national organisations assume increased responsibilities.
Second, de-statisation refers to the shift from government to governance discussed
above as the state withdraws from direct service provision in certain spheres of
activity, increasingly relying on partnerships and community initiatives to deliver
policy (Jessop, 1997d).3 Third, internationalisation reflects a number of inter-related
tendencies: the increased importance of the international and global environment in
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shaping state capacities and policies; the rapid transfer of policy initiatives between
national regimes; and the efforts of regional authorities to develop closer links with
one another, often by-passing national institutions (Jessop, 1997c, d; MacLeod and
Goodwin, 1999: 3).
While this provides a useful framework for contextualising and interpreting
changes in local governance, these claims involve substantial empirical generalisation
and do not necessarily reflect irreversible processes of structural transformation
(MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999: 3). As such, whether or not they are realised in
specific local contexts will be contingent upon the strategies and practices of
particular institutions and actors. The thesis questions accounts of local governance
based on simple notions of'hollowing-ouf, arguing that key agencies were established
as part of the nation state's effort to adjust to economic globalisation and pointing to
its continuing importance in underpinning and steering local institutional networks.
Jessop (1997a) draws on the idea of policy cycles to argue that the current
interest in local governance reflects a new phase of state restructuring. The 1980s'
reliance on the introduction of market disciplines, itself a reaction to state failure in
the 1970s, has been superseded, though not wholly replaced, by a new mode of local
governance defined by its reliance on the self-governing capacities of local
partnerships and networks. While this aims to co-ordinate the activities of state
agencies, it does so on terms and conditions established by the earlier process of
restructuring.
In the 1980s, the Conservative government sought to curtail and control the
activities of elected local government, imposing rigid financial constraints and by¬
passing local authorities through the creation of special-purpose organisations (TECs,
LECs, UDCs, NHS Trusts, etc.) (see Jessop et al., 1988; Goodwin 1992; Stewart and
Stoker, 1995). In other areas such as social work and housing, the state sought to
devolve responsibility by involving voluntary and private agencies in service delivery.
At the same time, compulsory competitive tendering imposed a market logic on many
local services, drawing private interests into networks of providers. Rather than
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signalling the retreat of government and the inexorable advance of the private sector,
these reforms were part of a political project designed to 'reinvent' government
through the wholesale introduction of business practices and norms into the public
sector (Bailey et al., 1995: 230-31). The outcome is a profound blurring of the
boundaries between public and private sectors.
Unelected local agencies were established as part of a broader process of state
restructuring. Conservative governments created new institutional structures to
incorporate selected interests (business) in policy delivery whilst marginalising groups
whose 'excessive' demands were identified as a major cause of state failure in the
1970s (organised labour and elected local authorities) (Jessop et al., 1988; Peck, 1995;
Jones, 1997a, b). LECs and TECs (their equivalents in England and Wales) can be
seen as institutional 'metaphors' of (late) Thatcherism, embodying this broader agenda
(Peck and Jones, 1995: 1364). Launched in 1988-89 at the peak of Thatcherite
confidence in its capacity to revitalise the economic and social fabric of British
society, LECs and TECs reflect the shift towards a focus on supply-side measures as
the core of local economic policy (Chapter four) (Peck, 1992; King 1993; Bennett et
al., 1994). This thesis places the evolution ofHIE LECs within the broader context of
state restructuring, showing how the contradictions and tensions contained within this
broader project are played out in particular regional and local spaces.
More recently, the central state has encouraged, through specific funding
initiatives, the development of multi-agency partnerships as a means of co-ordinating
organisational activity (Peck and Tickell, 1994b; Bailey et al., 1995; Jones and Ward,
1997). This in part a response to the unintended consequences of the 1980s reforms,
namely considerable fragmentation, duplication and confusion between a range of
initiatives and agencies, failings noted by the Audit Commission in 1989 (Bailey et
al., 1989: 60-64). Given the relativisation of scale, recent initiatives reflect not only
the efforts of central government to promote economic development after Fordism,
but also, increasingly, the activities of supranational institutions, particularly the EU
(European Union). As a key funder of local economic development, the EU's
insistence that its programmes are delivered through integrated partnerships is of
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crucial importance in re-shaping local institutional structures (Tommel, 1997; Ward
and McNicholas, 1998; MacLeod, 1998b). Although there is a tension between the
neo-liberal policies followed by British governments and the interventionist logic of
European integration, the shared emphasis on partnership, local initiative and
community involvement gives significant points of convergence (Ward and
McNicholas, 1998: 29). The thesis examines the dynamics of partnership in the
Scottish Highlands, investigating the extent to which inter-organisational relations are
conditioned by the effects of earlier reforms.
Many of the issues addressed in this thesis have been the subject of heated
political debate in recent years. The expansion of unelected state agencies under the
Conservatives is popularly represented in terms of the growth of a 'quango' state
threatening traditions of local democracy and accountability. In the run-up to the May
1997 General Election, 'quangos' became an important political issue as the opposition
parties sought to portray the reliance on unelected local agencies as symptomatic of
the political 'sleaze' engulfing the 1992-1997 Conservative administration (Stewart
1995; Weir, 1995). A vast number of appointments to these bodies were controlled by
government ministers, leading Davis and Stewart (1993) to proclaim the rise of a 'new
magistracy' of unelected local elites, usually drawn from the business sector, who
were suspected of having close links with the Conservative Party (also Morgan and
Roberts, 1993; Stott, 1995; Weir, 1995; Hirst 1995; Jones, 1997a). Concerns about
local political accountability reflect unelected agencies' overwhelming dependence on
financial and contractual relationships with central government, leading to fears that
the role of local 'quangos' was simply to deliver central government policy
irrespective of local preferences (Morgan and Roberts, 1993; Stewart, 1995; Weir,
1995). Indeed, the strong presence of unelected agencies in the old industrial regions,
the heartlands of 'municipal socialism', suggests that they were used to contain and
manage resistance to the Thatcherite project (Hudson, 1994; Jones, 1997b).
In defense of its reforms, one minister claimed that the government's efforts to
make public services more responsive to their consumers had led to a 'democratic
gain', given that the basic structure of accountability to parliament remained
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untouched.4 Eventually, however, the activities of the Committee on Standards in
Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan, in investigating Local Spending Bodies gave
official credence to public concerns about the growth of a 'quango' state. Since then,
concerns about unelected local agencies have been eclipsed by the election of a New
Labour government. The thesis is therefore able to consider the longer-term
implications of the fundamental changes in state organisation in the 1980s and early
1990s in the light of a recent change of government. Despite some radical pre-election
rhetoric, the Blair government has shown little inclination thus far to restructure the
system of local governance that it inherited. In the longer-term, however, its
commitment to regional devolution promises, in the context of rapid European
integration, to lead to a fundamental restructuring of the spatial organisation of
governance (Nairn, 1997; MacLeod and Jones, 1998; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).
One of the distinctive contributions of this research is the deployment of a
conceptual framework derived primarily from work in urban studies to a study of rural
governance. Despite the fact that the establishment of a range of unelected agencies
has transformed the institutional geographies of rural areas, questions of governance
have, at least until recently, been neglected within rural studies (Goodwin, 1998a). As
a result, theoretical claims tend to be grounded in studies of selected urban areas. This
thesis aims to help redress the balance by providing a detailed account of recent
changes in the structure and practice of governance in the Scottish Highlands. A case
study of a peripheral rural region allows claims - derived from studies of urban change
- that new institutional arrangements are locally 'embedded' (Amin and Thrift, 1994a,
b, 1995) to be re-assessed in the light of the distinctive historical experience of the
Highlands. In contrast to the current focus on business mobilisation in areas with a
strong tradition of business representation (Peck and Tickell 1995b; Ward, 1997;
Horan, 1997), the thesis concentrates on a peripheral region in which the private
sector has, historically, been under-represented.
While the HIE Network forms the main institutional focus of the research, the
thesis places it within the broader structure of local and regional governance (Fig 1.2).




















re-organisation); other unelected government agencies such as Scottish Natural
Heritage (SNH), the Crofters' Commission, the Scottish Environmental Protection
Agency (SEPA) and the North of Scotland Water Authority (NOSWA); bodies set up
to administer European programmes such as the Objective I partnership and the
various LEADER groups; the various area tourist boards, re-organised in 1996,
particularly the Highlands of Scotland Tourist Board (HOST) and the Western Isles
Tourist Board (WITB); employers' organisations, mainly Chambers of Commerce, the
local branch of the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) and local business and trade
associations; community and voluntary groups such as the Councils of Social Service,
community councils and community associations. The relationship between HIE-
LECs, local authorities and European bodies is of central importance, although the
role of community and business organisations is also considered. It is immediately
apparent that the 'localness' of this system of governance is questionable since many
of the key organisations are central government agencies or European-funded bodies
(Goodwin and Painter, 1996). The increasingly important role of the EU in funding
and monitoring local development programmes is a key feature of governance in the
region. The scope which these institutional arrangements offer for local initiative and
community 'empowerment' is a key theme running through the thesis.
Having established the substantive focus of the research and related it to the
wider context of state restructuring, it is now appropriate to state the main research
questions. These provide the focus and direction that allows the research objectives
listed earlier to be addressed.
1. How have the tensions between local initiative and central control have been played
out within the HIE network since 1991? As the opening quote stated, LECs were
promoted and legitimated through an official rhetoric of business leadership and local
involvement (IDS, 1988, 1989). At the same time, however, many aspects of
Conservative policy were leading to a centralisation of power (Gamble, 1988; Jessop
et al., 1988). While many studies have focused on the mobilisation and representation
of local business elites, the thesis goes beyond this to examine how the activities of
local agencies are regulated by the centre. It also considers the significance of the
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previous structure based on the HIDB in shaping and conditioning power relations
within the HIE Network. One key issue concerns the function of intermediate tiers of
the state like the Scottish Office and HIE core which have no equivalents in England
and Wales. Do they give regional elites a stronger capacity to adapt central initiatives
to their own purposes?
2. How are partnerships actually structured? Where does the pressure for partnership
stem from and to what extent do partnership arrangements reflect underlying relations
between HIE / LECs and local authorities? This involves critical analysis of the
concept and practice of partnership, cutting beneath the rhetoric to examine actual
power relations.
3. To what extent are local state agencies like LECs open to community involvement
and local agendas? This raises critical questions about accountability, participation
and representation. In common with other agencies dominated by local business elites,
LECs have been widely criticised for their lack of local political accountability. The
thesis examines the mechanisms they have developed to overcome these difficulties,
asking whether these are sufficient for them to develop credibility and legitimacy
within local communities.
1.4 Methodology
This section describes how the research project was designed to answer these
key questions, outlining the methods employed and discussing the main
methodological issues encountered. Decisions about method and research design are
best justified by demonstrating their 'fit' with the aims of the research and the
orientation of the research questions. They should also be consistent with the
theoretical perspectives and philosophical stances that inform and underpin the
research. The research is underpinned by a 'loose' version of critical realism which
sees realism as an ontological position rather than as a fully developed set of
methodological procedures (Yeung, 1997). The crux of the realist position is the claim
that there is an independent reality, made up of social objects and structures, although,
13
crucially, our knowledge and understanding of this 'reality' is always partial and
provisional, being channelled through language and discourse (Sayer, 1992a, b; Pratt
1995; Yeung, 1997).5 Although there is no direct correspondence between
philosophical claims and the use of particular methods, the adoption of a particular
philosophical position does have important methodological implications which
require to be worked through in empirical research (Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997).
1.4.1 Research Design and Methods
The research relies upon qualitative methods with semi-structured interviews
providing the main means of data collection. Most of these can be seen as 'corporate
interviews' in that they focused on key decision-makers within relatively powerful
organisations (Schoenberger, 1991). While research in economic and political
geography has traditionally been dominated by quantitative techniques, in recent years
the 'cultural turn' has encouraged the use of qualitative methods (Schoenberger, 1991;
Clark, 1998). Interviews form an appropriate method of data collection because they
are (potentially) able to illuminate the motivations and rationales of key actors and
institutions (Schoenberger, 1991). Crucially, in contrast to standardised questionnaires
which structure responses according to the researchers' categories, qualitative
interviews allow respondents to frame accounts in their own terms (Baxter and Eyles,
1997). This project's use of semi-structured interviews enabled respondents' to
articulate their own views and perspectives on the shaping of power relations within
the HIE network since 1991.6 From a realist perspective, interviews are often favoured
because of their capacity to highlight the discursive and representational practices
through which actors interpret and frame 'reality' (Pratt, 1995). In this way, research
can provide insights into how social structures and causal mechanisms are 'activated'
through human action (Giddens, 1984; Sayer, 1992a).
Seventy semi-structured interviews were conducted between November 1996
and November 1997, supplemented by documentary analysis and the collection of
some basic statistical information. Analysis of key documents - HIE and LEC annual
reports, strategies and business plans, council plans - allowed the key issues
emphasised by these organisations to be identified (not necessarily the same as those
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identified by the academic literature) and incorporated into interview schedules. Prior
documentary analysis also drew attention to the crucial promotional function of these
documents with annual reports and strategies often used to justify and legitimate
organisational policy to key constituencies. The purpose of the interviews was to get
beyond these public narratives and show how institutional practices and strategies
tend to be framed by a range of often competing rationales and motivations. The aim
was not to uncover an underlying 'truth' concealed by public discourses, but rather to
question institutional accounts in order to demonstrate that they are constructed from
particular positions.
It was anticipated, however, that a research strategy relying primarily on
interviews to achieve this would encounter substantial difficulties. Interviews provide
largely retrospective accounts of the rationales and dilemmas underlying institutional
strategy and practice. As such, they offer 'snapshots' of how on-going processes are
viewed and represented. Moreover, since respondents were interviewed as
representatives of their organisations, there was no reason to expect that interviews
would be immune from the tendency to provide promotional accounts of
organisational activity. This was reinforced by the experience of some early
interviews in which respondents tended to lapse into the delivery of corporate scripts
after positioning the researcher as an external observer. The research sought to address
this issue by adopting a 'triangulation' strategy. This was 'triangulation' in terms of
collecting data from multiple sources rather than the employment of a range of
methods (Silverman, 1993: 156-58; Yeung, 1997: 64; Baxter and Eyles, 1997: 514).
The project gained access to 'external' perspectives on the role of HIE-LECs by
interviewing business representatives and community activists in addition to
institutional personnel (Appendix 1.1, 1.2). The former were asked about their views
on LEG policy and practice as it affected them, as were local authority personnel. In
this way, the thesis addresses the tendency of recent research to neglect how
institutional discourses and strategies are received and interpreted within local
communities. The number of interviews conducted with different groups is shown in
Appendix 1.2. Approximately two-thirds were conducted with representatives of the
key organisations - HIE, LECs, local authorities, European funding bodies - and the
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remaining third with 'external' representatives.
It was important, however, to distance the research from some of the more
deterministic overtones that the term 'triangulation' has acquired in the methodological
literature. In particular, it rejects 'vulgar' notions of triangulation which see the
integration of different methods or data sources as the route to a more accurate and
complete account of the research problem (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 14). Neither
has 'triangulation' been employed to adjudicate between respondents' competing
versions of key issues in the sense of claiming that one set of accounts is somehow
more authentic or representative (Silverman, 1993: 157-8). Rather, different groups
were interviewed in order to explore different facets of the research problem (Coffey
and Atkinson, 1996: 14-5; Yeung, 1997: 65). The aim was not to replicate and
confirm emergent findings, but to examine how different groups are linked to the key
research 'object' (LECs), and, thereby, to explain the substantive relationships
structuring the politics of local governance in the Scottish Highlands (Yeung, 1997:
65).
Data was collected at two spatial scales: regional and local. This approach
followed the structure of the HIE Network in tenns of the division between a central
strategic core and 10 LECs. The first round of data collection focused on the regional
level, involving 10 interviews with personnel from the HIE core, the Highland
Council and the Objective 1 partnership (Appendix 1.1). The next key decision
involved the selection of three local study areas. After a review of basic statistical
information, Easter Ross (which contains about 85 per cent of the population of the
larger Ross and Cromarty LEC area), Skye and Lochalsh and the Western Isles were
chosen on the basis of their contrasting economic conditions (Fig 1.1) (Appendix 2.2).
Easter Ross was transformed by large-scale industrial development in the late
1960s and 1970s but has since suffered from major employment losses. It is thus
confronted with severe problems of industrial adjustment and structural change. Skye
and Lochalsh, by contrast, has experienced rapid population and economic growth
since the mid-1970s after decades of decline, creating problems of growth in terms of
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providing adequate levels of employment, housing and community facilities. The
Western Isles, however, retains many of the characteristics of economic marginality:
out-migration, high unemployment, low incomes and an over-dependence on the
primary sector (Appendix 2).
These three areas, then, present LECs with contrasting challenges and the
research examines their capacity to develop distinctive local initiatives to address
these. In this way, the selection of study areas was guided by the basic aims of the
research. While they enable the relationship between economic diversity and
institutional 'sameness' (LECs have a common structure and remit) to be explored,
these areas do not fuction as conventional case studies. The thesis does not present
detailed comparisons of conditions within them.7 Rather, the three study areas have
been selected to provide representative coverage of local economic conditions within
the Highlands. The aim is to construct a general picture of LECs' capacity - given
their relations with HIE and central government - to address diverse local conditions.
Most of the empirical material relating to LECs was collected in Easter Ross, Skye
and Lochalsh and the Western Isles, though five of the remaining seven LEC areas
were visited and interviews conducted with a LEC official and a local authority officer
(Appendix 1.2). After the local research was completed, the study returned to the
regional level for a further round of interviews designed to re-assess regional actors'
perspectives on their relations with local agencies in the light of local findings
(Appendix 1.2).
The recruitment of respondents was based on 'theoretical' or 'purposeful'
sampling in which the concern is to establish contact with people in key positions who
can provide high-quality information and insights on the main research issues (Cook
and Crang, 1995; Baxter and Eyles, 1997: 513). This contrasts with conventional
approaches to sampling where the aim is to ensure that respondents are representative
so that statistical techniques can be used to generalise findings to the wider population
from which the sample is drawn. Initially, an introductory letter stating the nature of
the research and requesting permission to interview staff was sent to the Chief
Executive of HIE. A senior official responded, saying that while they would be
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pleased to assist the research and arrange an interview with a key official, demands on
their time meant that they could not promise any more.8 After visiting HIE to
interview the 'gatekeeping' official who replied to the initial letter and another official
who was later suggested, however, other people were identified who provided, in turn,
further contacts when interviewed.
Respondents were therefore recruited through a 'snowballing' strategy in the
sense that they were identified and approached as a result of the accumulation of
contacts during the course of the research. In contrast to the norms of quantitative
research where respondents are usually identified in advance, this reflects the
'qualitative logic' of much research based on interviews where research design is
revised and modified as the research proceeds (Sayer, 1992a). Establishing contacts
with LECs proved much easier, reflecting their 'front-line' role as service providers
and the fact that the researcher was able to state that he had already spoken to people
in HIE. A letter was sent to each LEC to be visited, stating the nature of the research
and the main areas of interest. They then selected the people to be interviewed on this
basis. It was not practical to identify 'external' respondents in advance: the 'right'
people to talk to could only be identified in the field after asking LEC and local
authority staff which businesses and community groups had recent involvement with
their organisations. Any danger of 'bias' that this practice introduced was contained,
however, by the need to interview people from the same groups and the knowledge of
key issues, individuals and groups produced by earlier readings of the corporate
literature and local press. It was important to maintain the structure of the research by
ensuring that people drawn from the same range of groups were interviewed in each of
the study areas (Appendix 1.1).
1.4.2 Interview Practices
The programme of semi-structured interviews involved the formulation of a
basic schedule of key topics to be covered. This took the form of a 'checklist' rather
than any standardised sequence of questions. There was no set order to the discussion
in order to allow flexibility and ensure that respondents were able to emphasis key
issues in their own terms. In this sense, each interview was unique. Yet schedules
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were designed so that the same range of topics were covered in interviews with
respondents drawn from the same groups (see Appendix 1.3). The use of schedules
was important since an unstructured format may have made it easier for respondents
who were highly articulate 'experts' accustomed to representing their organisation to
other agencies, the public and press to 'take over' the interview (Schoenberger, 1991:
182-3; Thomas, 1995: 10-11). A prepared list of topics made it easier for the
researcher to retain a measure of control in guiding the discussion. While interviewer
control can only ever be partial (McDowell, 1992), 9 the practice of following up
initial inquiries about a topic with more detailed and demanding questions enabled
respondents' claims to be critically examined. That said, it proved difficult in some
cases to get beyond public discourses, with some respondents consulting or even
reading from strategy documents and business plans during the interview.10 Efforts
were made to question these claims, but this can only be done gradually and subtly in
order not to appear overly hostile and avoid damaging the rapport that had been built
up. These difficulties reinforced the need to interview a range of respondents drawn
from different groups.
Another issue that emerged as the empirical research got underway stemmed
from a growing awareness of a linguistic and conceptual gap between the theoretical
categories framing the research and the priorities and concerns of respondents. As
Hirsch (1995: 77) observes, the concepts driving research are largely irrelevant to
organisational and business elites pre-occupied with immediate operational issues.
State agencies do not have "departments for contingent accumulation strategies" (see
Jones, 1996b: 22). This suggested a need to 'package' research questions and
objectives to make them appear relevant to respondents. One tactic adopted for getting
round this problem involved detailed readings of the corporate literature before the
interviews were conducted. The schedules that were then drawn up were structured by
analyses of both these official reports and the wider academic literature. What was
crucial was that specific interview questions were under-determined by underlying
theoretical categories and that these questions were couched in the operational
language used by respondents. Otherwise, the credibility of the research would have
been threatened as many of the suspicions that 'corporate' actors tend to have about the
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value and purpose of abstract academic research would have been confirmed.
Maintaining credibility demands that the researcher is able to translate
between academic and operational languages. For earlier interviews, after a number
of requests, the practice of sending suitably 'packaged' summary schedules to
respondents in advance was adopted. This was later abandoned, unless specifically
requested, because it was felt that it may, in some cases, have encouraged prepared
responses. While abstract theory is rarely of interest to organisational actors, the
broader policy issues addressed by research often are. Responses to interview
questions are not uniform, varying according to the positions, interests and
backgrounds of the individuals concerned. While all respondents answered questions
willingly, some showed more interest in the research, assuming a role as insider/ critic
by adopting a revelatory stance where they tell what 'really' goes on within the
network (Clark, 1998). These were often people who were either politically active or
in a position less bound up with the workings of operational procedures (members
rather than officials), giving them an awareness of, and the space to reflect on, broader
political issues. Quotes from these key interviews form much of the empirical material
contained in later chapters.
While the substantive material collected from interviews forms the main data
for this research, the process of data collection was clearly structured by a number of
'social' factors framing interaction within the interviews. The researcher's background
in the sense of being from the Highlands had some influence, though it is impossible
to state exactly how it affected the research. Certainly, respondents made
presumptions along the lines of'you're from a place like this, so you'll know ...'. In a
small number of cases, it helped gain access to particular actors and organisations,
though this was the exception rather than rule. But it did not generally provide
privileged access or insight, and perhaps encouraged a 'taken-for-grantedness' in the
sense of respondents not expanding upon certain sensitive issues because they
assumed prior knowledge while this researcher's 'local' background may have blocked
questioning of some familiar interests of local politics and culture.
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The interviews with institutional personnel were conducted in formal
workplace settings, often open-plan offices (sometimes more 'private' seminar rooms),
advantaging the respondent given the everyday familiarity of this environment. In
order to ensure credibility, it was important that the researcher appear knowledgable
about the key issues (Schoenberger, 1991; Thomas, 1995). In this sense, background
preparation was vital. Yet appearing too knowledgable would have been likely to
inhibit respondents and to create the impression that there was little of value they
could add. The 'presentation of self was cross-cut by a number of conflicting tactics.
Rarely were conscious decisions taken about how to appear; rather, interactions were
structured by the interaction of a number of intangible factors beyond the control of
either interviewer or respondent.
The intention was to record the interviews with institutional representatives. In
the majority of cases, after being assured that confidentiality was guaranteed,
respondents agreed to this." This allowed responses to be read and analysed in detail.
By contrast, the decision was taken not to record interviews with 'external'
representatives.12 This decision can be justified on a number of grounds. First, the
detail of the responses was less important for these interviews since the intention was
not to interrogate organisational narratives but rather to collect additional perspectives
and viewpoints on key aspects of LEC policy and practice. Second, it was often
necessary to ask about a particular groups' role and aims in order to establish a rapport
that enabled the researcher to ask respondents for their views on LECs, avoiding the
response of 'well, you'll have to ask them that'. Since this was not of intrinsic interest
to the research, it was less important to 'capture' the material on tape. Third, it was
felt that recording these interviews, usually conducted in less formal settings, might
prove intimidating to respondents lacking the formal resources of public authorities.
Moreover, the organisations they represented were often locked in contractual
relationships with LECs.
Throughout the thesis, quotes taken from un-recorded interviews are presented
in italicised form in order to distinguish them from quotes based on recorded
interviews.13 This reflects basic differences in the ways that these two forms of data
21
were collected and processed. While quotes taken from recorded interviews are based
on verbatim records of the respondents precise words, those constructed from
unrecorded materials tend to offer 'clipped' versions of respondents words (Cloke et
al., 1997) from which many of the nuances, ambiguities and hesitations have been
lost. Data was collected from unrecorded interviews through detailed note taking. The
use of a schedule of topics allowed the information to be written in transcript form
(separating interviewer questions from respondents replies), both in the interview and
immediately afterwards when the notes were expanded. These notes were then typed
up and coded in a similar fashion to the recorded interviews, though the differences
between excerpts based on recorded material and those constructed from notes were
bome in mind during the analysis of the data.
1.4.3 Coding and Analysis
The recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim from the tapes and the non-
recorded ones from the expanded notes.14 Following this time-consuming process, the
next stage was to code the data. Coding is a fairly standard procedure in the analysis
of qualitative data; indeed, some commentators fear that the influence of software
packages is turning code-and-retrieve approaches into an "emerging orthodoxy"
(Coffey et al., 1996: 9; also Weaver and Atkinson, 1994; Crang et al., 1997;
Hinchcliffe et al., 1997). In common with the experience ofmany novice researchers,
a sense of a gap was felt in terms of an uncertainty and anxiety about what should be
done after data had been collected (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; preface; Crang et al.,
1997). As Crang et al (1997: 781-2) reflect, the attractions of coding, to the novice
researcher at least, lie in its promise to fill this gap by producing a feeling of moving
systematically through the data, of producing tangible outputs at the end of a day's
work. After gradually becoming aware of the possibilities of computer software
packages (through everyday social contacts) to aid this process, it was decided to
utilise an appropriate package instead of relying on traditional 'tactile' methods
(Hinchcliffe et al., 1997). After early experimentation, the Ethnograph programme
was deemed unsuitable since its rigid and cumbersome procedures led to considerable
frustration. Efforts to begin coding at this relatively early stage when only the first
two rounds of data collection had been completed proved unsuccessful as the research
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became bogged down in an overly detailed series of codes and memos. Although
coding was rapidly overtaken by further 'rounds' of data collection and transcription,
this early analysis was useful in the sense of later informing full-scale analysis.
After this experience, it was decided to employ the Hyper-RESEARCH
programme to code the data. Like many qualitative analysis packages, Hyper-
RESEARCH is based on code-and-retrieval procedures (Seidel and Kelle, 1995;
Weaver and Atkinson, 1994; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 170-72; Coffey et al 1996;
Crang et al., 1997; Hinchcliffe et al., 1997). The deductive approach adopted
previously was rejected because the reliance on a hierarchical system of codes
appeared, on reflection, to be creating deterministic linkages between categories prior
to detailed analysis. It was therefore decided to develop a 'flat' coding scheme derived
from the data itself rather than underlying theoretical categories. Interview transcripts
were organised according to response group'5 (see Appendix 1.2) and read through in
detail. Key words referring to segments of text were then listed on a separate sheet on
paper for each interview before being aggregated to form a coding scheme for each
group of data. Each interview was then coded on screen using this scheme.
Another key decision concerned the levels of generality and specificity which
codes represent (Weaver and Atkinson, 1994; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 36-7). One
of the main problems with early attempts to code was that the categories used were
overly detailed. Consequently, the process was impeded by a dense empirical map of
codes and memos. With this in mind, the decision was taken to restrict initial coding
to a general level, attaching (multiple) codes to fairly large segments of text. One
reason for this was to retain the initial context. As a number of reviewers have
observed, coding employs a logic of decontextualisation before recontextualisation
(Weaver and Atkinson, 1994; Dey, 1995; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 28-9; Coffey et
al., 1996; Hinchcliffe et al., 1997: 1118-1119). That is, segments of texts are extracted
from their original context (the interview) and placed in a new context alongside
similarly coded segments. Essentially, this new context "constitutes a juxtaposed set
of related excerpts" (Hinchcliffe et al, 1997: 1118). Analysis then proceeds by
examining and contrasting the juxtaposed segments. Concern has been expressed that
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the assumptions embedded in code-and-retrieve packages like Hyper-RESEARCH
privilege this 'meaning-through-comparison' over the 'meaning-in-context' approach
traditionally privileged by the ethnographic imagination (Dey, 1995; Hinchcliffe et
al., 1997: 1118-1220).16
In order to minimise these dangers and retain an element of the original
context, data was only retrieved by codes attached to lengthy segments. In addition,
the original transcripts were kept and referred to during analysis as well as coding.
While codes were attached at a fairly general level, the great advantage of Hyper-
RESEARCH over Ethnograph is its flexibility, meaning that coding assignations can
easily be changed. As Seidel has emphasised, codes are heuristic devices which refer
to certain features of the data rather than direct representations of phenomena (Seidel,
1991; Seidel and Kelle, 1995). As such, they are not intrinsic to the data but artefacts
of the relationship between researcher and data. Yet the contradiction between the
dynamic nature of this relationship and the static function of codes creates tensions,
requiring that coding procedures are flexible (Weaver and Atkinson, 1994). The
flexibility of Hyper-RESEARCH meant that codes could be modified and finned up
as more interviews were coded. One particularly important aspect of this concerned
the need to modify code assignations after procedures for retrieval had been
explored.17
Although codes were attached at the general level, the material retrieved under
key codes18 was then subject to secondary coding. This involved developing sub-codes
and attaching these to the data collected under primary codes. This process was
informed by the basic principle of juxtaposing related excerpts in order to facilitate
'meaning-through-comparison'. Secondary coding was necessary in order to avoid the
dangers of a vague and undetailed analysis created by the decision to carry out
primary coding at a general level (Weaver and Atkinson, 1994: 32). The capacity to
do this is another advantage that Hyper-RESEARCH enjoys over competing
packages. It also claims to go beyond coding and retrieval by offering a hypothesis-
testing function. The decision not to use this reflects a suspicion of its underlying
epistemological assumptions. The hypothesis-testing facility relies upon the
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unsustainable assumption that the co-occurrence of codes within a segment of text can
be used to infer a substantive relationship between two phenomena (Coffey and
Atkinson, 1996: 180-1). It provides (at best) a useful heuristic tool to aid analysis by
exploring and summarising the data rather than some kind of electronic substitute for
such analysis.
It is implicit in much of the above that coding itself is not analysis; rather, the
key purpose of coding is to facilitate and structure analysis (Weaver and Atkinson,
1994: 30-31). For, as Coffey and Atkinson (1996:26-7) argue, the important analytical
work lies in developing and examining linkages and connections within the data rather
than the process of coding itself. The benefits of software packages like Hyper-
RESEARCH, then, lie not in their capacity to 'do' the analysis but in their ability to
retrieve coded material more rapidly and efficiently than traditional manual methods
(Crang et al., 1997: 777). Analysis is an inherently interpretative task that relies upon
researchers' disciplinary knowledge and their capacity to utilise the theoretical
categories driving the research. For this project, the aim was to pull out common
themes and relationships from the empirical detail.
While coding procedures divide data largely according to its content, its form
was also of interest. There is a long-standing division in interview analysis between
those who regard interview texts as neutral representations of underlying phenomena
(the externalist position) and those who regard them as artefacts of the social
encounter between interviewer and respondent (the internalist position) (Silverman,
1993: 90-114). As Pratt (1995: 69) argues, however, critical realists are interested in
both the form and content of qualitative data, in how things are said as well as what is
said. This follows from the basic realist position that holds to the notion of an
independent 'reality' but contends that it can only be known through specific linguistic
and discursive practices. Thus, contrary to the assumptions of many postmodernists,
an attention to discourse and rhetoric is not antithetical to critical realism though
forms of discourse analysis that deny the existence of any causal mechanisms outside
the text may be (Sayer, 1992b; Pratt, 1995: 70).
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One problem stemming from the coding procedures adopted was data
multiplication. The strategy of attaching multiple codes to large segments of data (so
as to retain context) meant that the same segments were collected under several
different codes. As a result, 1800 pages of data had been accumulated by the time
coding and retrieval was complete. This proved to be less of a problem than it
appeared, however, since the deep familiarity with the data accumulated from several
'encounters' and the format which it was now in (relevant segments stored under
primary codes) enabled the most important passages to be extracted after rapid
comparison. Extensive data reduction took place at this late stage in the research
process (all data was retained in original (transcript) form).
Through the adoption of a 'key quotes in context' approach (Pratt, 1995: 71),
the 1800 pages were reduced to a series of significant excerpts stored under the
analytically significant primary codes. These quotes were then subjected to detailed
examination and comparison focusing on their underlying assumptions and rhetorical
effects in addition to what they were saying about 'external' phenomena. The selection
of quotes was guided by a number of factors: their significance in addressing key
research questions and issues; the desire to present a range of perspectives on these
issues; whether or not they can be linked to underlying theoretical categories; and how
they relate to findings of similar research. The quote that introduces the thesis (p.l),
for instance, was selected because it sets up the main research issues (without
answering them), offers an insider/critic's perspective on this fundamental issue and is
closely related to arguments developed by critical research on TECs (Peck, 1992,
1993, Peck and Jones, 1995; Jones, 1997a). In this sense, research invariably appeals
to a wider 'interpretative community' (Baxter and Eyles, 1997: 509). But to avoid the
dangers of 'normal science' in the sense of research remaining within existing
paradigms, it is important that the empirical material be used to question underlying
theoretical assumptions (Lovering, 1996). In this way, the inductive 'moment' of
intensive research can be used to advance the research agenda (Sayer, 1992a).
While this involved a movement from data to theory, however, it did not
follow the precepts of 'grounded theory'. For, as Yeung (1997: 61-4) shows, the
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epistemological assumptions informing grounded theory are antithetical to those of
critical realism. What the detailed open coding that grounded theory relies upon tends
to produce is not 'theory' but a dense map of empirical categories grounded in the data
(Yeung, 1997: 63). It also seems to assume that theory only emerges after data has
been collected and coded when these tasks are invariably structured by theoretical and
philosophical preconceptions, whether or not the researcher is fully aware of these. In
this sense, the analytical procedures of qualitative sociology amount to little more
than naive empiricism in a fresh guise. By contrast, critical realist research is informed
by prior theorisation aiming to identify important relationships and issues, (Sayer,
1992a; Yeung, 1997: 58-61). On-going conceptualisation should provide the ideas to
guide interpretation of the empirical material in particular. Reflections on regulation
theory and state theory were in practice intertwined with detailed fieldwork.
At the same time, theoretical categories did not determine the course of the
research and premature 'closure' to the diversity of field materials was averted. Indeed,
the thesis aims to question these categories, reflecting respondents' comments back on
them in an effort to enhance the methodological integrity of the research. It has not,
however, used 'respondent validation' (Baxter and Eyles, 1997) in the sense of feeding
draft chapters and findings back to HIE and LECs for comment, though it has been
informed by comments from a contact within the HIE network on an informal level.
Submitting writings for comments was not a condition of access and the critical aims
of the research led to a wariness about involving HIE and LECs in the production of
the thesis.
1.5 Structure and Contents of the Thesis
This introductory chapter has outlined the research focus and methodology. It
has introduced governance as the key research 'object'; set up the research objectives
and research questions; outlined the research design; and considered important
methodological issues. Chapter two 'steps back' from this immediate research focus to
consider how recent theoretical debates inform the thesis. It reviews regulation theory
and neo-Gramscian state theory, concluding that despite recent advances both these
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approaches remain under-developed in terms of their capacity to inform and structure
analyses of local governance. Consequently, work on govemmentality is introduced in
an effort to develop a new conceptual synthesis. Chapter three focuses on the broader
historical context, viewing HIE as the latest in a series of institutional 'solutions' to the
Highland 'problem'. It traces the construction of the Highlands as a 'problem' region
before considering the policies and practices of the HIDB in more detail.
Chapter four assesses the impact of Thatcherism on the local state in the
Highlands. It explains the shift from the HIDB to HIE as a product of the interaction
between Thatcherism as political strategy and the pre-existing structure of regional
governance (including the Scottish Office as well as the HIDB). The chapter argues
that crucial changes occurred in the early-to-mid 1980s as the HIDB adapted to the
new political climate, creating the conditions for the later establishment of HIE. The
key change which the latter involved was the creation of LECs and the chapter argues
that this created major tensions between local empowerment and central control. In
focusing on the shaping of power relations within the HIE Network since 1991,
chapter five then examines how this tension has been worked out. Whilst it argues that
the Network is actually more centralised than was originally envisaged, the chapter
draws attention to the capacity of regional and local actors to 'translate' central
priorities and points to the important continuities linking the HIDB and HIE.
Chapter six considers the dynamics of 'partnership' and inter-organisational
relations in the Highlands, emphasising how these are structured by tensions between
HIE-LECs and local authorities which, in turn, reflect the broader patterns of state
restructuring. Chapter seven addresses questions of accountability. While chapter five
emphasised accountability to central government, chapter seven focuses on local
political accountability. It reviews the measures that HIE and LECs have taken to
address criticism, arguing that while LECs remain unaccountable to local
communities, their accessibility in offering resources and support generates a level of
legitimacy that allows effective operation. Chapter eight offers a general conclusion,




1 LEC director, interview 7.7.97.
2 This geological metaphor is, of course, associated with Doreen Massey's work on
industrial restructuring which argued that places were produced through the
combination of successive 'layers' of investment (Massey, 1984).
3
Jessop's labelling of this process as one of de-statisation depends on his state-centred
approach. From a different perspective, these changes can be seen in terms of a
governmentalisation of diverse organisations and practices as a range of non-state
(private and voluntary) actors are drawn into policy regimes (see Rose, 1996a; Rose
and Miller, 1992).
4 This was argued in a speech by William Waldegrave, then directly responsible for
public services as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in 1993 (cited in Stewart,
1995: 48).
5 In this sense, criticisms of critical realism as a totalising philosophy rest on a basic
misunderstanding, reflecting the way in which it has become implicated within
postmodernist critiques of scientific discourse. Critical realism makes its claims at an
ontological rather than epistemological level (Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997).
6 This is not to claim that interviews offer a privileged access to 'Truth' but simply to
say that they allow respondents to state their 'truth' (see Baxter and Eyles, 1997: 515).
7 Sections 6.4 and 7.4 present the only exceptions to this statement as they present
some comparative material on inter-organisational relations in the different local
(LEC) areas visited.
s These early difficulties seemed to reflect the position ofmost researchers conducting
'corporate interviews' as supplicants "requesting time and expertise from the powerful,
with little to offer in return" (McDowell, 1992: 213; also Thomas, 1995: 7).
9 Even if attainable, full 'control' would be undesirable as it would prevent
respondents from introducing new topics of interest.
10 Thomas (1995) suggests that it is important to decide in advance which persona of
the person to be interviewed is the focus, arguing that is important to separate the
individual from their position and role as official representative in order to get beyond
formal corporate scripts and prepared responses.
"
Only three out of forty-three people from public organisations who were
interviewed refused to be recorded. Four were interviewed twice (see Appendix 2).
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Although two of the interviews with business personnel were recorded, a decision
shaped by the circumstances of the interview. In total, just under two-thirds of the
interviews were recorded (forty-three out of seventy).
13 To ensure confidentiality, quotes are matched with respondents through response
groups (HIE, local authorities, etc.) rather than name. Where the note lists multiple
sources, the quote is always taken from first one listed. Other sources, always prefixed
by 'also', are listed to provide additional support for the particular point that is being
made.
14
Tape recordings and full transcripts of the interviews are available for consultation.
13 An analytic decision was taken to organise the material for analysis by response
29
group rather than by 'rounds' of data collection. This was based on a need to ensure
commonalties between the transcripts contained within these groups. Since
respondents from the same response groups were asked similar questions, it made
sense to organise the material on that basis rather than being constrained by the
relatively arbitrary order in which the data was collected.
16 For this reason, a number of recent reviews have identified packages based on
hyper-text as the way forward, arguing that their capacity to move through materials
(texts, artefacts, visual materials) leaves them closer to the "narrative culture" of
traditional ethnography (Weaver and Atkinson, 1994; Hinchcliffe et al., 1997: 121;
also Coffey et al., 1996).
17 For instance, it was anticipated that some segments would be retrieved by
combinations of two codes. Attempts to do this demonstrated, however, the
unsatisfactory nature of the Boolean searches as the 'and' command invariably selected
all instances of each code rather than just the combinations. While the resultant
duplication was dealt with in this first group of data to be retrieved by simple cut and
paste operations, later interviews were not coded in this way.
18 Not all the codes developed in the original coding schemes were used to retrieve
data. Only those that were of theoretical significance, usually those relating to aspects
of institutional practice and strategy rather than background economic processes, were




Conceptualising Rural Governance: Recent Debates on Regulation,
Governmentality and the State
2.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies and outlines the main theoretical perspectives which
inform this thesis's analysis of the HIE network. It concentrates on three perspectives:
the regulation approach, neo-Gramscian state theory and governmentality theory. The
aim is to not only situate the thesis within a wider literature, but also to develop a
conceptual framework in order to inform the analysis of local governance in the
Scottish Highlands. While a number of recent studies of local and regional governance
draw upon a synthesis of the regulation approach and neo-Gramscian state theory
(Jessop 1997b, d; Jones 1997a, b, 1998b; MacLeod 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin,
1999), the potential contributions of govemmentality theories have received less
attention. One of the original contributions of this research is to broaden the synthesis
to include certain aspects of governmentality theory, arguing that these provide
analytical purchase on the concrete practices and mechanisms deployed by state
agencies to regulate local economies. Another key contribution is to apply this
integrated approach to the study of rural governance.
The selection of these three approaches can only be fully justified through the
course of the thesis, as 'theory' and empirical material are worked together. Yet the
influence of the recent 'institutional turn' in encouraging a merging and blurring of
distinct approaches (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998: 8), points to the importance of
clarity and rigour in showing how particular theoretical perspectives are relevant to
particular research problems (cf. Jessop 1995b). One key principle guiding selection is
the need to situate the rise of local governance within the context of wider political-
economic shifts. Various regime and 'growth machine' theories which concentrate on
the internal dynamics of coalition-building and political mobilisation in urban arenas
to the exclusion of external articulations with broader political and economic
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structures are therefore not discussed here. Neither are 'socioeconomic' or 'new
regionalist' approaches which, in focusing on the extra-economic conditions for
regional development in a global economy (Arnin and Thrift 1994a, b, 1995; Storper,
1995, 1997), neglect the impact of state restructuring and uneven territorial
development (Raco, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998, 1999).
The next section reviews recent work on the structuring of rural space.
Subsequent sections review the regulation approach, neo-Gramscian state theory and
governmentality theory in turn, considering how they might be operationalised and
'put to work' in research on local state restructuring and economic governance in the
Scottish Highlands.
2.2 Revisiting the Rural State
The influence of the 'cultural turn' in re-defining the research agenda in rural
geography has seen political economy approaches lose much of their earlier
prominence (Cloke et al., 1994; Cloke 1997; Cloke and Little 1997). In the mid-to-
late 1990s, cultural analyses of power, meaning and identity arguably represent the
'cutting-edge' of critical research in the sub-discipline. Reflecting an increasing
concern with "difference and division in the countryside" (Murdoch and Pratt, 1997:
66), a number of studies have sought to document processes of marginalisation or
'othering' (see Philo, 1992; Cloke and Little, 1997; Cloke, 1997). This section
contends that there is, however, a need to re-visit work on political restructuring and
the 'rural state' inspired by political economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Cloke,
1989; Day et al., 1989; Cloke and Little, 1990; Cloke and Goodwin, 1992). It argues
that re-focusing on these questions in the light of the 'cultural turn' and recent re-
workings of regulation and state theories can generate insights into the politics of rural
governance.
One central theme of recent critical rural geographies is the notion of rurality
as socially constructed (Mormont, 1990; Halfacree 1993; Cloke et al., 1994;
Shucksmith 1994; Bryden 1994; Woods, 1997a). In contrast to traditional descriptive
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and functional approaches, rurality is seen as a symbolic resource mobilised by social
groups and actors in struggles over power and identity. Rather than naturalising the
rural as the site of orderly and harmonious social relations, recent research has
stressed how different groups construct rurality in different ways as they struggle to
contest and transform existing power relations. This concern with social divisions
within rural localities echoes Massey's (1991) view of place as constructed from the
convergence of contradictory social relations. Although clearly informed by the post-
structuralist desire to deconstruct established meanings (Cloke et al., 1994) as well as
postmodernism's privileging of the symbolic over the material (Halfacree, 1993), the
emphasis on social construction also stems from empirical research documenting the
transformation of 'traditional' rural communities by affluent incomers in search of a
'rural idyll' (Forsyth 1980; Cloke and Thrift, 1987; Cloke and Milbourne, 1992; Cloke
et al, 1995, 1997; Thrift 1987; Mormont 1990; Phillips, 1993; Murdoch and Marsden,
1994; Jedrej andNuttall, 1996).
One focus of interest inspired by political economy approaches in the late
1980s and early 1990s was the state (Day et al., 1989; Cloke and Little, 1990; Cloke
and Goodwin, 1992). For instance, Day et al's account of the role of the state in
managing economic and social restructuring in rural Wales drew heavily upon
Massey's (1984) concept of'rounds of investment'; Cloke and Little's (1990) analysis
of the rural state is informed by the Marxist distinction between the form, function
and apparatuses of the state; and Cloke and Goodwin's (1992) more general
examination of political and economic restructuring draws on a blend of regulation
theory and Harvey's (1985) work on 'structured coherence'. Cloke and Little's (1990)
study represents the most systematic examination of the role of the state in structuring
economic and social relations in rural areas (Goodwin, 1998a). While drawing upon
Marxist theory at an abstract level, their account is also structured by Duncan and
Goodwin's (1988) conception of the local state as both agent of and obstacle to the
centre. Although much of the activity of the local state is orientated towards adapting
service delivery to local needs, its wider representative role means that it can be
'captured' by local groups whose interests may clash with those of the centre (Duncan
and Goodwin, 1988). Cloke and Little (1990: 76-87) rejected the idea of a distinct
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rural local state but noted the broad similarities in political forms in rural areas in
terms of an underlying conservatism, relatively harmonious relations with the centre
and paternalistic power structures. They focused on the planning process in particular,
stressing how this tended to be colonised by dominant interests, and concluding that
constraints on participation appeared to increase as policy was transmitted from the
centre to the locality (Cloke and Little, 1990: 252-54).
Although limited by its reliance on a conceptual framework rooted in 1970s
Marxist state theory, Cloke and Little's account contains valuable insights. Its
sensitivity to the tendency for patterns of representation to reflect unequal social
relations anticipates recent re-workings of state theory (Jessop, 1990b, 1997b; Jones
1997a; MacLeod 1997b; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998, 1999). Patterns of
representation were changing as incoming middle-class fractions sought to colonise
institutions previously dominated by agricultural interests (Cloke and Goodwin, 1992;
Murdoch and Marsden, 1994). In this way, processes of economic restructuring and
social recomposition were leading to the formation of new hegemonic blocs in the
countryside. One key result of these changes, stemming from the weakening of
national frameworks of agricultural regulation in particular, is that of 'local
differentiation' as rural places are increasingly forced to manage their own
development trajectories (Marsden et al., 1993).
In an effort to capture this emerging diversity, Marsden et al., (1993: 187-90)
introduce four 'ideal type' categories. First, the 'preserved countryside' refers to high-
status areas where incoming middle-class fractions have been successful in protecting
their amenities. Second, the 'contested countryside' defines areas where middle-class
incomers are challenging the priorities of productionist interests. In the 'paternalistic'
countryside, these agricultural elites retain hegemony whereas the 'clientelistic'
countryside refers to remote areas where development remains a key priority,
reflecting the influence of productionist and welfarist ideologies in exerting pressure
for state intervention to protect local communities (Marsden et al., 1993: 187-90).
One key way in which earlier work on the rural state and changing forms of
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representation can be linked to current research agendas is through a focus on rural
governance (see Journal ofRural Studies, 1998, 14.1). Institutional arrangements for
governing rural space are becoming increasingly complex as the growth of unelected
'quangos' and multi-agency partnerships raises questions about the role of elected
local authorities (Marsden and Murdoch, 1998; Goodwin, 1998a; Woods, 1998). In
addition, the EU is becoming increasingly active in funding and managing
development programmes (Ward and McNicholas, 1998). The emerging interest in
governance reflects a concern with co-ordinating relations between key institutional
actors (Jessop, 1995a, 1997b, 1998a; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker 1998; Goodwin 1998a).
Goodwin (1998a) sets out a preliminary research agenda, arguing that studies should
focus on questions of power, looking at how the shift to governance is mediated
locally by specifically rural (agrarian and landed) fonns of power and influence and
asking what underlying interests and agendas are privileged by dominant forms of
representation. There is also a series of questions related to how emerging forms of
governance are articulated with underlying patterns of uneven development in an
'differentiating countryside' (Marsden et al., 1993; Goodwin, 1998a).
This section has reviewed some key themes of recent rural research, arguing
that there is a need to revisit some of the ground covered by political economy
approaches in the late 1980s and early 1990s in order to re-assess key questions in the
light of current theoretical concerns. In particular, linking research on the rural state to
work on contested constructions of rurality raises important issues about how state
institutions represent different groups. These can be linked to questions about the role
of state agencies in regulating and governing rural space, in particular whether
institutional practices tend to privilege some interests over others (Jessop, 1997b).
2.3 The Regulation Approach
Rather than forming a single coherent theory, the regulation approach (RA) is
best characterised as an on-going research programme rooted in Marxist political
economy (Jessop, 1990a; Tickell and Peck, 1992). The original Parisian regulationists
focused on the problem of macro-economic stabilisation, exemplified by Aglietta's
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pioneering study of the post-war American economy (Aglietta, 1979). In the mid-to-
late 1980s, regulation theory became highly influential in economic geography as
researchers sought to explain the growth of 'flexible' forms of production (Gertler,
1988, 1992; Harvey 1989; Harvey and Scott, 1989; Scott 1988; Schoenberger, 1988).
Yet whilst these accounts of a shift from Fordism to post-Fordism deployed the
language and concepts of the RA, their neglect of key methodological principles led to
a reliance upon dualistic impositions and 'ideal types' (see below) (Hay, 1995). At the
same time, the substantive claims of this 'derivationist' literature (Hay, 1995: 387)
have been undermined by recurring economic difficulties, encouraging the adoption of
a more reflexive approach in the mid-to-late 1990s (MacLeod, 1999: 3-4).
Researchers have sought to re-state underlying methodological principles in
order to prise regulationism away from the Fordism/ post-Fordism debate, re-casting it
as a framework for analysing institutional relationships across a range of spatial scales
(Boyer, 1990; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Peck and Tickell 1995a; Hay 1995; Jones,
1997a; MacLeod, 1997b). Associated with this re-working is a greater concern with
the role of the state and the geography of regulation, allied to an awareness of its
provisional and contested nature (Hay and Jessop, 1995: 305).1 This shift of focus
from issues of macro-economic stabilisation to local spaces of regulation raises
important questions about the utility and scope of the RA. For Jones (1997b: 832), it
highlights the regulationist enigma: the difficulty of using regulationist concepts
developed to explain national change to theorise local transformations. According to
Jessop (1995b; 1997b), the RA is best interpreted as offering 'plausible
contextualisation' of local change rather than direct explanation. Consequently, I
argue that integration with other approaches is required and present neo-Gramscian
state theory and govemmentality theory as the sources of integration in the context of
this research project. The regulationist enigma can only be overcome by movement
beyond the confines of the RA.
Regulation theory emerged as a distinctive branch of Marxist political
economy in the mid-to-late 1970s in response to the perceived inability of existing
economic paradigms to explain the uneven historical and geographical development
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of capitalism. The original regulationists sought to define a middle-ground between
the neo-classical mainstream, with its formalistic conception of general equilibrium
and its concomitant neglect of social relations, and the structural rigidities of French
Marxism (Aglietta, 1979; Jones, 1997a; MacLeod 1997b). In particular, they sought to
develop a conception of integral economics that views economic objects as embedded
within broader social, cultural and institutional formations (Jessop, 1995a; 1997b).
Informed by Marx's analysis of the accumulation process, regulation theorists focused
on the question of how, given its inherent tendencies towards crisis, capitalism
continues to survive (Boyer, 1990: 34). They sought to develop a greater sensitivity to
contingency and variation over both time and space.
Two intermediate concepts assume a key role in regulationist accounts of
capitalist development: the regime ofaccumulation (RoA) and the mode of regulation
(MoR) (Lipietz, 1986, 1992; Boyer 1990; Tickell and Peck 1992; Jones 1997a;
MacLeod 1997b). A regime of accumulation refers to a "macroeconomically coherent
phase of capitalist development" (Tickell and Peck, 1992: 192). It is formed from the
'structural coupling' between modes of regulation and accumulation systems.2 The
latter refers to a relationship between production and consumption which ensures that
investments advanced by individual capitalists are met with sufficient demand in the
market-place (Tickell and Peck, 1992). Crucially, however, this relationship is
dependent upon the institutionalisation of a range of social norms, habits and practices
(Lipietz, 1986: 19). Regulationists argue that these tend to become consolidated into a
mode of regulation which, through its links with a corresponding accumulation
system, structures a regime of accumulation within which capitalism is reproduced.
(Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1986; Jessop 1990b; 1992a). This 'institutional fix' is unable
to fully contain the contradictions of capitalism in the longer-term, however, leading
to periods of structural crisis as the regulatory possibilities of particular regimes are
finally exhausted (Boyer, 1990; Peck and Tickell, 1995a: 21-24).
The key notion is that the expanded reproduction of capitalism is never
guaranteed, but depends upon a range of social nonns and institutional practices
(Boyer, 1990; Goodwin et al., 1995). In contrast to the neo-classical emphasis on
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market exchange and the Marxist focus on the value fonn of capital, regulationists
draw attention to the role of extra-economic mechanisms in co-ordinating and
stabilising economic processes. As Jessop (1995a: 316) puts it, whilst both neo¬
classical and Marxist analyses concentrate on the economic mode of economic
regulation, regulation theory has, since Aglietta (1979), been primarily concerned
with the social mode of economic regulation.3 Although often interpreted as referring
to processes of administrative rule-making, the concept of regulation more properly
refers to processes of regularisation or normalisation through which individual
subjects are constituted by institutional practices (Jessop, 1995a: 309; 1997a).4 It is
through such extra-economic mechanisms that individual agents internalise regulatory
principles and norms (Boyer, 1990). Thus, the RA rejects the orthodox conception of
pre-constituted economic actors driven by rational choice considerations, insisting that
the subjects of regulation are constituted through the regulatory process itself. It relies
upon notions of regularisation to explain how macro-economic coherences can emerge
from a multiplicity of decentralised decisions.
Arguably, many of these principles were lost as regulationist concepts filtered
into geographical research during the 1980s. Characteristically, regulation theory was
used as conceptual anchor for claims that a new regime of'flexible accumulation' was
emerging to replace post-war Fordism (Gertler, 1988, 1992; Harvey 1989a; Harvey
and Scott, 1989; Scott, 1988; Schoenberger, 1988). Such accounts tended to be
grounded in analyses of production, often focusing on changes in the labour process
and technological systems and drawing upon the experience of 'archetypal' regions
like the 'Third Italy' and Silicon Valley. In claiming that these changes represented
key principles of a new economic order, post-Fordist writers were guilty of serious
over-generalisation (Gertler 1988; 1991; Sayer, 1989; Amin and Robins, 1990). In
regulationist tenns, the tendency to privilege accumulation over regulation lost sight
of the importance of 'structural coupling' between the two processes. Accounts of
flexible production were therefore unable to satisfy criteria for identifying coherent
regimes of accumulation (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Peck and Tickell 1994a, 1995a).
The association between regulation theory and studies of post-Fordism has led
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many to reject regulationist analysis (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991; Murdoch, 1995). In
particular, the charge of functionalism has been levelled by critics who cite accounts
of post-Fordism as evidence of a tendency for the norms and practices of regulation to
be determined by the requirements of the accumulation system (Hirst and Zeitlin,
1991; Bonefeld and Holloway, 1991; Hay, 1995; Murdoch, 1995). Against this,
however, regulationists have insisted that relationships between particular
accumulation systems and modes of regulation are contingent, arguing that co-
stabilisation occurs through 'chance discoveries' within a context of continuing social
struggle (Lipietz, 1986; Boyer, 1990). From this perspective, recent neo-liberal
strategies are viewed as part of a process of regulatory experimentation as dominant
social forces search for a new 'institutional fix' (Jones, 1997a). Rather than
representing the solution to underlying economic difficulties, the ascendancy of neo-
liberal strategies is seen as part of the problem, reflecting a failure to develop
sustainable regulatory structures (Peck and Tickell, 1992, 1994a, 1995a; Jones,
1997a). Despite this important clarification, however, the RA's neglect of politics and
the state leaves it vulnerable to related charges of functionalism and economic
determinism (Jenson, 1990; Hay, 1995). The problems of deploying regulationist
concepts in studies of local transformation highlight these issues.
Regulationist concepts have been utilised to relate recent changes in the local
government system to the apparent shift towards post-Fordism (Stoker, 1989; Stoker
and Mossberger, 1995). However, this approach's lack of mid-level concepts to
mediate between micro and macro-levels and its inadequate treatment of local politics
means that it tends to 'read off local change from macro-structural shifts, thus
exemplifying the regulationist enigma (see Jones, 1997b: 838-41). Stoker sees the
transformation of the local state as a part of the Thatcherite response to the demands
of economic change. His construction of a typology of local government 'responses'
to restructuring, ranging from "early adherents", through "pragmatic compliers" and
"critical compliers" to "late adopters" (Stoker and Mossberger, 1995: 221),
demonstrates a conception of change as uni-directional and determining, leaving little
scope for local actors to resist and translate central strategies (Jones, 1997b). What is
clearly missing is an appreciation of the politics of local change. There is little
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consideration of how the transformation of the local state has been the subject of
struggle and contestation, and of how the dialectic between such struggles and central
policies produces uneven development, giving different outcomes in different places
(Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Jones, 1997b: 838-839).
Another influential approach to the spatialisation of regulation theory has been
developed by a group of Manchester geographers (Peck and Tickell 1992, 1995a;
Jones 1997b). Drawing upon research on industrial restructuring and uneven
development (Massey, 1984; Harvey, 1985; Allen and Massey, 1988), Peck and
Tickell develop the concept of local modes of social regulation. These are
distinguished by their "unique position within wider (national and international)
structures of accumulation and regulation" (Peck and Tickell, 1995a: 27). Peck and
Tickell argue that the 'regulatory deficit' of south-east England, reflecting the
contradictions of uneven development under Thatcherism, was a key factor behind the
region's eventual collapse in the recession of the early 1990s (Peck and Tickell
1995a). This regulatory failure is seen as symptomatic of the inability of neo-liberal
strategies to achieve sustainable long-term regulation such that a coherent 'regime of
accumulation' stabilises. While this approach represents an ambitious effort to extend
the scope of the RA, the focus on the effect of central strategies upon the region leads
to a neglect of the role of local institutions and actors in translating and delivering
these strategies (MacLeod, 1997b: 541). Again, there is little consideration of the
complex and contradictory politics of local transformation. Other recent contributions
suggest, however, a way out of these difficulties.
As part of an effort to re-work the RA as method, Painter and Goodwin (1995)
trace accusations of functionalism to the concept of mode of regulation, noting that:
The term 'mode' is often understood as implying a completed system rather than one in the
process of formation ... the notion of modes of regulation overemphasises the functionality,
stability and coherence of regulatory relations and underemphasises change, conflict and
development during their period of operation (Painter and Goodwin, 1995: 340).
As Goodwin and co-researchers noted earlier, the overwhelming concern with the co-
stabilisation of modes of regulation and accumulation systems at the national level is
associated with the (implicit) assumption that regulatory practices are
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unproblematically translated into local action (Goodwin et al., 1993: 69). The
complexity of current structures of local governance has already been emphasised
(Chapter One: 5-14), and any assumption that the activities of the cluster of local,
regional, national and supranational institutions somehow cohere into stable local
modes of regulation is problematic. Painter and Goodwin (1995) prefer to stress
regulation as process, as a set ofmaterial and discursive practices that 'ebb and flow'
through time and space. Such a concern with practice, they argue, brings geography
centre-stage. Since regulation consists of the "contingent interaction" of a range of
practices grounded in particular local contexts, it is geographically constituted (Painter
and Goodwin, 1995: 342). While local state agencies may well act as channels
through which national regulatory priorities are "interpreted and ultimately delivered"
(Goodwin et al., 1993: 69; Goodwin and Painter, 1996: 645), the notion of regulation
as process constituted through practice directs attention towards the role of
institutional cultures, conventions and discourses in structuring and mediating such
interpretation. Given that local practices, struggles and conflicts are inherently
discursive, the incorporation of the key notion of discourse, hitherto neglected by
regulationists, becomes essential (Painter and Goodwin, 1995: 346).
One of the key merits of the RA is that it enables changes in the economy to
be linked to changing social, cultural and political relations (Goodwin et al., 1995:
1249). Given that, in conventional approaches, the mode of regulation provides the
crucial link between the economic and the extra-economic, Painter and Goodwin's
rejection of this concept requires that the relationship be reconceptualised. Again, this
involves re-stating some of the original principles of the RA in order to avoid the
reductionist tendencies of post-Fordist approaches. As Painter and Goodwin (1995:
338) argue, the regulation approach reverses the 'causal arrow' of classical Marxism.
Rather than relying upon a mode of explanation in which the economic base is seen as
driving the development of the political 'superstructure', it focuses on how economic
relations are conditioned by a range of social, political and cultural forces. Thus, the
economy is identified as the object of regulation in the sense that regulatory
institutions evolve particular mechanisms for intervening in the economic sphere in
order to support the process of economic development. One implication of this
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arrangement of explanandum and explanans is that since the local state functions
largely as a key institutional site for the regulation of the economy, changes in its
organisation fall outwith the explanatory scope of the RA (Painter and Goodwin,
1995: 338, 347). This reinforces the claim that the latter's aims are actually rather
modest (Goodwin and Painter, 1996: 640), pointing to the need to draw upon other
perspectives able to explain local state restructuring more adequately.
The generally anti-functionalist stance adopted by this emerging 'new'
regulationism involves the view that the process of regulation is constitutive of the
(economic) objects of regulation (Jessop, 1997b; 60). As part of a broader research
agenda concerned with the discursive construction of economic space (Daly, 1991;
Leyshon and Tickell 1994), this principle directs empirical attention towards the
construction of local economies as objects of regulation by local institutions and
agencies. Again, this has been neglected by regulationist analyses. Jones (1997b: 843-
4) notes that despite the growing interest in regulation at the local level, researchers
tend to take the 'local' for granted as an object of analysis, failing to demonstrate why
local economies seem to have become more important as targets for intervention.
Explaining the rise of this strategic localism as part of a broader 'relativisation of
scale' (Chapter one: 6-7) requires a greater sensitivity to the political and strategic
calculations of state institutions struggling to respond to the challenges of economic
development after Fordism. Jessop has recently begun to examine these issues,
arguing that institutional intervention depends upon the complex web of intra-local
and extra-local networks and relations being transformed into "a real space amenable
to regulation" (Jessop, 1997b: 61). Economic strategies and economic discourses are
closely related, since it is only through the latter that problems can be identified and
policies pursued (Jessop, 1997d). Consequently, particular development strategies
depend upon particular constructions of local economies. Within this 'real' economic
space, intervention is strategically selective: particular objects (firms, sectors, places)
are targeted as development priorities.
This section has reviewed the principles and trajectory of the RA, arguing that
recent efforts to re-work regulationism as method provide a way out of the problems
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of regulationist analysis. These offer a set of guiding principles for concrete research
on local governance rather than direct forms of causal explanation. They include the
emphasis on regulation as a contested process rather than a completed structure; the
importance of distinguishing between the objects and agents of regulation; and the
related view that such objects are constituted through the process of regulation.
However, the increased awareness of the limits of the RA that recent contributions
have brought (Jessop, 1995b; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Jones, 1997a) leads to the
view the regulationist enigma can only be overcome by developing links with other
approaches. One of the most serious problems of the RA - its neglect of politics and
the state (Jessop, 1990a; Jenson, 1990; Hay, 1995) - is encouraging growing interest
in recent developments in state theory.
2.4 Neo-Gramscian State Theory
Jones (1997b) argues that state theory offers one way out of the 'regulationist
enigma'. In particular, he claims that, as the leading edge of 'neo-Gramscian state
theory', Jessop's 'strategic-relational' approach (Jessop, 1990b) offers a way forward
because of its conceptualisation of the role of the state within its political and strategic
context. Although the abstract and conceptually dense nature of Jessop's writings has
tended to limit their influence, there now seems to be a growing interest in his work
among local and regional analysts (Goodwin, 1992; 1998b; Goodwin and Pemberton,
1997; Jones 1997a, 1997b; MacLeod 1997b; 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998,
1999; Collinge and Hall, 1997). To the extent that Jessop's sophisticated treatment of
politics and the state enables some of the crucial 'missing links' in regulationist
research (Tickell and Peck, 1992) to be 'filled in', this can be seen as a positive
development. Yet this thesis argues that there is a need for detailed consideration of
the precise ways in which Jessop's "novel concepts" (Collinge and Hall, 1997) might
be operationalised in local governance research. In particular, it questions whether the
key notions of 'state project', 'accumulation strategy', and 'hegemonic project',
developed to explain aspects of national state development, can be easily transferred
to the local level. It is argued instead that the concepts of 'strategic selectivity' and
'representational regime' offer important insights into the structuration of local
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governance, suggesting that the structures and practices of state agencies tend to
privilege the interests of some groups over others.
Jessop's work should be seen as an attempt to go beyond the debates
surrounding Marxist state theory in the 1970s. It poses the same basic questions of the
relationship between the state and the balance of social forces, rejecting the claims of
the 'state-centred' theories prominent in the 1980s and 1990s because of their reliance
on a "superficial" and "misleading" distinction between state and society (Jessop,
1990b: 2). Jessop draws upon the insights of leading Marxist writers like Offe and
Poulantzas, who sought, in different ways, to improve upon crude instrumentalist and
functionalist approaches (Offe, 1974: 31-36; Poulantzas, 1978: 12-19; Jessop, 1990b:
25-41, 249-54). Against prevailing tendencies to reduce state power to the external
determinants of capital and class, Poulantzas's key contribution was to insist that
social struggles were inscribed in the "institutional materiality" of the state
(Poulantzas, 1978; cf. Jessop, 1985: 114-48). He argued that the state was a social
relation rather than a 'thing', deriving its specificity from the dialectical interplay
between state structures and the struggles of social forces (Poulantzas, 1978: 123-60;
Jessop, 1982: 153-80; 1985: 115-48; 1990b: 256-7).5 Poulantzas placed considerable
emphasis on the internal fragmentation of the state, insisting upon the relative
indeterminacy and contingency of the struggles contained within it as state managers
sought to contain popular pressures by shifting power between apparatuses
(Poulantzas, 1978: 127-45; Jessop, 1985: 124-42). Ultimately, however, he was
unable to reconcile this with his continuing emphasis on class domination, failing to
demonstrate how a 'general line' favouring capitalist forces emerged from the clash of
diverse social forces within the state (Jessop, 1982: 185-88; 1985: 134-38; 1990b:
256).
Jessop aims to overcome these difficulties by emphasising 'strategy' whilst
simultaneously rejecting notions of capital logic and class unity (Jessop, 1985: 341 -
45; 1990b: 52-54). He argues that the formation (making) of collective groups such as
classes depends upon an active process of organisation and direction. Such groups
only become aware of their identity and interests during the course of struggles that
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involve direct engagement with the state. Jessop draws on Poulantzas's notion of the
state as a social relation, arguing that it can be analysed as the "site, the generator and
the product of strategies" (Jessop, 1990b: 260). As a site of political strategy, Jessop
defines the state as a system of 'strategic selectivity', claiming that:
The bias inscribed on the terrain of the state as a site of strategic action can only be understood
as a bias relative to specific strategies pursued by specific forces to advance specific interests
over a given time horizon in terms of a specific set of other forces each advancing their own
interests through specific strategies. Particular forms of state privilege some strategies over
others, privilege the access of some forces over others, some interests over others, some time
horizons over others, some coalition possibilities over others. A given type of state, a given state
form, a given form of regime will be more accessible to some forces than others according to
the strategies they adopt to gain state power. " (Jessop, 1990b: 10)
This summarises the core arguments of the strategic-relational approach,
demonstrating the continuities with Offe's and Poulantzas's insistence that the state is
not a neutral instrument open to all social forces (Offe, 1974; Poulantzas, 1978).
Where Jessop departs from these analyses, however, is in his argument that state
selectivity is strategic rather than structural (Jessop, 1990b: 260-72). The notion of
structural selectivity is closely associated with the writings of Claus Offe who argued
that the internal workings of 'sorting processes' resulted in the state favouring
capitalist interests and marginalising oppositional groups (Offe, 1974: 36). For Jessop
(1990b: 260), emphasising strategic selectivity brings out the "relational character" of
the state more clearly since access is determined by the interaction between the form
of the state and the specific strategies adopted by social forces as they compete for
state power.
The role of the state as generator of strategy takes on a particular importance
given Jessop's basic conception of the state as a loosely articulated 'institutional
ensemble'. Criticising approaches which assume that the state has an essential unity
and coherence, Jessop takes Poulantzas's emphasis on its internal fragmentation in the
face of underlying contradictions to its logical conclusion in stating that the state has
no substantive operational unity (Jessop, 1990b: 9, 261). Crucially, the state has to be
actively unified through 'state projects' directed by state managers (officials and
politicians) representing those groups that have gained state power. Particular state
projects and strategies aim to benefit the social basis of the state, consisting of those
groups and actors that support the "basic structure of the state system, its mode of
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operation and its objectives" (Jessop, 1990b: 161; Jessop et al., 1988: 167). This
social base is linked to the internal structures of the state through specific forms of
representation (Jones, 1997a). Those groups that support state policies will tend to be
mobilised and placed in key positions within state institutions and a range of material
concessions and symbolic rewards directed towards them. Offe's notion of
'institutional filters' is useful in illuminating how the rules and norms inscribed in
systems of representation incorporate some groups whilst excluding others (Offe,
1974). As new coalitions and alliances gain state power, the internal structures of the
state are restructured, and new institutional forms, associated with particular
representational regimes, are created in order to deliver policy (Jones, 1997a). Chapter
four demonstrates that this approach provides insights into processes of state
restructuring in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s as Thatcherite forces dismantled
the post-war institutional fix, creating new apparatuses and agencies to deliver policy.
The notion of the state as a product of strategy focuses attention on the ways in
which state power is conditioned and constrained by inherited forms. These inherited
forms are themselves the product of past political strategies and struggles (Jessop,
1990b: 261). In this sense, current forms of strategic selectivity are constituted out of
the interaction between past patterns of strategic selectivity and the strategies adopted
for their transformation (Jessop, 1990b: 261). This relationship is best illustrated by
newly-elected governments' efforts at state-building. The Thatcher government was
initially forced to work within existing structures until it had consolidated its position,
continuing to channel its interventions through inherited institutional forms like the
Manpower Services Commission (MSC) (Gamble, 1988; Jessop et al., 1988; Evans,
1992; King, 1993). The current efforts of the New Labour government to re-structure
the fabric of political and economic governance at the regional level in particular are
being directed through institutions and actors (for instance, business leaders)
privileged by its predecessor (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998: 15-6).
One implication of Jessop's relational view of the state is that the effects of
state projects and strategies are not contained within the institutional boundaries of the
state itself. Dominant social forces seek to project their strategies into the fabric of
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civil society and the economy. In terms of the latter, the state forms a key site for the
formation of accumulation strategies, which define a "specific economic 'growth
model' with its various extra-economic preconditions and also outline a general
strategy appropriate to its realisation" (Jessop, 1990b: 198). Accumulation strategies
provide the connection between abstract models of the accumulation process and the
concrete realities of economic relations in particular places. While constructed to
mobilise a broad coalition of social forces, they often tend to privilege the material
interest of key groups (Jessop, 1990b: 198-205). Although originally developed to
account for national development trajectories, the concept of accumulation strategies
has recently been deployed by those seeking to develop the RA at local level. In
particular, this concept is useful in informing analyses of local state agencies' efforts
to enhance the competitiveness of local economies (Jessop, 1997b, 1997d; Collinge
and Hall, 1997). As part of a broader interest in the discursive constitution of local
economies as 'objects' of regulation (see p.41-42), the extent to which particular
accumulation strategies rely upon particular constructions of the local economy which
are invariably selective, highlighting certain sectors or firms as appropriate targets for
intervention, is another key aspect receiving attention (Jessop, 1997b, 1997d;
Goodwin and Pemberton, 1997; MacLeod, 1999).
State power is extended into the cultural and ideological domains through
'hegemonic projects' (Jessop, 1990b: 207-218). In developing this concept, Jessop
draws heavily upon both Gramsci and Poulantza. The latter, in particular, laid
particular emphasis on the capacity of the state to contain class contradictions
inscribed in its form by projecting itself as the expression of the "national-popular
will" (Poulantzas, 1978: 93-120). Jessop extends this idea to argue that the dominant
classes construct 'hegemonic projects' in an effort to mobilise support behind a
programme of action which reinforces their accumulation strategy (Jessop, 1990b:
207-215). A key feature is that conflicts between particular interests can be resolved
through efforts to construct a general interest:
It is the task of hegemonic leadership to resolve this problem through specific political,
intellectual and moral practices. This involves the mobilisation of support behind a concrete
national-popular programme of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of
objectives that implicitly or explicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class
(fraction) and which also privileges particular 'economic-corporate' interests compatible with
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this programme (Jessop, 1990: 208).
This programme is always contested: it is important to re-state the partial and unstable
nature of hegemony. Alliances are continually constructed, fractured and re-assembled
as new conditions emerge, undermining the basis of previous arrangements
(Fairclough, 1992). Successful mobilisation of a coalition will normally involve the
sacrifice of short-term interests of the hegemonic class and a flow of material
concessions to other social groups mobilised behind the project. Unless hegemonic
projects and accumulation strategies are seen to address the priorities of subordinate
groups, they are unlikely to secure the necessary degree of legitimacy upon which
power depends. Again these ideas are being used to inform research on local
governance. One crucial empirical question concerns whether the apparent 'hollowing
out' of the nation-state involves a re-location of hegemonic functions to the local and
regional levels (Jessop, 1997b: 62; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998: 15). Whilst the
attractions of using notions of hegemony to analyse the politics of urban-regional
leadership in areas with strong forms of business representation are apparent (Holden,
1998), it is important to avoid loosely deploying them in a way which obscures rather
than illuminates the precise mechanisms and practices through which particular spaces
are regulated.
To the extent that Jessop's 'strategic-relational' approach emphasises the
contingent and context-dependent nature of political and economic relations it offers a
sophisticated, "state of the art" Marxist theory of the state (Taylor, 1995: 251) which
overcomes economistic and functionalist tendencies. In focusing attention on the
political strategies and regulatory practices constituting particular modes of local
governance (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999: 12) it seems to provide a way out of the
'regulationist enigma' (Jones, 1997b). Arguably, however, the 'strategic-relational'
approach has been insufficiently operationalised in the context of research on local
governance. While it has been claimed that the mid-level abstractions employed by
Jessop are not scale-specific and can, therefore, be applied in local research (MacLeod
and Goodwin, 1998: 16, 1999: 14), evidence that nation states remain crucial sites for
the articulation of political strategies raises questions about their transferability (Peck
and Tickell, 1994a, 1995a; Jessop 1997c).
48
These issues are underlined by Jessop's neglect of his own theoretical insights
in recent empirical work on the re-organisation of the national-state (Jessop, 1994).
Indeed, the notion of a transition from a Keynesian Welfare State to a 'Schumpeterian
Workfare State' (Jessop 1994; Peck and Jones, 1995), reproduces the problems of
post-Fordist approaches by offering an under-politicised account which falls back on
an underlying economism (MacLeod, 1997b: 545). Jones (1997a) attempts to
spatialise the 'strategic-relational' approach through the concept of the 'spatial
selectivity of the state'. He argues that there is an inherent tendency for the state to
privilege certain places through its accumulation strategies, hegemonic projects, and
state projects. This argument fails to fully consider the complexities of local
transformation, however, under-stating the capacity of local institutions and actors to
adapt and translate central priorities.
A number of recent reviews have presented 'neo-Gramscian' state theory as a
way forward for research on local governance (Jones, 1997a, b; MacLeod and
Goodwin, 1998, 1999). Crucially, the neo-Gramscian emphasis on political and
strategic context provides a non-reductionist way of linking local institutions to
broader political-economic processes. Through the notion of strategic selectivity and
the associated focus on the representational regime of the local state, it highlights how
particular institutional structures tend to privilege the interests of some groups over
others. Yet crucial issues relating to scale and strategy remain unresolved. While the
apparent 'hollowing-out' of the nation-state after Fordism appears to have brought
about a relativisation of scale, it is clear that national institutions retain a central role
in monitoring and co-ordinating local regimes (Jessop, 1997c). This raises questions
about the effectiveness of concepts like accumulation strategies and hegemonic
projects in specifying the precise mechanisms and practices deployed in the regulation
and governance of local and regional spaces. And the focus on the formulation and
articulation of strategy at the national level raises the question of whether local actors
can challenge and translate central priorities within the institutional networks that link
local sites to the centre.
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2.5 Governmentality Theory
This section argues that neo-Foucauldian theories of governmentality offer
important insights for research on local governance. Although research is showing an
increasing interest in local micro-sites, both the RA and strategic-relational
approaches have been primarily concerned with macro-actors such as the state,
institutions and social classes. Consequently, there is a need to develop conceptual
linkages with approaches that have taken local sites as their primary object of
analysis. This section argues that notions of governmentality help to provide firmer
analytical purchase on the mechanisms and practices deployed to regulate and govern
local economic space. Given local state agencies' dual role as both agents of and
obstacles to the centre (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988) - as both regulators and regulated
- these mechanisms and practices are both deployed by them in their interaction with
the objects of government and upon them by central government as it strives to ensure
that local institutional practice remains within the parameters of underlying policy
preferences and administrative norms. In addition, governmentality theorists'
characteristic emphasis on the role of expertise in constituting and structuring
governmental networks (Barry et al., 1996; Rose, 1996a, b; Rose and Miller, 1992)
draws attention to the role of'expert' knowledge in local economic regulation (Painter,
1997b).
In this sense, governmentality theory supports a focus on the how of
government, an issue neglected by the strategic-relational approach with its
dependence on less precise notions of hegemony. Its focus on routine aspects of
institutional practice can perhaps be used to extend Jessop's relational approach to the
state by emphasising how the state projects, accumulation strategies and hegemonic
projects formulated by leading social forces are mediated and channelled through
particular forms, practices and techniques inscribed in the structure of the state. And
recent research on local-central networks - informed by actor-network theory (Latour,
1986; Callon, 1986; Murdoch and Marsden, 1994, 1995; Murdoch, 1995; Murdoch
and Abram, 1998; Woods, 1998) - is useful in countering any tendency to reify
strategy by highlighting the capacity of local actors to translate and adapt central
priorities to their own purposes.6
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It must be recognised, however, that these claims bring dangers of an
unprincipled eclecticism, raising crucial questions about the compatibility of the
perspectives reviewed in this chapter. In particular, there would appear to be a
philosophical clash between the critical realist foundations of the RA and neo-
Gramscian state theory and the post-structuralist orientation of writings on
governmentality inspired by Foucault. These issues are addressed in the remainder of
this chapter which argues that many of the key emphases of governmentality theorists
are not incompatible with a realist ontology (Sayer, 1992a, b; Pratt, 1995; Yeung,
1997).
The origins of current debates on governmentality are found in Foucault's
reflections on the nature of modern government in the late 1970s (Foucault, 1991;
Barry et al, 1996; Burchell, 1996; Rose 1996a; Rose and Miller, 1992).7 Foucault
interpreted the term as referring to the 'conduct of conduct' - the techniques and
practices evolved for governing the conduct of others (Burchell, 1996: 19). He traced
a crucial change in the "art of government" to the early eighteenth century and the
emergence of a new mode of governmentality focused on the "right manner of
disposing things" which relied on the deployment of particular tactics and techniques
rather than the abstract laws of previous regimes (Foucault, 1991: 95). This change
involved the constitution of'population' as the object of government and the isolation
of 'the economy' as a sphere of reality in which the nascent sciences of statistics and
political economy played a crucial role. The mobilisation of disciplinary instruments
for managing population relied upon these particular fonns of knowledge (Foucault,
1991: 98-104). The rather top-down emphasis of these writings seem to have been
developed at a point when Foucault's characteristic emphasis on studying the exercise
of power in its "local forms and institutions" (Foucault, 1980: 96) was being
supplemented by a growing interest in the colonisation and integration of diverse
micro-powers into more global systems of domination (Foucault, 1980: 96; Jessop,
1990b: 234-35).
Neo-Foucauldian writers have developed and extended this approach,




applying some of Foucault's basic insights and emphases in studies of particular
political rationalities such as liberalism, neo-liberalism and social democracy (see
Burchell et al., 1991; Barry et al., 1996). This section concentrates on the work of
Nikolas Rose in particular, who stresses the importance of knowledge and expertise to
modem forms of government:
Government is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, whose role is not one of
weaving an all-pervasive web of 'social control', but of enacting assorted attempts at the
calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often competing,
local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and
encouragement (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175).
This concern with the incorporation of expertise by political forces seeking to
mobilise 'external' agents and techniques (Rose and Miller, 1992: 181) bears close
similarities to Jessop's relational view of the state. For Rose, what makes particular
techniques and practices governmental is their capacity to be made practical, to be
transformed into concrete devices for managing and directing reality (Rose, 1996a:
41). As an inherently problematising activity which frames the obligations of
authorities in terms of the problems they address, government depends upon
knowledge (Rose and Miller, 1992: 181-2). The disciplinary knowledges of the social
sciences play an important role here in providing an "intellectual machinery" of
ordering procedures and explanations which construct and frame reality in ways that
allow government to act upon it (Rose and Miller, 1992: 182).8 Yet expertise can also
pose problems for government given the tendency of specialist knowledge to form
enclosures', tightly-bounded sites within which the authority of experts is concentrated
and defended against external interference (Rose and Miller, 1992: 190).''
Ruling strategies are characteristically structured and articulated through
specific programmes of government (Rose and Miller, 1992: 181). These consist of
efforts to address identified problems through more or less coherent plans or strategies
that specify intended outcomes consistent with the principles of underlying political
rationalities. Rose and Miller (1992: 185) refer to the set of mechanisms, techniques
and procedures through which programmes are activated and put into practice as
technologies ofgovernment. Following Latour (1987), inscription and calculation are
identified as key technologies of government, enabling 'enclosures' to be breached by
'responsibilising' and disciplining local actors to the claims of central authority (Rose,
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1996a). The objects of government are represented through these crucial processes;
their characteristics recorded and collected as information. These methods of
inscription work to make reality "stable, mobile, comparable, combinable", thereby
enabling government to act upon it (Rose and Miller, 1992: 185). Through successive
'cycles of accumulation', infonnation is gathered and transferred back to distant
centres (Latour, 1987). By bringing traces of distant objects of government back to
centres of calculation in this way, government is able to 'act at a distance' on these
same objects (Latour, 1987: 227, 239; Rose and Miller, 1992: 185). Centres of
calculation are the key nodes where information is compared, combined and
aggregated through the deployment of statistical and mathematical techniques (Latour,
1987: 237-40). These mobile technologies enable events to be connected and
aggregated across time and space, creating particular representations of the objects of
government such as public opinion, Gross National Product, unemployment rates and
birth rates which can then be programmed and manipulated as autonomous entities by
governmental actors and agencies (Rose and Miller, 1992: 186).
These arguments owe much to the development of actor-network theory by
Latour and others (Latour, 1986, 1997; Callon, 1986). Actor-network theory styles
itself as the 'sociology of translation', focusing on how actors attempt to enrol other
actors into networks, translating their identities and re-defining their roles according
to their place within the network (Latour, 1986, Callon, 1986; Murdoch, 1995). Power
is an outcome, an effect rather than a cause of action (Latour, 1986, 1997).10 Actors
become powerful by building stable networks through the enrolment of other actors.
This process is crucially dependent on the non-human intermediaries - technological
artefacts, texts, machines, money - used to bind networks together (Latour, 1997). A
number of recent studies have applied these ideas in analyses of networks linking
local and non-local actors (Murdoch and Marsden, 1994, 1995; Murdoch and Abram,
1998). Murdoch and Marsden (1995) demonstrate how a mineral extraction proposal
in North Buckinghamshire - embedded within a broader official network of
government, developers and planning authorities held together by calculations of
mineral demand - was successfully resisted by local residents through the formation of
an 'anti-development network' able to 'enrol' significant national actors in the
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campaign. This case study shows the autonomous capacity of actors not only to
translate central priorities into their own terms, but also to refuse enrolment, resisting
and challenging the logic of the network to the extent of forming their own network to
contest the issue. This is a useful lesson in the context of neo-Gramscian state theory's
emphasis on the state as political strategy, suggesting that central priorities are likely
to be transformed as they come into contact with the priorities of other actors within
institutional networks.
Neo-Foucauldian writers like Rose, however, are quick to distinguish their
analyses from the traditions of state theory (Rose, 1996a; Rose and Miller, 1992). For
governmentality theorists, the entrenched dualisms - state and society, public and
private, government and market - that have dominated political thought are wholly
inadequate as devices for grasping the complexities of modem government (Barry et
al., 1996: 1-2; Rose, 1996a; Rose and Miller, 1992: 174). They criticise the tendency
to over-value the state by giving it an illusionary functionality and unity, arguing that
state power is an outcome of the interaction of diverse forces, an effect rather than a
cause, such that it cannot be used as an explanation of social change but must itself be
explained (Rose, 1996a: 42). The object of analysis is not the state's domination of
civil society but the "govemmentalisation of the state": examining how a complex of
diverse institutions, techniques and practices are mobilised, articulated and
operationalised within particular programmes of government (Rose and Miller, 1992:
175, 177). Rose and Miller (1992: 176-78) counter-pose their account of 'political
power beyond the state' to the sociology of state formation (Giddens, 1985; Mann,
1988), criticising the latter's realist orientation towards uncovering the forces driving
the growth of the state. By contrast, they view the state as a "historically variable
linguistic device for conceptualising and articulating ways of ruling" that has emerged
and been consolidated within discursive fields stmctured by traditional political
thought (Rose and Miller, 1992: 177).
These claims appear to undermine state theory, and the Marxist tradition
represented by Jessop in particular. In many ways, however, this incompatibility is
more apparent than real. Governmentality theorists offer a caricature of state theory
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which tends to be far less functionalist and reductionist than they claim (Jessop,
1990b). This is particularly the case for Jessop's 'strategic-relational' approach which
has worked through many of the problems that the neo-Foucauldians point to. To this
extent, their criticisms miss their target. Jessop's relational approach successfully
overcomes the distinction between state and society which he accuses contemporary
'state-centred' approaches of reifying (Jessop, 1990b: 288). Neither does he assume
state unity and functionality. Indeed, the emphasis on the role of 'state projects' in
overcoming internal fragmentation by mobilising state personnel and institutions
behind a distinct line of action parallels the neo-Foucauldian emphasis on
programmes of government. While governmentality theorists' refusal to consider any
links between government and external determinants like class or capital brings about
a decisive break with the Marxist tradition, in many ways the concern with the
interaction of diverse tactics, techniques and procedures echoes Poulantzas's later
work on the state as a relation of forces (Poulantzas, 1978).
The post-structuralist stress on the state as merely a product of political
discourse is also misconceived. For the state is much more than just an idea, having a
distinct institutional materiality as an ensemble of diverse agencies, practices and
techniques (Poulantzas, 1978; Jessop, 1990b; Hay, 1996). From a realist perspective,
the state has ontological status as a distinct object, although our knowledge of it can
only be gained through particular forms of discourse and representation (Sayer, 1992a,
b; Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997). The crucial implication of this is that social objects such
as the state have, once established and consolidated, a relative autonomy from our
ways of knowing that is rooted in their 'emergent properties' (Sayer, 1992a). Whilst
the state is indeed a "device for conceptualising ways of ruling" (Rose and Miller,
1992: 177), it cannot be reduced to this."
Where the 'strategic-relational' approach goes beyond governmentality
theorists is in its on-going concern with locating the social bases of state power
(Jessop, 1990b). Although neo-Foucauldians are concerned with the relationship
between government and expertise, this tends to be translated into a one-sided focus
on the incorporation of expertise through programmes of government. Both
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government and expertise remain curiously 'faceless' in the absence of any indication
of which social groups are represented and involved. Jessop (1990: 269-70) observes
that the state has no power as such, only the power of the social forces acting through
it, though this is mediated and modified by the institutional capacities and liabilities of
the state. Similarly, it is not programmes and technologies of government that act, but
the social forces deploying these mechanisms and techniques for their own particular
purposes. This under-socialisation of governmentality approaches stems from their
Foucauldian roots. For Foucault's marked reluctance to relate power to social and
economic structures led critics to allege that he invariably reified and essentialised
power by reducing it to the "modalities of its exercise" (Poulantzas, 1978: 148-50; cf.
Jessop, 1990b: 220-241). In effect, neo-Foucauldian theories of governmentality
reproduce this problem.
This section has argued that notions of governmentality provide analytical
concepts for grasping the nature of the practical mechanisms deployed to govern and
regulate local economic space, directing attention to the vital role of expertise in this
process. The emphasis on power as an effect of the successful construction and
stabilisation of networks highlights the capacity of actors to translate and adapt the
projects of others to their own purposes, providing a useful counter to any tendency to
reify and essentialise state strategy by stressing the capacity for translation within
institutional networks.
The thesis's reliance on these insights does not, however, signal acceptance of
the epistemological project of neo-Foucauldian theorists. Rather, key insights are
combined within a broader conceptual framework structured by the RA and neo-
Gramscian state theory. This is underpinned by a loose form of critical realism that
accepts the key role of discourse and language in constituting our knowledge of social
objects like the state whilst resisting any move to reduce these objects to discourse or
language (Sayer, 1992a, b; Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997). When re-conceptualised in this
way, the insights of governmentality theorists become compatible with a critical
realist position. One way in which governmentality theories contribute towards the
analysis of rural governance in the Scottish Highlands is in conceptualising the role of
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neo-liberal governmentalities in the establishment and regulation of local state
agencies (see Chapters four and five). They also focus attention on how these agencies
problematise the processes and objects of governing as they seek to represent and
intervene in local economic space (Ward and McNicholas, 1998).
2.6. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed three bodies of work in search of conceptual
insights which can be operationalised in research on rural governance in the Scottish
Highlands. It has sought to develop a new synthesis, connecting governmentality
theories to the links being drawn between the Regulation Approach and neo-
Gramscian state theory. The value of the RA is twofold. First, it contextualises rural
governance by placing key unelected agencies like LECs within the context of a
broader search for a 'new institutional fix' by national state actors. Second, it provides
a set of methodological principles for research on local governance, stressing
regulation as a contested process rather than a completed structure and the importance
of distinguishing between the objects and agents of regulation whilst maintaining that
these 'objects' are themselves constituted through the regulatory process. The
contribution of neo-Gramscian state theory is to 'fill in' the political and strategic
context neglected by the RA. Its emphasis on the state as a system of 'strategic
selectivity' draws attention to the ways in which social forces utilise the capacities of
the state to generate 'state projects', 'accumulation strategies' and hegemonic projects'
which benefit the groups making up the social base of the state. This provides
valuable contextualisation, and by viewing the establishment of unelected agencies
like LECs as a product of state strategy corrects any tendency towards economism or
functionalism. More directly, however, the emphasis on strategic selectivity focuses
attention on the question of whether the representational regimes of local state
agencies and the institutional practices they deploy privilege the interests of some
groups over others. Governmentality theories go beyond this in considering the 'how'
of rural governance, focusing attention on the mechanisms and practices used to
regulate rural space and the crucial role of expert knowledge in mediating and
directing this process. They also balance the neo-Gramscian tendency to privilege
57
strategy formulation at the national level by stressing local and regional actors'
capacity to contest and translate central agendas within institutional networks.
This conceptual framework is directly employed in Chapter four to interpret
the establishment of the HIE Network in terms of a process of institutional
experimentation. The search for a new regulatory fix involved a transformation of the
state as the structures of post-war Fordism were dismantled and a new layer of
unelected, business-led agencies established at the local level. The regulation
approach is unable, however, to explain why this process seems to have privileged the
'local' as an 'object' of regulation. Chapter three addresses the tendency to take the
local and regional economies for granted as objects of analysis by reviewing the
historical construction of the Highlands as a 'problem' space requiring particular forms
of political and economic regulation. Through an analysis of the strategies and
practices of the H1DB in particular - perhaps the most important institutional 'solution'
devised during the course of the twentieth century - analysis of the political
structuration of the HIE Network is placed within a historical context.
Notes
1 For Hay and Jessop, these characteristics define a British school of regulationist
analysis whilst Jones (1997b) sees them as constitutive of a 'third generation'
approach, distinguished from a 'first generation' focus on macro-economic
stabilisation (Aglietta, 1979) and 'second generation' concerns with the insertion of
national economies into international economic space (Lipietz, 1986, 1992).
2 Not all regulationists recognise the accumulation system, using the regime of
accumulation to also refer to the narrower relationship between production and
consumption. This thesis follows Peck and Tickell in emphasising that the concept of
accumulation system is useful in specifying the domain which the mode of regulation
acts upon, leaving the regime of accumulation to refer - at a higher level of abstraction
- to the general system formed out of the coupling between the accumulation system
and mode of regulation (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Peck and Tickell, 1992, 1994a,
1995a).
3
Jessop prefers the precision of this term to the more general mode of regulation since
it captures both the object and modality of regulation (Jessop, 1995: 316-7). This
contrasts with Peck and Tickell who rely upon a notion of mode of social regulation
(Tickell and Peck, 1992; Peck and Tickell 1992, 1995a) which tends to conflate the
object of regulation and the mechanisms through which regulation operates.
4 This confusion appears to have arisen from over-literal translation from the original
French in which regulation corresponds more closely to regularisation than the
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dominant English-language sense of rule-making (reglementation in French) (see
Jessop, 1995a: 309; 1997a).
5 This emphasis is characteristic of Poulantzas's later work, reflecting his gradual shift
away from the Althusserian structuralism which had informed his earlier efforts to
develop a 'regional' theory of the capitalist state (Poulantzas, 1973; cf. Jessop, 1982:
156-80; 1985: 84-114).
6
Although this section is informed by certain aspects of actor-network theory, this
does not signify an acceptance of the epistemological project of leading actor-network
theorists (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1988, 1997). Actor-network theory plays a largely
supplementary role in informing the research; in Murdoch's (1995) terms, the thesis
does not offer a network analysis of the HIE network.
7 Actor-network theory also shares these Foucauldian roots (see Latour, 1997).
x An example of this, emphasised by Foucault (1991) and cited by Miller and Rose, is
the role of the theories and techniques of economics in rendering 'the economy'
programmable.
9 An obvious example highlighted by Rose and Miller (1993: 193-95) is the medical
profession's creation of the NHS as an enclosure, successfully resisting external
interference until the mid-1970s.
10 Actor-network theorists tend to exaggerate the originality of this insight. From a
different perspective, Jessop concluded his review of Marxist state theory, published
in 1982, by making essentially the same point, arguing that state power is an
explanandum rather than an explanans (must be itself explained rather than used to
explain) (Jessop, 1982: 225, 254-55).
" To do so is to commit a form of linguistic reductionism, in line with Bhaskar's
broader critique of the 'epistemic fallacy' which reduces being (reality) to knowledge
(objects to concepts) (see Sayer, 1992b; Pratt, 1995).
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Chapter 3
Redressing History: The Construction of the Scottish Highlands as
'Problem' Region, 1880-1982
3.1. Introduction
Remote areas are full of the ruins of the past ... the remains of failed innovations, and of dead
economic periods, scatter the landscape ... Remote areas cry out for development, but they are
the continuous victims of visions of development ... Remote areas offer images of unbridled
pessimism or Utopian optimism, of change and decay, in their memorials. Within [the] total
landscape with ruins (and a few human figures) nest many smaller landscapes with their own
ruins (Ardener, 1987: 46, original emphasis).
This chapter reviews the twentieth century history of the Highlands in order to
place the analysis of the politics of rural governance in the Scottish Highlands since
1991 within a broader historical context. It takes up Chapter two's call to consider the
processes through which local and regional economies are constituted as 'objects' of
regulation by assessing the construction of the Highlands as a 'problem' region. A
succession of special-purpose agencies have been established to promote economic
development since the 1880s, and the chapter pays particular attention to the HIDB as
the most significant institutional 'experiment' of the twentieth century. In this context,
LECs can be seen as the latest in a series of institutional 'solutions' to the Highland
'problem'. The fact that development is still being promoted in the late 1990s indicates
that these efforts have been less than fully successful in addressing underlying
problems of underdevelopment and remoteness. The Highlands provide a paradigm
case of a remote area subject to successive visions of development in which the
remains of development schemes introduced in earlier eras continue to scatter the
landscape.
This chapter is informed by calls for a 'reconstructed regional geography' that
views regions as social constructs in a state of continual transformation (Gregory,
1978; Thrift, 1983, 1990; Pred, 1984; Johnston, 1992; Paasi, 1991; Murphy, 1991).
These claims, rarely followed through in empirical research, can usefully be linked to
recent work on the political construction of geographic scales which similarly
suggests that scale is socially produced, being actively "implicated in the constitution
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of social, economic and political processes" (Delaney and Leitner, 1997: 93; cf
Swyngedouw, 1997; Cox, 1998; K. Jones, 1998; Brenner, 1998). Both literatures
provide a useful starting point for regulationist work which aims to overcome the
tendency to take local economies for granted as objects of analysis.
The chapter is structured in two main sections. First, it considers the historical
construction of the Highlands as a distinctive region, paying particular attention to its
institutional!sation within political structures since the 1880s. Second, it examines the
strategies and practices of the HIDB from 1965 to 1982 through three sub-sections.
The first focuses on the origins of the HIDB, demonstrating how a Labour Party
committed to economic modernisation and regional planning incorporated local
demands for a powerful development authority. The second considers the early HIDB
in some detail. The third focuses on a significant re-orientation ofHIDB policy in the
late 1970s in the face of economic stagnation and local political pressures.
3.2. The Construction and Institutionalisation of the Scottish Highlands, 1880-
1965
If there is bitterness in my voice, I can assure the House that there is bitterness in Scotland too,
when we consider the history of these areas. We have to put this aside, however, to do what we
are all now determined must be done to redress history ... For two hundred years the Highlander
has been the man on Scotland's conscience ... No part of Scotland has been given a shabbier
deal by history ... Too often there has only been one way out of his troubles for the person bom
in the Highlands - emigration. (Hansard, 16 March 1965).
These words, spoken by the Labour Secretary of State, Willie Ross, as he
introduced the bill establishing the HIDB to the House of Commons in March 1965,
represent perhaps the most powerful statement of the often unspoken assumptions and
agendas which have framed Highland policy in the twentieth century. They reflect
concerns about the place of the Highlands within Scottish society, raising questions
not only about 'history' but also about the way that history has come to be viewed and
represented. How did the 'Highlander' come to occupy this place on "Scotland's
conscience"? The desire to "redress history" has been a key theme underlying policy,
and economic development has been seen as a way of equalising opportunity and
increasing living standards. Recent work on the construction and transformation of
regions provides a useful framework for considering questions about the position and
status of the Highlands within Scotland and Britain (Pred, 1984; Paasi, 1986, 1991;
61
Murphy, 1991).
Paasi (1986, 1991) has conceptualised the emergence and transformation of
regional structures in terms of four distinct stages: the development of 'territorial
shape' through processes of material transformation which define regional boundaries
and structures; the creation of 'symbolic shape' as regional symbols and images enter
into the consciousness of the wider society; the emergence of institutions as key
agencies of socialisation reproducing regional distinctiveness; and the consolidation
of the region within wider social and economic structures through a continuation of
these institutionalisation processes. These 'stages' are, however, interdependent rather
than sequential (MacLeod, 1998a: 836-7). Paasi (1991) emphasises how regions are
reproduced through socialisation processes (spatial socialisation), introducing the
concept of structures of expectation to help understand the ways in which human
experience is bound up with the (re)production and transformation of regional space.
This term refers to how people organise their knowledge of the world on the basis of
the historical accumulation of experience in particular places and then use these
resources to react to new experiences.1 Paasi argues that it expresses collective,
institutionally-mediated rules established through the development of regional
consciousness and which are always expressed through language (Paasi, 1991: 249-
50).
Most of the institutional structures that have shaped Highland development
policy in the twentieth century were established in the period 1880-1925. Perhaps
most importantly, the Liberal government passed the Crofters' Holding (Scotland) Act
in 1886 in response to crofter agitation.2 This can be seen as a critical moment in the
institutionalisation of the Highlands in that it created, through the formation of the
Crofting Counties, a distinct administrative region, defined by government
recognition of customary land rights (Cameron, 1997, 1998). Crucially, the crofters'
discourse of land rights succeeded in disrupting romanticised representations which
had given the Highlands much of their 'symbolic shape' since the late eighteenth
century (Paasi, 1991). Government intervention reflected official perceptions of the
Highlands as a 'problem' region containing a unique set of difficulties that required a
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distinct set of policy instruments (Devine, 1994: 239). Economic integration had
accentuated the region's peripherally, creating a dependence on external demand for
key commodities and establishing a highly marginal economic structure based on
agricultural units (crofts) that were so small as to require another source of income
(Cameron, 1996a: 8-9). As Geddes (1984) argues, the net result of the crisis of the
1880s was a regional society increasingly regulated by the state. Although "a vague
and ill-defined commitment" to a policy of economic and social development emerged
after the 1886 Crofters' Act (Devine, 1994: 228), state intervention in the 1880-1925
period remained primarily a short-term political response to shifting patterns of unrest
(Cameron, 1996a). For many critics, the protection offered by the Crofters' Act has
succeeded only in ossifying an inefficient structure of land-holding, creating structural
rigidities that have prevented modernisation and development in the twentieth century
(Gillanders, 1968; Cameron, 1996a).
The role of the state in the region continued to expand after 1920. In contrast
to the special measures of the previous period, intervention took the form of applying
and administering national legislation. The local state assumed a key role in
administering new provisions as it "evolved new functions and services" (Collier,
1953: 90). By the 1920s, the traditional industries of the Highlands (agriculture,
weaving, and fishing), the source of relative prosperity in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, were in prolonged decline, prompting large-scale emigration, with
thousands leaving the Western Isles (especially Lewis) alone in the 1920s (Table 3.1)
(Ennew, 1981).
Although state intervention was a response to the traditional elites' inability to
maintain social stability in the face of class conflict in the 1880s, landowning interests
remained influential (Cameron, 1996a). Landowners extended and consolidated their
control of the local state in the 1920s and 1930s, exploiting the networks of power that
bound them to British financial and political elites. They sought to re-position
themselves within an emerging preservationist discourse associated with newly-
formed institutions like the Association for the Preservation ofRural Scotland (APRS)
and the National Trust for Scotland. Although it drew heavily upon the established
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'tradition' of Highlandism, preservationist discourse involved significant re-imagining
of the region. The construction of the Highland landscape as a glorious wilderness
preserved by the enlightened actions of a benevolent class of patriots functioned to
naturalise the prevailing social order of the Highlands and its associated elite culture
(Hunter, 1995; Lorimer, 1997b).
Table 3.1. Population Change by District, 1921-61
Area 1921 1931 1951 1961
HIDB Area 325,853 293,212 285,786 277,948
Shetland 25,520 21,421 19,352 21,812
Orkney 24,111 22,077 21,255 18,747
Caithness 28,285 25,656 22,710 27,370
Sutherland 17,802 16,301 13,670 13,507
Ross and 42,440 37,594 36,777 35,705
Cromarty
Inverness 38,194 40,046 45,620 45,820
Badenoch 7,926 6,784 6,814 6,473
Skye 11,607 10,407 8,632 7,772
Western Isles 44,177 38,986 35,591 32,609
Lochaber 11,426 13,198 13,783 14,236
Argyll 73,365 60,942 61,582 57,797
Source: (adapted from HIDB, Eighth Report, 1973: 88, based on Census of
Population).
Yet elite groups continued to provoke resistance. Lorimer (1997b) identifies
three main sources of opposition to landed authority: the growth of an outdoor
recreation movement among urban working class youth; arguments for further land
settlement and rural re-population; and calls for integrated development and regional
reconstruction. Proposals for a development authority were inspired by the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA), set up as part of Roosevelt's 'New Deal' in the United States
(Grant, 1935; Murchison, 1938), and resulted in the fonnation of the Highland
Development League (HDL) in February 1936. In some respects, the political climate
of the 1930s was receptive to the demands of HDL activists. The development of
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regional policy through the creation of Special Areas of assistance reflected a limited
but significant shift towards economic management and state intervention (Parsons,
1988: 1-23). This trend was particularly evident in Scotland as political and industrial
elites sought to retain legitimacy by establishing interventionist bodies as part of an
emerging 'technocracy' (Paterson, 1994: 105-15). In 1936 the Scottish Economic
Committee, set up in response to the depression, sponsored a special Highland sub¬
committee (the Hilleary Committee) (Hunter, 1991). While the Committee's
investigations marked a change in the official construction of the Highland 'problem'
as 'depopulation' rather than 'congestion' - the problem which had pre-occupied an
earlier generation of administrators - became the central concern, the outbreak of war
in 1939 saw its proposals shelved.
Despite its appetite for economic intervention, the post-war Labour
government offered little in the way of distinct measures for the Highlands. It ignored
renewed calls for a Highland development authority, establishing instead the
Highlands and Islands Advisory Panel, composed of County Council representatives
and Highland MPs, plus four members appointed by the Secretary of State
(Thompson, 1978). The idea of a Highland development authority surfaced
intermittently throughout the Panel's life, and, in 1954, the Balfour Commission on
Scottish Affairs considered the issue, only to reject it on the grounds that it would
inevitably impinge upon the functions of local authorities (Magnusson, 1968;
Thompson, 1978).
By the late 1950s, however, criticisms of the unwieldy structure and inefficient
practice of the local state in the Highlands were mounting (Darling, 1955; Magnusson,
1968). The economic crisis of the Highlands intensified in the post-war period as the
relentless decline of traditional primary sector activities left the region in a critical
condition (Geddes, 1984: 71-96). Increased awareness of the opportunities being
created by the expansion of the British industrial economy fuelled out-migration,
threatening the viability of many marginal communities. The condition of 'historic
marginality' characteristic of Highland society in the nineteenth century had, by the
1950s, given way to a new condition of'relative deprivation' (Geddes, 1984: 122-3).
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This wider crisis was expressed through the state which became the focus for
conflicting demands for a resolution. Although the efforts ofHDL activists created the
language in which many of these demands were expressed, significant change was
dependent upon national political developments. As the Labour and Liberal parties
sought to end the long period of Conservative hegemony in the early 1960s, Highland
development provided one key area in which they could appeal to the Scottish
electorate.
3.3. The Highlands and Islands Development Board: Strategies for Economic
and Social Development 1965-81
When the Labour Party was returned to power in 1964, the establishment of a
Highland development authority occupied a prominent place in its Scottish political
programme. Legislation creating the HIDB was passed without much opposition in
1965. While the Board was granted a broad remit and a wide range of powers, its
objectives were twofold: to assist the people of the Highlands to improve their
economic and social conditions, and to enable the region to play a more important part
in the social and economic development of the (British) nation (Highlands and Islands
Development (Scotland) Act 1965). To achieve these ends, the Board was granted
powers to acquire and dispose of land; to offer financial assistance to business through
a grant and loans scheme; and to erect buildings and provide associated services. The
HIDB's responsibilities were not narrowly economic; it was charged with securing
economic and social development. To grant a development agency such wide powers
was unprecedented in the context of British regional policy (Carter, 1974: 181).
The creation of the HIDB by the Labour government in 1965 is often
presented as a victory for progressive forces, finally breaking the stranglehold of
landlordism over political and economic relations in the Scottish Highlands {Hansard,
16 March 1965; Geddes, 1981; Hetherington, 1990). This perception has since
informed a number of uncritical accounts of the HIDB which stress its unique role as
an integrated and progressive regional development agency (see Grassie 1983; Hughes
1983; Alexander 1985; and Geddes, 1981 for a critique). This section attempts to go
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beyond these internalist perspectives by developing a critical analysis that places the
strategies and practices of the HIDB within a wider economic, political, social and
cultural context.
3.3.1. Locating the Origins of the HIDB
Although influential landowners had resisted proposals for large-scale
industrial development, significant elements of a "new" economy had been introduced
to the region (Geddes, 1984: 97-107). These included developments in aluminium
smelting, hydro-electric power, forestry and tourism, in addition to a general
expansion in state administration. As Geddes (1984) shows, the cumulative effect of
those developments produced major changes in the class structure of Highland
society. The simple polarisation between landlords and crofters characteristic of the
late nineteenth century was replaced by a more complex social structure in which an
expanded middle stratum, employed mainly in state institutions, played an
increasingly important role (Geddes, 1984: 106). The increasing contradiction
between the demands of these class forces and the tendency of established
institutional forms and patterns of representation to privilege landlord interests created
further pressure for institutional change. For such demands to be realised, however,
they had to be connected to the national political agenda.
Since the decline of the Liberal Party, with which the crofting cause had been
closely associated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Highlands
lacked effective institutional channels linking it to national politics. By the early
1960s, however, the links between the middle classes employed in state
administration and the Labour Party were becoming increasingly important (Geddes,
1984: 133-6). During its long years in opposition in the 1950s, Labour had been
converted to the cause of Highland development (Labour Party, 1953; Thompson
1978; Hunter, 1991: 151). The gathering momentum of the political forces lobbying
for a Highland development authority (Johnston, 1964) put the ruling Conservatives
on the defensive (Thompson, 1978). Labour's victory in the 1964 General Election
seemed to herald a new era ofHighland development.
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The election victory was secured on the basis of a programme of economic
modernisation which appealed to both modernising fractions of capital and organised
labour (Geddes, 1984: 133-64). The government promoted an accumulation strategy
designed to modernise the British economy in the face of increased competition and
growing economic difficulties. Increased technological dynamism was regarded as the
key to transformation, and the concentration and centralisation of capital through a
series of mergers and alliances was encouraged so as to generate the economies of
scale required for large-scale investment. Associated with this was the promotion of
rational and scientific modes of economic management and state planning as the
means towards securing the key social democratic norms of full employment and
economic growth. These developments took place within the broader framework of an
established 'Fordist-Keynesian' mode of regulation in which national demand
management, the institutionalisation of collective bargaining, and the expansion of the
welfare state served to underwrite social demand, thereby guaranteeing the conditions
for continued accumulation (Jessop, 1992a, 1994). Within the general context of
modernisation and economic planning, regional policy acquired a new importance.
This trend had been a feature of the later years ofConservative government which saw
Lord Hailsham appointed as 'minister' for the North-east (Parsons, 1988: 116-19).
Initially it represented a direct response to the growing problems of the 'old' industrial
regions, but, by the early 1960s, the emphasis on modernisation and structural change
was leading to a convergence of regional policy around the idea of 'growth poles'
(Parsons, 1988: 120).
The Scottish Office, which had been converted to economic planning by the
early 1960s, played an important role in the development of the 'growth pole' concept
(Paterson, 1994: 118). In 1961 it sponsored the influential Toothill Report which
argued for a re-direction of government policy away from managing unemployment in
'problem' areas towards the provision of regional infrastructures to encourage
economic growth and modernisation (Harvie, 1977: 180-1; McCrone, 1985: 203;
Parsons, 1988: 114-5). It was within this context that the growth pole concept became
the "new panacea" for regional economic development, providing a language that
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expressed how the development of new industries would transform the fortunes of
peripheral regions (Parsons, 1988: 135). A White Paper published after Labour's
election victory emphasised the need to encourage the growth of new sectors to
replace declining 'smokestack' industries, and, in anticipation of labour shortages,
called for more co-ordinated planning (Scottish Office, 1966).
The HIDB was thus established as part of a wider programme of economic
modernisation and regional development. Through the formulation of a distinct 'state
project', the Labour government sought to unite diverse institutions and interests
behind its programme. The Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) was created in an
effort to counter the power of the Treasury whilst Economic Planning Councils were
set up in the regions to co-ordinate development (Parsons, 1988: 156-64). At the same
time, however, the establishment of the HIDB as one expression of this modernising
programme was influenced by regionally-specific factors. In particular, it was
structured by long-standing demands - initially articulated by the HDL before being
taken up by members of the Highland Panel (see p.83) and some local authorities in
the 1950s and early 1960s (Thompson, 1978) - for a powerful regional development
authority. These demands became increasingly urgent as criticisms of the fragmented
nature of the local state in the Highlands mounted, leading to a "regional crisis of the
state" that threatened state legitimacy and authority (Geddes, 1984: 133-43).
Rationalisation through the creation of a powerful interventionist body served the
interests of 'managerial' groups within the state apparatus who had developed close
links with national institutions through the Labour Party and trade unions. While the
HIDB was primarily the product of national (British) political priorities, it was
established and promoted through an appropriated discourse of regional reconstruction
and development. Although the concept's roots within regional society ensured
widespread support for the Board, its founders' radical rhetoric of 'redressing history'
fuelled structures of expectation that the HIDB was to find difficult to meet.
3.3.2. "Thinking big":3 economic modernisation 1965-76
The HIDB was established as a centralised unelected state agency based in
69
Inverness. It was linked to other parts of the state apparatus, particularly the Scottish
Office, whose role as the source of core grant funding and in appointing Board
members allowed it to shape policy development. A six-person Board directed the
activity of professional staff organised into functional divisions. Professor Robert
Grieve, a leading Scottish planner who had been a involved in the visionary Clyde
Valley Plan of the 1940s, was appointed as the first chairman. John Rollo, a lowland
industrialist with nationalist sympathies, was appointed as vice-chairman (Hunter,
1991: 152-55). The Board's four ordinary members were a former Convener of
Shetland County Council, an Easter Ross farmer, a local industrialist and a national
Trade Union official (Gillanders, 1968). This 'representational regime' reflected
broader features of state organisation under Keynesian modes of regulation: in
particular, the incorporation of private capital and organised labour as equal partners
in economic management. The lack of representation from the peripheral Gaelic-
speaking areas was contested at the time, and the perceived inaccessibility of the
Board to the demands of the crofting margins was a source of tension throughout its
early years (Gillanders, 1968; Carter, 1974).
The success of the HIDB in defining its general approach towards economic
and social development was dependent on its capacity to transform the inherited web
of economic relations into a coherent and manageable economic 'space' (Jessop,
1997b). Its initial strategy depended on identifying key sectors, companies and areas
as appropriate targets for intervention. This process of selection was channelled
through specific discursive constructions which distinguished these 'objects' of
regulation from their surrounding context, privileging them as immediate strategic
priorities. It had two crucial dimensions: distinguishing the local economy from the
broader supralocal economic environment and specifying the relationship between the
local economy and its extra-economic local environment (Jessop, 1997b: 60). The
specific characteristics of the regional economy inherited by the Board simultaneously
constrained and enabled its strategic options, defining the parameters of selection and
directing it towards particular 'objects' as targets for intervention.
In its first Annual Report, the Board sought to establish a basis for progress:
70
It is probably the measure of the problem that a host of definitions exist, are passionately
pressed upon us, and are so often mutually exclusive ... The Board ... paid great attention to all
points of view ... In the midst of such a complexity of opinion, some simple facts and aims must
be the basis of understanding and the impetus for action (HIDB, First Report: 1-2).
This not only acknowledges the competing pressures on the Board, it also emphasises
its pluralist credentials, stating that it listened to and took account of "all points of
view". The Board saw its role as that of a neutral umpire required to arbitrate between
competing demands, and identify and act upon the common interest. This need to
present itself as independent of social conflict was crucial to the Board's efforts to
construct itself as a legitimate authority empowered to impose objective solutions on
the regional problems it inherited. Such 'objective' solutions depended, however, on
equally 'objective' definitions of the 'problem'. In moving towards its own definition
of the Highland 'problem' the HIDB fell back on a "commonsense empiricism"
(Geddes, 1981: 5), stressing the importance of "some simple facts and aims" as a
starting point.
In emphasising depopulation as the "central problem" and stating that "most
opinions" accepted this (First Report: 1-2), the HIDB drew upon an established
discourse which stressed demographic loss as the crux of the Highland 'problem'.
Implicitly, however, the Board seemed to regard the depopulation problem as a
reflection of deeper economic difficulties, themselves stemming from the fact that the
Highlands had been by-passed by the "various revolutions in agriculture, industry and
technology" (First Report: 1-2). The Highland economy, as the specific 'object' of
regulation, was constructed as having been marginalised because of its isolation from
progressive historical forces. In actuality, however, the region's marginalisation was
precisely the product of its structural relations with the wider capitalist economy
(Carter, 1974; Hunter, 1976; Smith, 1992). In this sense, peripherality is activley
produced through the dynamic linkages which connect the Highlands to a wider set of
economic and political relations (see Massey, 1995). One crucial effect of the HIDB's
definition of the Highland 'problem' was to create a space for it to intercede as the
agent of regional transformation. Accordingly, the orientation of the Board's
accumulation strategy was towards the 'integration' of the Highlands into the capitalist
economy.
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As well as being shaped by inherited local economic structures, the Board's
strategy operated within the broader context of national economic policy. By 1965-66,
the Labour government's initial emphasis on growth poles and modernisation was
being balanced by a renewed commitment to directing investment to peripheral
regions (Parsons, 1988: 151-55). Following the Toothill Report, the 1965 White Paper
on the Scottish economy emphasised the need for modernisation and structural
change, identifying the Inner Moray Firth, Caithness and Lochaber as areas suitable
for industrial development (Scottish Office, 1966; Gillanders, 1968: 126). HIDB
strategy followed this line directly, identifying the same three areas as growth poles.
The Board also drew upon the White Paper in its selection of three key sectors -
manufacturing, forestry and tourism - for development. Manufacturing was presented
as the key to regional regeneration:
Manufacturing industry is very poorly represented in the Highlands and Islands. Without it, the
region will continue to lack any real possibility of a substantial enough rise in numbers to give
credibility to Highland regeneration. Modern industrial enterprises are absolutely essential in
providing more of the range of skills and initiative which will breed new enterprises and
broader the range of social and cultural leadership. (HIDB, First Report. 4).
Industrial development thus became the core of the Board's efforts to present itself as
a progressive vehicle for regional transformation. The impact of such development
would be comprehensive, modernising not only the economy but also social structures
and cultural attitudes.
The means by which the HIDB intervened in the regional economy were
structured by the combination of comprehensiveness and selectivity inscribed in the
founding legislation (Geddes, 1981). Unlike traditional regional policy, the Board was
neither limited to the provision of grants and loans nor required to assist any job-
creating activity. Key firms and sectors could thus be singled out as targets of
intervention and assisted with measures ranging from property provision to marketing
whilst less progressive units of capital were ignored. This ensured the Board could
have a substantial transforming impact on individual sectors and enterprises (Geddes,
1981). The marketing of the region to external investors was one area in which the
deployment of a specific set of discursive and material practices was directed towards
regional economic transformation. Presentations at trade fairs and exhibitions stressed
the attractions of the Highlands as a modern industrial location offering a pliable
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labour force and a high quality of life (HIDB Fourth Report 1969; Seventh Report
1972: Geddes 1981).
Whilst the HIDB followed the priorities of national economic policy, its
project of economic modernisation echoed the HDL's arguments for regional
regeneration. This selective appropriation of pre-existing discursive resources helped
to legitimate the HIDB's claims to authority by presenting its policies as responses to
long-standing demands for a powerful regional development authority. The breadth of
powers granted to the HIDB also served an important legitimising function, enabling
it to cast itself as a unique and effective regional development agency (Geddes, 1981).
The rhetoric of 'modernisation' and 'development' through which the Board strove to
present its programme as being in the interests of all social groups was underpinned
by a wider contemporary belief in the capacity of science and technology to improve
economic and social conditions.
The programme of economic modernisation through which the ambitions of
the HIDB were articulated was dependent on external economic processes generating
flows of investment into the region. It was these conditions that gave the Board's early
public pronouncements much of their "rhetorical ebullience" (Geddes, 1981: 11). The
government's decision to establish an aluminium smelter at Invergordon and the
opening-up of the North Sea for oil exploration provided external boosts to HIDB
strategy (HIDB, Third Report 1968; Fifth Report 1970). In particular, the demand for
offshore platforms and drilling rigs offered further opportunities for large-scale
industrial development in adjacent onshore areas. The HIDB saw this as providing
momentum for its growth pole strategy as it promoted the attractions of the Inner
Moray Firth area (HIDB, First Report 1967; Third Report 1968; Fourth Report 1969).
The Board's role here was largely a coordinating one, ensuring that the requirements
of developers for labour, infrastructure and housing could be met. Subsequent
developments included the decisions of the American multinationals Brown and Root
and McDermotts to locate platform fabrication yards at Nigg Bay in Easter Ross and
Ardersier outside Inverness respectively. The scale of these developments, with the
Nigg yard alone employing 5000 workers in its peak years of the late 1970s, allowed
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the Board to speak of the development of a 'linear city' along the shores of the Moray
Firth. Yet, while large-scale industrial transformation was presented as being in the
'general' interest because of its capacity to provide employment and income, its
massive impact on small communities provoked much local opposition.
The Nigg yard was opposed by a coalition of local residents, farmers and
landowners concerned about the disruption and pollution involved and viewing the
influx of industrial labour as a threat to the 'Highland way of life' (West, 1973).
Similar fears influenced the Secretary of State's decision to refuse planning
permission for the proposed Drambuie platform construction yard on the West coast
(WHFP 23.8.1974). The rhetoric of those opposing development, with their stress on
the need to protect the pre-existing character of the Highlands, echoed long-standing
notions of the region as a place separate from modernity. Concerns about the impact
of industrialisation on the landscape in particular demonstrate a striking resemblance
to arguments against hydro-electric development in the 1930s and 1940s (Lorimer,
1997b). The Board continued to be unimpressed by such arguments, dismissing
opponents for their inhibiting influence on 'development':
Where traditional impressions of the Highlands and Islands rest on romanticism and emotion
they can be a hindrance to the sound development of the region. It is the Board's duty to
provide information about the region and most of the work in press and public relations is
devoted to opening up new channels of communication so that the Highlands can be seen as
they really are (HIDB, Fifth Report: 59).
This statement illustrates the tendency to marginalise all opposition by lumping it
together as 'reactionary'. The HIDB was actively constructing a new image of the
Highlands as a modern development area containing all the pre-conditions of
industrial growth. This official discourse of development challenged romanticised
constructions of the region whilst dismissing the arguments of those groups who,
drawing on a radical tradition, expressed reservations about the entry of industrial
capital. Much of this discourse's authority rested on the Board's formal resources and
accumulated local knowledge. Since 1965 the HIDB had deployed these resources to
gather a range of infonnation on economic and demographic trends in the Highlands.
Its designation of 17 'statistical areas'4 increased the institutional capacity of the
Board, providing it with a more accurate source of data and allowing it to compare the
economic performance of different parts of the Highlands at more a detailed scale than
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had been possible previously.
The backward-looking ideologies of opponents were contrasted with the hard-
headed pragmatism of the HIDB, striving to provide 'objective' information about the
Highlands to potential investors. In the forewords of successive Annual Reports, the
Board proclaimed the progress that had been made, though acknowledging the
persistence of some key problems (HIDB, Third Report 1968; Fourth Report 169;
Seventh Report 1972). The effect of this mode of presentation, in which "progress"
was separated off from "problems" (seen as either stemming from the legacy of prior
inadequacies or as secondary by-products of the development process), was to
separate the future (progress) from an undeveloped past, leaving little room for the on¬
going contradictions of development (Geddes, 1981: 10-11).
The radical rhetoric accompanying the establishment of the HIDB fuelled local
structures of expectation, leading many residents to anticipate a substantial assault on
the existing structure of land-ownership. The Board's compulsory purchase powers
gave it the capacity to introduce new forms of ownership (Geddes, 1981). But the
First Report took a cautious line, stressing the complexity of the issues, and insisting
on the need for a "land use plan". In response to concerns about the inhibiting effect
of large estates on development, the Board saw the problem as one of land use,
initiating a programme of comprehensive development in two sample areas in order to
encourage more intensive utilisation of land (HIDB, Second Report 1967; Third
Report 1968). This tendency to turn social and political questions regarding the
structure of land ownership into technical questions of land use (Geddes, 1984: 195-
218) reflected the HIDB's general construction of its role as a neutral and objective
body standing above the conflicting demands of regional society.
3.3.3 Recession, Resistance, Re-appraisal
After more than a century of decline, population levels had risen markedly in
the early 1970s (Table 3.2). While the HIDB sought to take credit from this, its
cridibility was undermined by the unevemiess of growth. By the early 1970s, there
was evidence that oil-related development in Easter Ross was drawing labour out of
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peripheral areas like Lewis, thereby intensifying the rural depopulation problem that
the Board had been set up to address ()WHFP 4.5.1973; HIDB, Ninth Report 1974:
15). This forced it to recognise the problem of 'unbalanced development' {Eighth
Report, 1973: foreword).
Table 3.2. Population Change by local authority area,5 1961-81
Area 1971 1974 1981
HIDB Area 298,331 308,913 340,50!
Caithness 27,779 27,901 27,636
Sutherland 13,634 13,410 13,308
Ross and Cromarty 34,600 38,226 46,687
Skye and Lochalsh 9,644 9,759 10,602
Lochaber 18,674 19,226 19,491
Inverness 49,004 51,897 57,101
Badenoch and 8,736 9,043 9,859
Strathspey
Nairn 8,304 8,906 9,953
Orkney 17,137 17,462 19,047
Shetland 17,535 18,445 23,388
Western Isles 30,327 30,060 31,637
Argyll and Bute 62,957 64,578 66,141
Source: HIDB, Fifteenth Report 1980: 115; Eighteenth Report 1983: 62.
By the mid-1970s, the HIDB's approach to development was provoking
resistance in peripheral areas, where it was regarded as an unresponsive and
inaccessible agency lacking real commitment to rural development {WHFP 4.5.1973;
Ennew 1981; Geddes, 1981; 1984: 227-237). Accusations of secrecy regarding its
response to claims that the bulk of investment was being concentrated in growth areas
and generally poor public relations blighted the Board's relations with crofting society
(Geddes, 1981). The increasing perception of anti-local discrimination - that the HIDB
favoured development proposals from incoming entrepreneurs over those of local
people - was articulated through the local press {WHFP 11.5.1979). 'Structures of
expectations' raised by the creation of the HIDB were being disappointed, and the
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tendency to express this disappointment through an established local-incomer
dichotomy suggests that it was being translated into more familiar terms through
existing discursive resources. Increasingly, these complaints were being expressed as
part of a broader process of mobilisation as crofting communities discovered a new
assertiveness and confidence (MacDonald, 1990). Radical traditions were re-activated
and re-articulated to form an oppositional discourse of cultural and community
regeneration in the crofting areas (Geddes, 1984: 230). This discourse was channelled
through key institutional sites, particularly the new all-purpose Western Isles Council,
established by the 1974 round of local government re-organisation (see below), which
provided resources to support the Gaelic language and crofting economy.
At the same time as these developments were exerting increasing pressure on
the Board, economic recession was curtailing the supply of external investment. There
had also been a significant change in personnel as a new chairman, Sir Kenneth
Alexander, a leading economist closely linked to the Labour Party, replaced the
previous Conservative appointee in late 1975 (WHFP 17.10.1975). These
developments converged to prompt a shift in the Board's activities. In particular, the
decision to launch a scheme of community cooperatives in the peripheral areas
marked a radical departure from previous policy6 (HIDB, Twelfth Report, 1977). It can
be seen as a response to the political problems stemming from the HIDB's failure to
reverse the long-standing pattern of economic and social decline in the North-west.
The scheme sought to address the specific development problems of these areas by
drawing upon their communal traditions (Geddes, 1981). In this period, the Board also
began to develop a network of local offices in order to address the accusation that it
was inaccessible, while it expressed support for the Gaelic language and developed
proposals for the compulsory purchase of under-utilised estates (HIDB, Twelfth
Report, 1977).
The reorganisation of local government in Scotland in 1974 had major
implications for the Highlands. The rationale behind the re-organisation was one of
modernisation. The existing structure of local government was perceived, particularly
by the Scottish Office, as archaic and fragmented. The parochialism and traditionalism
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ofmany local authorities sat uneasily with the prevailing ethos of economic planning
and modernisation (Hutchison, 1996: 60-1). The demand for large-scale authorities
with the resource base to provide integrated services and greater strategic coordination
resulted in the creation of Regional Councils as part of a two-tier structure of local
government. In the Highlands, after considerable lobbying and negotiation, three all-
purpose island authorities, Highland Regional Council (HRC), and eight District
Councils came into operation in May 1975 (Kerr, 1990; HRC, 1996). While the
tradition of political independence survived, 'modernisation' seems to have enhanced
the power of internal bureaucracies and encouraged the emergence of a new
generation of professional councillors.
The relationships between the HIDB and local authorities were complex.
Although both organisations shared similar goals of economic and social
development, the means by which these were to be achieved became the subject of
periodic dispute. While formal liaison meetings ensured some strategic coordination,
the different functions and territorial remits of the HIDB and local authorities
produced conflict. These could become acute if a council felt that HIDB activity was
undermining their authority or, in contrast, if they felt that their area was being
neglected. The tendency of local councillors to periodically deploy a rhetoric of
democracy and public service to oppose HIDB claims7 (WHFP 24.5.1989) seemed to
reflect their perceptions of being marginalised by technocratic authority.
The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed a transformation of the Highlands. The
nature of the Highland 'problem' changed as new economic sectors replaced traditional
industries. The increasing diversity of local economic conditions within the
Highlands clashed with established perceptions of a monolithic 'problem' region
disadvantaged by the absence of modern industry. Instead of introducing a new era of
growth and prosperity, processes ofmodernisation accentuated established patterns of
uneven development. The 'back-wash' effects of large-scale industrial development
encouraged labour migration from the rural periphery, intensifying the problem of de¬
population that the HIDB had been set up to address. The Board's tendency to view
local cultures as obstacles to development, shown by its dismissal of legitimate
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concerns about the impact of modernisation on local communities, alienated many
potential supporters. While the HIDB changed the focus of its activities in an effort to
address these problems in the late 1970s, economic recession was forcing it to focus
its energies on the struggle to keep key projects afloat (Grassie, 1983: 116-129). The
hardest blow came in December 1981 when the flagship Invergordon smelter closed.8
This event seemed to signal a final shattering of "the 1960s dream of implanting large-
scale industry into the Highlands" (Wilson in WHFP 8.1.92), and called into question
the future viability of grandiose projects of economic modernisation.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has placed the politics of economic development in the Scottish
Highlands within the broader context of the historical construction of the Scottish
Highlands as 'problem' region. The 1886 Crofters' Act institutionalised the Scottish
Highlands as a distinct administrative region. From this date, it was constituted as a
'problem' region requiring special measures as an official discourse of development
was produced and channelled through state agencies. The often unspoken aim of
Highland development in the twentieth century has been to 'redress history'. Much of
the power of 'development' as state strategy stems from its capacity to promise
improved material conditions without redistributing resources between social groups.
Demands for regional development in the face of continuing economic decline
were not realised until 1965 when the Labour Party adopted the cause of Highland
development as it developed a distinctive electoral appeal to break Conservative
hegemony. Although the establishment of the HIDB was crucially dependent on it
being adopted by one of the major national political parties as policy, the idea was
rooted in regional society. Once established, the HIDB formulated a modernising
project which aimed to attract industrial investment by constructing the region as a
modern development area. In some respects, the strategy of modernisation proved
highly successful as oil-related development in particular transformed regional
structures. The HIDB's perceived neglect of the crofting periphery provoked criticism,
however, and, as recession undermined the conditions on which modernisation
depended, the Board adjusted its strategy in the late 1970s. This suggests that while
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the HIDB was largely the product of a national political agenda, it needed to respond
to local pressures in order to maintain legitimacy.
By the late 1970s, the combination of economic recession and political change
threatened to undermine the HIDB's status and autonomy. At the same time as
recession was leading to the closure ofmany of the 'branch plant' enterprises attracted
North since the 1960s, the social democratic state regime was facing crisis. Its
inability to address the percieved causes of 'stagflation' spawned a vigorous right-
wing critique. As the economic and social consequences of state failure were
graphically demonstrated by the 'winter of discontent' in 1978-79, the Conservative
opposition was condensed into a coherent Thatcherite alternative (Hall, 1988a, 1988b;
Hay 1996a, b). The Conservative Right's success in seizing state power in 1979
allowed it to impose a new trajectory on the structures of the state (Hay, 1996a, b).
Chapter four shows how, after an initial period of consolidation, corporatist
institutions like the HIDB, faced with the constant threat of abolition, were pressured
to 'prove' their worth by demonstrating that they could successfully adapt to the
rigours of Thatcherism. It shows how the changes implemented as a result of
Conservative pressures in the early 1980s created the conditions for the HIDB to be
replaced by HIE, an agency modelled on neo-liberal principles.
Notes
1 There are obvious parallels with Raymond Williams' more holistic notion of
'structure of feeling' (Williams, 1977: 128-35).
2 The Act went beyond the Commission's recommendations in offering security of
tenure, fair rents and the right to assign tenancy .
3 This title is derived from a telegram sent by HIDB staff to the Chairman, Professor
Robert Grieve, exhorting him to continue to "think big" in the summer of 1967 amidst
evidence that the Scottish Office was shaken by the scale of the HIDB's ambitions.
(Grassie, 1983: 61).
4 When the statistical areas were established in 1970, there were 17, but by 1990 this
had risen to 23, reflecting, in part, the incorporation of West Moray and parts of
Southern Argyll/ North Ayrshire (Arran and the Cumbraes in particular) into the
HIDB area.
5 These are the post-1974 local authority areas.
6 Former HIDB official, interview 25.11.96.
7 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.11.97.
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8 See Shucksmith and Lloyd 1982; Smith 1982; Hughes 1983; Grassie 1983: 118-29;
and Young 1990 for details and viewpoints.
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Chapter 4
From the HIDB to HIE: Institutional Restructuring and Economic
Governance,1982-91
4.1. Introduction
The market, it was believed, had to be liberated from the restrictive grip of the plan and the
bureaucracy. So the project of Thatcherism ... was popularly defined ... The battle was not just
about creating a space to allow untrammeled market forces to reign, but about reconstructing
the institutional infrastructure through and around which these market forces would operate.
Markets ... had to be politically reconstructed (Peck, 1995: 25, original emphasis).
This chapter examines the transition from HIDB to HIE as part of a process of
state restructuring under the Thatcher governments. It argues that this shift can only
be understood within its broader political and strategic context. As the above quote
indicates, Thatcherite reforms did not simply involve a rolling back of the state in
order to advance the rule of the market (de-regulation). Rather, they are best
understood as part of a process of re-regulation involving the creation of new
institutions to promote and deliver Conservative policy. A range of non-elected local
agencies, including TECs, LECs, NHS Trusts, and Housing Action Trusts (HATs)
were established in the late 1980s and early 1990s, building on the earlier launch of
UDCs and Enterprise Zones (Goodwin, 1992: 82-3). TECs and LECs, launched from
1988-1991, can be seen as key "institutional metaphors" of (late) Thatcherism,
embodying many of the principles and contradictions of neo-liberal state restructuring
(Chapter one, p.7-8) (Peck and Jones, 1995: 1364).
This chapter applies the conceptual framework developed in Chapter two. The
establishment of unelected local agencies can be seen, from a regulationist
perspective, as part of a process of regulatory experimentation as state elites search for
a new 'institutional fix' to the problems of economic development in a global
economy. By promoting 'flexibility' and innovation and by attempting to harness the
enterprise and initiative of 'active citizens' within local communities, these unelected
agencies formed part of a broader project to dismantle the corporatist structures of the
1960s and 1970s and address associated problems of'dependency'. While this project
had a direct impact on the local state in England and Wales, it was mediated in
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Scotland by a distinct network of interests and institutions focused on the Scottish
Office (Moore and Booth, 1989; Paterson, 1994). The shift from the HIDB to HIE is a
product of the interaction between underlying forces of state transformation and the
pre-existing structure of regional governance (centred on the HIDB and Scottish
Office).
While the establishment of HIE in 1991 may appear to be the key moment of
transformation, this chapter contends that the key changes in local and regional
governance in the Highlands can be traced back to the early 1980s. These created the
conditions for the establishment of HIE which was then able to develop and extend
this pre-existing agenda in new directions. This argument is developed in four main
sections. Section two outlines processes of state transfonnation under Thatcherism.
The third section considers how the HIDB and SDA adjusted to these wider political
changes. Section four examines the transition from the HIDB to HIE, outlining the
key processes of LEC formation. The fifth section considers some of the effects of this
restructuring process, tracing processes of internal re-organisation and identifying a
crucial tension between local initiative and central control.
4.2. Transforming the State Regime: the Politics of Thatcherism
As a distinct political phenomena which dominated the 1980s, Thatcherism
has received much academic attention (Gamble 1988; Jessop et al., 1988; Hall 1988a,
b; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; 1995; Marsh 1995; Hay, 1996a, b). This chapter follows
critical analyses in viewing Thatcherism as a hegemonic project originating in the
rejection of the assumptions and values of social democracy and the post-war
consensus (Gamble, 1988; Jessop et al., 1988; Hay 1996a). Although its ideological
instincts were tempered by pragmatism, Thatcherism should be viewed as inherently
strategic, and its impact gauged not in terms of discrete policy outcomes but according
to its success in defining the political agenda (Hay 1996a: 128-30).
As a 'state project', Thatcherism sought to marginalise and exclude trade
unions and local authorities from the privileged position they occupied under social
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democracy whilst creating new channels of delivery to mobilise strategically
significant sections of the population. In gaining state power in 1979, the
Conservatives capitalised on the mounting economic and political difficulties of the
1970s, successfully 'narrating' the 1978-79 'winter of discontent' as a crisis caused by
Fordist-Keynesian techniques of intervention (Hay, 1995; 1996b).' Before radical
changes in the representational regime of the state could be introduced, however, the
Conservatives were faced with the immediate task of political consolidation.
Consequently, the period from 1979-85 was dominated by a struggle to assert political
control over the institutions and structures inherited from the previous state regime.
One of the principal aims of Thatcherism was to limit public expenditure.
According to the Thatcherite critique, state spending had burgeoned out of control as a
result of the 'excessive' demands of organised labour and local authorities in the 1960s
and 1970s. This diagnosis was rapidly translated into a 'new managerialism' in the
early 1980s as the government sought to improve efficiency, economy and
effectiveness within the public sector (Day and Klein, 1987: 37-44; Gray, 1997: 343-
4). Accordingly, local authorities were required to publish information on spending
and performance and subjected to increasingly stringent audit requirements. In this
way, the 'enclosures' of professional groups in the public sector were breached by a
new calculative technology associated with the rise of neo-liberal governmentalities
(Rose and Miller, 1992: 198-201; Rose, 1996a: 54-56). These techniques depend upon
the authority and apparent objectivity of the 'grey sciences' - disciplines such as
accountancy, economics and management which have risen to prominence in the
1980s and 1990s (Rose, 1996a: 54). Beneath the apparent neutrality of these forms of
technical expertise, however, 'target' groups claimed that managerial procedures
functioned as instruments of a political agenda designed to cut spending and social
provision.
A series of carefully designed reforms in the early 1980s succeeded in largely
excluding organised labour from the state regime at a time when high unemployment
was eroding the basis of trade union power (Gamble, 1988: 103-4, 115-17; Jessop et
al., 1988: 151). Local authorities, which had played a major role in underwriting
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collective consumption under social democracy, formed the other main target for
Conservative policy (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Stoker 1989; Goodwin 1992;
Stoker and Mossberger 1995; Stewart and Stoker 1995; Goodwin and Painter 1996).
The clash between government policy and the alternative strategies developed by
radical Labour-controlled councils in the major metropolitan regions sparked a major
politicisation of local-central relations (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). Tight control of
local government finance, coupled with the abolition of the metropolitan country
councils in 1985, enabled the government to assert its agenda (Goodwin, 1992: 79-83;
Stewart and Stoker, 1995). The net result of all these changes was to consolidate an
'undemocratic centralism' which increased the power of the central executive relative
to Parliament, elected local government and interest groups (Jessop et al., 1988: 82,
145-47, 175-77; Gamble, 1988: 128-33, 231-36).
Controlling inflation was the key initial priority of Conservative economic
policy. After the abandonment of the Keynesian commitment to full employment, the
period from 1979-82 was dominated by the struggle to impose a monetarist-inspired
austerity programme (Gamble 1988: 102-10; Jessop et al., 1988: 62-3). The impact of
spending cuts and high unemployment provoked considerable opposition, and it took
the "popular triumph" of the Falklands War in 1982 to bolster the authority of the
state and create a space for the formulation and implementation of a more radical
programme of economic and social restructuring (Gamble, 1988: 111, 119-20). After
1983 a more positive and contradictory accumulation strategy began to emerge as
monetarist orthodoxy was relaxed and a more expansionist programme embraced.
In place of the techniques of national demand management privileged under
Keynesianism, supply-side strategies were emphasised. The Conservatives sought to
'free' local factor markets from intervention by reducing trade union and local
authority influence over the labour process, land markets and investment programmes
(Chisholm, 1990: 123-30; Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993: 61-66). Increasingly, social
policy was subordinated to the demands of economic competitiveness as wage
bargaining was decentralised and entitlement to social security payments reduced
(Jessop, 1994; Peck and Jones, 1995). Cuts in direct taxation aimed to increase work
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incentives and, together with a range of related initiatives, promote 'entrepreneurship'.
Deregulation and the privatisation of large segments of the public sector sought to
enhance efficiency by re-asserting market disciplines (Jessop et al., 1988: 169-71).
These policies were designed and implemented within the context of an open
economy. This not only reflected a restatement of the traditional British liberal
commitment to free trade, it also signaled a privileging of the interests of the financial
sector and international capital over domestic industry (Gamble, 1988: 225-7). Efforts
to improve the 'flexibility' and competitiveness of local and regional economies
increasingly came to focus on up-grading their technological capacity and creating a
more skilled workforce (Chisholm, 1990). Consequently, training policy assumed
greater significance as the 1980s wore on.
As a hegemonic project, Thatcherism sought to promote popular capitalism
and the entrepreneurial society over the collectivist values of the post-war settlement
(Jessop et al., 1988: 169-71. This involved concerted efforts to dismantle the social
and organisational bases of Labourism and social democracy. Rather than representing
a functional response to a pre-formed business agenda, Thatcherism actively
constructed business 'needs' through political discourse (Peck, 1995: 27). After
deflationary policies provoked early opposition from sections of corporate capital,
Thatcherism gradually gained the support of the business community as the
programme of liberalisation and deregulation gained momentum (Gamble, 1988: 217;
Peck, 1995: 21). Although the rhetoric of enterprise and self-reliance was important in
channeling and mobilising popular support, the electoral success of Thatcherism after
1982 was crucially dependent on its capacity to offer material benefits through tax
cuts, council house sales and the expansion of financial credit (Jessop et al., 1988: 78-
9). Given the weakness of a divided opposition, the strength of market-led recovery
from 1982-88 in delivering economic prosperity for a privileged majority placed the
Conservatives in a strong electoral position (Gamble, 1988: 188-20).
In the longer-term, however, the highly unequal impact of Thatcherism as a
'two-nation' strategy that sought to displace the costs of restructuring onto
marginalised sections of the population limited its electoral appeal (Jessop et
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a/., 1988). Key social democratic norms of universal citizenship and full employment
were rejected in favour of a rhetoric of enterprise, choice and self-reliance. This
involved a "re-coding of dividing practices" as new divisions were drawn between
affiliated and marginalised groups (Rose, 1996b: 340). Those groups thought capable
of'active citizenship' and privatised consumption were favoured and supported while
those deemed incapable of self-management were actively stigmatised as undeserving
and parasitic.
By the mid-1990s, it was clear that the Conservatives had presided over a
period of profound structural transformation (Hay, 1996a: 107-8, 151). The corporatist
structures inherited from social democracy had been dismantled as part of a broader
agenda to smash the social and organisational bases of Labourism (see Jessop et al.,
1988). A series of unelected, business-led agencies had been established at the local
level in the late 1980s and early 1990s to by-pass elected local authorities and
organised labour. From a 'strategic-relational' perspective, the key role of local
business elites points to the state's need to incorporate interest groups in processes of
economic management (Jones, 1997a, 1998b: 982). By mobilising business, the
Conservatives were able to expand the repertoire of techniques of intervention and
channel rewards to a key part of their social base whose support was vital in the
struggle against social democracy. Consequently, the outlines of a new 'post-
corporatist' state were discernible, based upon a bipartite relationship between
government and business as a new local-elitist mode of representation emerged to
replace the old tripartism (Peck, 1992; 1995).2 In Scotland, however, Thatcherism
faced considerable resistance, not only from populist forces, but also from established
institutional networks focused around the Scottish Office who saw it as their role to
guard the institutional autonomy granted by the Treaty ofUnion (Paterson, 1994).
4.3. Adjusting to the Thatcherite Agenda: Economic Governance in Scotland,
1982-88
In the corporatist era, two state development agencies, the HIDB and the SDA,
had been set up as a response to regional economic decline. They quickly became
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incorporated into the Scottish institutional system, becoming symbols of its
distinctiveness (Moore and Booth, 1989). In the 1980s their ability to adapt to the
agenda of the Thatcher governments seemed to have secured the survival of the SDA
and HIDB (Danson et al., 1993). By 1988, however, the rise of'radical' Thatcherism
in a climate of rapid economic growth was exerting pressure for far-reaching
institutional change in Scotland. In order to understand how the Scottish Enterprise
(SE) and HIE networks emerged from this process of institutional restructuring, it is
necessary to briefly outline the key features of the network of institutions and interests
focused upon the Scottish Office before considering how the HIDB adapted to
Thatcherism.
4.3.1 Defending Difference: Scottish Institutional Networks
History has dictated that the arrangements for governing the United Kingdom,
a multinational state, reflect its territorial diversity. The Scottish Office, a
territorially-defined department of central government, was established in 1885 and
re-located from London to Edinburgh in 1939 in response to complaints about the
inadequacy of existing institutional arrangements to address distinctively Scottish
interests (Kellas, 1989: 30-3; Paterson, 1994: 62-3). From the 1930s onwards, the
administrative system was professionalised and bureaucratised as successive
governments sought to incorporate professional expertise into the state apparatus.
According to Paterson (1994), this has provided Scotland with a ruling technocracy,
with state authority exercised by groups of professional experts working through a
dense network of institutions and agencies. After 1945, much of this activity took the
form ofmanaging the development of the Welfare State in Scotland. The lobbying of
organised interests for extra resources from the centre was channelled through the
Scottish Office, whose closeness to the policy networks and interest groups it had
sponsored gave it representational legitimacy (Paterson, 1994: 109-17).
By the mid-1960s, economic development and planning was becoming an
increasingly important activity as the Scottish Office promoted the notion of a
distinctively Scottish economic interest (Paterson, 1994: 118-20). The protracted
decline of the Scottish economy, with its basis in an integrated complex of basic
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manufacturing and extractive industries, fostered a reliance on the state (Paterson,
1994: 117-23). By the 1980s, the Scottish economy was regulated by a dense network
of regulatory institutions. As well as the Scottish Office, SDA and HIDB, these
included the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC), CBI Scotland, the Scottish
Council (Development and Industry), COSLA, the Scottish Federation of Small
Businesses, Scottish Financial Enterprise, the Scottish Council for Voluntary
Organisations, the Scottish Association of Chambers of Commerce, Locate in
Scotland and Scottish Trade International (MacLeod, 1997a: 301-2; 1999: 9). The
structures of regional (Highland) governance sketched in Chapter one (p. 10-12) can be
conceptualised as nested within this broader regulatory system.
According to Moore and Booth (1989), relations between Scottish institutions
developed through a form of negotiated order as distinct groups came together to
define a collective interest in managing change. This reflects a close relationship
between institutions, associated interest groups and an underlying sense of identity
which gives Scotland an administrative autonomy and scope for policy manoeuvre
that the English regions lack (Moore and Booth, 1989: 15-6, 82-85, 147-9). Both
Moore and Booth (1989: 19, 24) and MacLeod (1997a: 301-2) report respondents
referring to these closely-textured institutional arrangements as the 'Scottish village'.
Although the HIDB was very much part of this system by the early 1980s, its position
on the Highland periphery left it marginal to many of the key networks.
While undoubtedly constituting a distinctive regulatory system, the 'Scottish
village' did not function independently of central government. It had limited scope to
pursue its own agenda, provided this did not conflict with the polices of central
government (Moore and Booth, 1989: 25). The relative position of the various
organisations and interests shifted in line with central agendas, so that the alliances
forming around the Scottish Office were continually being fractured and re¬
assembled. The increasing exclusion of the STUC during the 1980s shows the
influence of central ideology in structuring the representational regime of the Scottish
'village' (Moore and Booth, 1989: 86-104). In some ways, the impact of Thatcherism
forced a defensive uniting of interests against this external threat. Scottish elites
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lacked the capacity to form an alternative strategy, however, and individual
institutions were ultimately forced to engineer their survival by adapting to the new
political climate.
4.3.2 Restructuring the SDA and HIDB
There can be little doubt that the suspicion of the new Conservative
government in 1979 towards corporatist institutions extended towards the HIDB and
SDA (Danson et al., 1990; 1993; MacLeod, 1999: 10). Consequently, they were
immediately identified as key objects of regulation. While the government deployed
the tools of the 'new managerialism' to regulate the activities of the HIDB as it strove
to exert political control over the interventionist structures it inherited, these same
tools were also deployed by the board itself as it sought to allocate resources
efficiently across a range of programmes.3 As part of its efforts to engineer its
survival, the HIDB re-packaged its radical-sounding Community Cooperative
Scheme:
It started off as the Community Cooperative Project or Programme and we kind of changed that
to the Community Enterprise Programme ... It was about the time of the change of government
and it seemed more in tune with the ... acceptable terminology, and we're not averse to ...
dressing up in the appropriate clothes.4
The 1981-7 period saw the SDA and HIDB gradually adapt to the market-led
paradigm of economic development as they moved away from interventionism to
adopt an increasingly commercialised profile (Danson, et al., 1990, 1993). As chapter
three highlighted, the HIDB was in a state of crisis by early 1982. While there is
clearly a sense in which the government expected the HIDB to adapt to its agenda, the
board was not a passive recipient of central directives. Rather, it actively used
elements of the new policy agenda to re-focus its strategic priorities and re-cast its
'official discourse'.
Apart from its role as the key funding source, the principal means by which the
government could exert political influence over public agencies like the HIDB was
through its power to appoint board members. The representational regimes of the
HIDB and SDA were restructured during the early 1980s as the government increased
the number of business leaders on their respective boards (Scottish Office, 1985;
Moore and Booth, 1989: 28; MacLeod, 1999: 10). The organisational cultures of both
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agencies were transformed by the introduction of private sector practices such as
performance-related pay (Moore and Booth, 1989: 69).5 Individuals such as George
Matthewson, the new SDA Chief Executive, and Robert Cowan, the new HIDB
Chairman (appointed in 1982), a former Hong Kong merchant banker, seem to have
been recruited as change-agents to bring in a more commercial approach. According
to one former HIDB board member, appointed in 1987:
Certainly it looked as if [x] and I had been brought in to give the place a bit of a shake again as
outsiders if you like, people with different backgrounds, and we were certainly given the remit
to make sure it didn't get too cosy ... They'd already been, before I got there, the big change
which was from saying this was a super-experimental organisation to saying that this has got to
be an agency that delivers and is measured on what it delivers ... I think Bob Cowan was
brought in to do that.6
This represents a clear statement from a well-positioned source that key changes took
place in the early 1980s, pre-dating the introduction of HIE by almost a decade. From
1982-83, HIDB Reports became increasingly coloured by the rhetoric of the
'enterprise culture' as the rather utilitarian style of its earlier Reports was replaced by
the glossy brochures characteristic of development agency literature in the 1980s and
1990s. The adoption of a rhetoric of 'efficiency' and 'value-for-money' provides
insights into the Board's struggle to survive in the face of government suspicion:
We have been striving to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Many small cases are processed
promptly and under powers delegated to staff. In the total investment, the ratio of private
investment to our contribution continues to grow ... representing better value for HIDB money
(HIDB, 21st Report 1986: foreword).
This quote indicates that the Board perceived itself to be under considerable political
pressure to emphasise government priorities. The "continual squeeze on efficiency"
was one manifestation of these pressures.7
In terms of strategy, the HIDB and SDA seem to have enjoyed greater
autonomy. The limited scope of Scottish institutions to pursue their own strategic
priorities extended into the 1980s with consensually-minded ministers like George
Younger, Scottish Secretary from 1979-86, willing to support initiatives that did not
conflict with government policy. It is important to recognise that while the
government could monitor such initiatives through its direct powers over the board, it
also depended upon the accumulated local knowledge and experience of agencies like
the HIDB to deliver credible responses to particular local issues and problems. In
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order to retain the legitimacy and authority of the state, government is forced to work
through established local and regional institutions.
As the marginal location of the Highlands militated against a concentration on
large-scale inward investment in the changed economic conditions of the 1980s, the
HIDB adjusted its strategic priorities, moving further away from the industrial
modernisation of the 1960s and 1970s. It sought to stimulate local entrepreneurial
capacities by encouraging the development of small businesses and the exploitation of
local resources. The Board's re-launched strategy focused on the need for economic
diversification in peripheral areas while continuing to pledge support for traditional
industries (HIDB, 17th Report, 1982). The HIDB's relative strategic autonomy
allowed it to extend its network of local area offices and strengthen its support for
community development and the Gaelic language. Increasingly, the HIDB viewed
'community action' as an important foundation for economic development because of
its role in increasing confidence and skills (HIDB, 18th Report, 1983: 28).
The shift away from large-scale investments towards more 'endogenous',
'bottom-up' forms of development allowed the HIDB to recover credibility after the
difficulties of the early 1980s. By removing a key source of criticism after a
succession of high-profile failures in the 1970s and by encouraging local 'solutions',
the Board was able to restore some of its damaged reputation:
My personal view is that the HIDB was getting much better towards the end of its life. Before it
had been involved in a lot of big investments which didn't come off... but latterly there were
signs that it was becoming more interested in development from within ... supporting local
resources and businessesA
Together with the enhanced role of local area offices and its increased support for
cultural initiatives, this increased interest in 'local' development signalled that the
HIDB was becoming more accessible and 'user-friendly'. The combination of a
detailed knowledge of local conditions and the HIDB's formal resources as part of the
state apparatus enabled it to balance the demands of government paymasters with
those of local communities. The impact of Thatcherism on the Highlands was
crucially mediated by pre-existing institutional forms, with the HIDB able to ensure
that local priorities were not subordinated to the dictates of an externally-derived
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political agenda.
The SDA and HIDB were subject to a series of stringent government reviews
during the 1980s. While these reflected the perceived need to assert political control
over the agencies, there was clearly an underlying recognition that outright abolition,
in many ways the logical consequence of Thatcherite ideology, would be politically
damaging (Moore and Booth, 1989: 111: MacLeod, 1999: 10). Indeed, despite the
general squeeze on public spending, established funding levels were maintained.9 The
joint Scottish Office - Treasury review of 1987 concluded that, though the Board had
had a "positive impact on the confidence and entrepreneurial spirit" of the Highlands,
the general rationale for public intervention remained since an "irreversible
improvement in economic and social conditions" had not yet been secured (IDS,
1987: 112, 119). The official view that the HIDB's role was one of correcting market
failure implied that it should concentrate on services that the market could not
provide, seeking to support rather than displace commercial actors in the longer-term.
For much of the 1980s, official recognition that any talk of abolition would spark a
stonn of political protest was enough to contain proposals for radical reform from the
ideological fringes of the Conservative Party. Yet major changes in the organisational
practices and discourses of the HIDB had taken place in the early-to-mid 1980s as it
adapted to Conservative policy (Danson et al., 1990), establishing a basis for further
reform:
I think the big change happened ... between Bob[Cowan]'s arrival and the time I got there
[1987] there was ... another sort of consolidation if you like when people were coming in, and I
think then you got a structure ... that HIE ... could be built on.10
After the 1987 election, circumstances changed as rapid economic growth and falling
unemployment encouraged more radical reform.
4.4 Establishing the Enterprise Networks in Scotland
By 1988 rapid growth was stoking government rhetoric about the British
'economic miracle' (Evans, 1992: 132; Peck, 1993: 290). This formed the context for
the introduction of Employment Training, a new adult training programme based
firmly upon neo-liberal principles (King, 1993: 225). Previously, the government had
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been forced to use the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) to manage the
unemployment crisis of the early 1980s (Evans, 1992: 49-89). Whilst the
Conservatives were able to mould the MSC to their distinctive policy agenda, its
tripartite regime was retained, largely because the involvement of organised labour
through the Trade Union Congress (TUC) played an important role in legitimating
government policy (Evans, 1992: 53-6).
Employment Training was linked to welfare policy as the 1988 and 1989
Social Security Acts made eligibility for benefits dependent on applicants' willingness
to participate in training schemes (King, 1993: 227-29; Jones, 1996a: 143)." The
resistance this provoked from organised labour created the political space for radical
change to the institutional architecture of training and economic development policy
(Jones, 1997a).'2 Trade union opposition was rooted in concerns about compulsion
leading to the introduction of workfare, together with the proposal that participants
would receive only their state benefits plus an extra £10 a week (Evans, 1992: 112-19;
King, 1993: 225-30). This fracturing of the existing representational regime gave the
government the opportunity it needed to announce major changes to the system
(Jones, 1997a). In response to the TUC's decision not to participate, the Employment
Secretary, Norman Fowler, announced in September 1988 that the Training
Commission would be abolished in favour of a new Training Agency with immediate
effect (Evans, 1992: 116-19; King, 1993: 227). This ended the tripartite system of
representation as the new Training Agency was established as an executive agency of
the Department of Employment. At the same time, however, the collapse of tripartism
encouraged further interest in local employer-led agencies.
The 1987 manifesto commitment to reform training policy accelerated the
search for more radical solutions. In particular, it reinforced interest in the experience
of the American Private Industry Councils (PICs), local business-led bodies charged
with delivering economic development, as Fowler and officials from the Department
of Employment made a number of trips to Boston to study the practices of the
Massachusetts PIC (Evans, 1992: 127-8; Bennett et a/.,1994: 58; Jones, 1997a). At
the same time, the proposals of a leading Scottish entrepreneur, Bill Hughes, then
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chairman of the Scottish CBI and a leading light in the Scottish Conservative Party, to
create local employer-led agencies to take over the role of the SDA, attracted high-
level government attention (Moore 1989; Jones, 1997a). The 'Hughes Initiative' was
attractive to Scottish ministers to the extent that it enabled them to address the
political perception that the Conservatives could never 'own' the SDA and HIDB
because of these agencies' corporatist origins and structure (Moore, 1989; MacLeod,
1999: 14-19). Following meetings at Chequers in September 1988, the Prime Minister
'bought' the radical PIC model (Jones, 1997a).
Following the Cabinet agreement to opt for local employer-led agencies,
separate white papers were drawn up for England and Wales and Scotland, reflecting
their distinct institutional arrangements. The December 1988 White Paper,
Employment for the 1990s, introduced TECs as the core of the new approach in
England and Wales (Department of Employment, 1988). The intention was to set up a
network of some 80-100 employer-led TECs to take over responsibility for training
and enterprise development (Peck, 1992, 1993: Bennett et al., 1994). In many ways,
the move towards local training agencies represented the logical culmination of a
supply-side policy that had run up against limited labour productivity and a lack of
skills as fundamental barriers to local competitiveness.13 Beginning from the
assumption that government policy had provided economic prosperity, the White
Paper drew on a discourse of globalisation and technological change to proclaim the
need for a 'skills revolution' in order to match competitors (Jones, 1997a). Given the
expected tightening of the labour market, due to falling unemployment and
demographic changes, TECs signaled a shift away from schemes for the unemployed
towards a focus on improving the skills of those in work (Department of Employment,
1988). Of central importance was to be TECs capacity to match the delivery of
training to local circumstances, an emphasis that reflected the supply-side orientation
of government policy, with its concern to encourage labour-market flexibility (Evans,
1992: 134-47). This was accompanied by a rhetoric of local 'empowerment' where it
was argued that decentralisation would allow local business leaders, working closely
with other agents, to build local capacity and thereby overcome the legacy of failed
centralist solutions (Bennett et al., 1994: 1-2, 25-9).
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The December 1988 Scottish Office White Paper, 'Scottish Enterprise: A New
Approach to Training and Enterprise Creation', applied the principles agreed by the
Cabinet to the Scottish context (IDS, 1988). Specifically, the proposals consisted of
three main elements. First, training and economic development, previously the
preserve of separate agencies, the Training Agency and the SDA/ HIDB respectively,
were to be integrated. Second, the role of the private sector was to be greatly
expanded:
A way has to be found of encouraging the private sector to take more responsibility.
Decentralisation to the local level will help, but to achieve greater private sector involvement...
a shift is required from a bureaucratic system within which the private sector has a purely
advisory role to one which is led by the private sector. The private sector can best be brought to
centre-stage by giving real responsibility to a strong, employer-based body. At its most effective
such a delivery mechanism should emerge as a powerful agent of change with the capacity to
galvanise employers and influence local development. (IDS, 1988: 9-10).
Accordingly, the White Paper and the subsequent legislation required that two-thirds
of the places on the boards of the new agencies were filled by employers (IDS, 1988:
15). State restructuring was thus channelled through particular forms of strategic
selectivity that privileged the interests and agendas of local business elites. The
emerging pattern of representation reflected the political imperative ofmobilising and
rewarding those groups that made up the social base of Thatcherism. Members of
LEC boards are appointed as individuals, on the basis of their particular experience or
knowledge, rather than as representatives of any established interest or organisation
(IDS, 1988: 11-12; Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990).
Third, business leadership was to be linked to 'local empowerment' in that the
establishment of local agencies directed by business elites would ensure the
'flexibility' and 'responsiveness' of the new system (IDS, 1988). This localist rhetoric
was located within a broader discourse of active citizenship and community
responsibility. It reflects a shift away from the welfarism and social government of the
1960s and 1970s in favour a new process of 'governing through community' (Rose,
1996a, b). Discourses of community were mobilised in response to criticisms about
the uncaring nature of government policy based on an amoral market individualism
(Kearns, 1995: Peck 1995: 30-1). 'Community' was privileged as government sought
to harness and mobilise the networks of mutual obligation and moral responsibility
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binding individuals together (Rose, 1996b). Local employers working to set up LECs
in their areas were advised to work in partnership with the local community to
maximise their chances of being awarded the operating contract (IDS, 1989: 6). The
alternative morality created by discourses of community and citizenship, based on
individuals taking on responsibility for their own lives within relations of mutual
obligation, became a key strand of'radical' and 'late' Thatcherism (Kearns, 1995: Peck
1995; Rose, 1996b). It established new lines of inclusion and exclusion: supporting
those capable of active choice and self-reliance while re-coding impoverished groups
such as the unemployed as the authors of their own misfortunes (Rose, 1996b).
The origins of the 'Hughes Initiative' within Scottish elite networks meant that
key proposals in the subsequent White Paper generated considerable consensus. Given
the underlying rejection of Thatcherism in Scotland, a failure to recognise its
distinctive institutional arrangements by imposing the same measures proposed for
England and Wales (TECs) would have been likely to provoke opposition. In the
event, the integration of training and economic development and the decentralisation
to local agencies received the support of key interests (STUC, 1994; COSLA, 1994),
allowing the Scottish Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, to claim "enormous support" for
the proposals (Hansard, 9.6.1990). The requirement for the private sector to have a
two-thirds majority on LEC boards, however, sparked often bitter controversy as trade
unions, local authorities and the voluntary sector contested their marginalisation
within the new representational regime (Moore, 1989; Danson, et al., 1989; see also
Scottish Affairs Committee, 1995).
The White Paper noted the continuing distinctiveness of the Highlands, stating
that while general policy principles would be applied, delivery mechanisms would
need to be adapted to the special circumstances of the region (IDS, 1988). In its
response, the HIDB expressed broad support for the government's proposals (HIDB,
1989). However, it counselled a more evolutionary approach to the establishment of
local agencies, arguing that it had already addressed this concern through the creation
and expansion of its network of area offices. The Board's desire to control the pace
and direction of change reflected a concern that external political pressures would
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impose inappropriate measures:
It was widely felt that although it was an understandable prescription for the Central Belt ... It
didn't really take account sufficiently of the differences between SDA and HIDB and that
therefore in a sense HIE was going to be formed on a somewhat false set of assumptions.14
The HIDB soon realised, however, the strength of the government's political will to
restructure the institutional architecture of intervention in Scotland, and decided to
campaign for the retention of a separate agency for the Highlands and Islands. After a
brief period of consultation, symptomatic of neo-liberal 'fast' policy (Jessop 1995b;
MacLeod, 1999: 12), the government announced in July 1989 that it had decided to
set up two new bodies, Scottish Enterprise to replace the SDA, and HIE to replace the
HIDB (Hansard 26.7.1989). Each would be made up of a network of LECs and a
central strategic core.
Initially, the HIDB suggested setting up seven local agencies, which it termed
Local Enterprise Boards, based upon the three island groups and a simple fourfold
division of the mainland (HIDB, 1989). The Scottish Office feared, however, that
these (geographically) large areas would conflict with the principle of local delivery
(Bennett et al., 1994: 44-5).15 It thus produced a map of 8 prospective LEC areas to
act as a guide for groups of business people forming bids for the right to run LECs
(Fig 4.1) (IDS, 1989). This strong degree of central direction contrasted with the
situation in England and Wales where TEC units emerged in a more 'bottom-up'
fashion as business groupings came together to form bids (Bennett et al., 1994: 40-43,
77-80). The Scottish Office map was subject to marginal adjustment in response to
local pressures, creating the eventual structure of ten LECs (Fig 1.1, compare Fig 4.1).
As a result of local pressure, Skye and Lochalsh gained its own LEC having originally
been grouped with Lochaber.16 The other major change involved the creation of a
single LEC linking Badenoch and Strathspey with Moray. This again reflected the
constitutive role of local politics after the Scottish Office recognised the strength of
opposition to its initial plans to incorporate each of these areas within larger territorial
units:
The reason why the LEC was set up in the first place, I mean it's a bit strange ... Badenoch and
Strathspey did not want to be with Inverness and Moray did not want to be part of Grampian ...
Aberdeen orientated, so they both didn't belong anywhere else and decided to come together
and form a LEC of their own ... They got together and signed it and put in a bid of course as all
the other LECs did for funding ... To a lot of people it was a surprise ... that they agreed to set it
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up in the first place.17
The integration of two distinct areas which had previously been administered
separately created an anomalous structure, reflected in the fact that Moray, Badenoch
and Strathspey Enterpriose (MBSE) contracts with both parent bodies.18
In other cases, however, local proposals to change the prospective map were
rejected by the Scottish Office. Most significantly, the mid-Highland bid, a proposal
to set up a LEC encompassing the entire Inner Moray Firth area (Easter Ross,
Inverness, Nairn and Moray), the economic heartland of the region, lost out to
separate bids for Inverness and Nairn, Ross and Cromarty and Moray, Badenoch and
Strathspey (Fig 4.1). Whilst the two changes that were accepted were relatively
marginal, this proposal was more far-reaching. It appears to have been rejected
because it clashed with underlying objectives. The industrial power of a mid-Highland
LEC would have created an imbalance, leading to 'horizontal' tensions with smaller
LECs in the periphery and potential 'vertical' tensions with the HIE core given the
prospect of it developing into a rival centre.1'' Moreover, the involvement of leading
figures from Highland Regional Council thought to be hostile to the HIDB further
reduced its prospects given that LECs were designed to by-pass local authorities.20
The government's neo-liberal rhetoric envisaged LECs being formed by a
market-driven process as groups of local business-people competed for development
funding. In line with this vision, LECs were, like TECs, legally constituted as private
companies limited by guarantee. Rather than reflecting a spontaneous up-welling of
entrepreneurial energy, however, the preparation of initial business plans and
formation of LEC boards owed much to the directive role of the Scottish Office,
channelled through the HIDB:
Highland Board members toured around the Highlands and Islands, explained what the Scottish
Office was trying to achieve, and encouraged local leaders of industry, business, whatever, to
come together if they wanted to form Local Enterprise Companies. There was limited funding
available to assist companies to prepare bids and strategies and ultimately all of those
contenders presented their proposals to a small panel.21
Recruiting local business leaders was clearly crucial to the credibility of the TEC- LEC
initiative; the mobilising rhetoric of local autonomy and flexibility seems to have been
deployed for this reason. The prospectuses and promotional material produced by the
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rigure 4.1 Prospective LEC Areas, 1989
ENTERPRISE COMPANY AREAS




Western isles Western Isles
Argyll. Bute, Arran and Argyll and Bute District with Arran and the Cumbraes
tne Cumbraes
^ochaber. Sxye and Lochaber and Skye and Lochalsh Districts
Lochalsn
Caithness and Caithness and Sutherland Districts
Sutherland
Ross and Cromarty Ross and Cromarty District
Inverness Badenoch and Strathspey, Inverness and Nairn D-sr cs
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Source: Industry Department for Scotland, 1989.
Scottish Office in the autumn of 1989 invited business to "play a vital part in
stimulating enterprise creation and training in your locality" (IDS, 1989: 10). In this
way, the contributions and needs of business were discursively constructed through the
production and circulation of a promotional literature. To the surprise of many
observers, these efforts secured adequate levels of mobilisation as business
representatives and community leaders came together to bid for development
funding.22 Bids had to be submitted by early December 1989 and decisions were
announced in March/April 1990, leaving successful groups a year to prepare business
plans and operating programmes for the April 1991 start date.23
One effect of the historic weakness of business representation in the Highlands
was that there was little real competition for the right to run LECs. Only in the Inner
Moray Firth area, where the mid-Highland bid clashed with proposals to create three
separate LECs, and the Western Isles and Argyll where rival groups were formed to
submit bids,24 was there an element of competition. The fact that there was also a lack
of competition in lowland areas with a much stronger tradition of business activism
(MacLeod, 1999: 13-4), suggests that neo-liberal discourses were engendering
unrealistic expectations. In general, local groups recognised the inevitability of change
and acted to ensure that their local area was represented in the new structure:
Our view at the time I think was really that irrespective of you know ofwhether we thought the
principle of LECs was good, bad or indifferent, they were clearly going to happen whatever we
or anyone else said or did, and that if they were going to happen we should have one of our
own.25
This suggests that rather than responding to local demand, local 'movers and shakers'
were being mobilised in response to an externally-derived political agenda. Such
comments provide empirical support for Peck's argument that the "business localism"
around which the state was re-constituted is very much a centrally-orchestrated
localism (Peck, 1995). The business leadership of LECs depends upon the support
and direction of the central state.
For HIDB staff, the changes had a huge impact on the structures within which
they worked. While HIDB strategy in the 1980s under Cowan promoted local
decentralisation, this gradual internal process was superseded and overtaken by the
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government's agenda:
HIDB was going that way anyway ... there was beginning to be a head of steam for local
delivery anyway ... Bob Cowan ... had not only continually beefed up these area offices, but he
had also started to re-organise teams within this building along geographic boundaries ... So we
were going that way anyway, but it would have taken us another ten or fifteen years, it would
have been a very slow process of devolution, instead what we had was a single large externally
imposed revolution which pulled over half the staff out overnight from this building and put
them into area offices and called them LECs in a different technical structure.26
This metaphorical contrast between external revolution and internal devolution
presents a powerful image of external forces imposing change, "pulling" out staff
from the centre to create a new structure. It emphasises the establishment of LECs as
the major change confronting HIDB personnel, suggesting that the promotion of
business practices and rhetoric had rather less of an impact since the board had already
embraced this key aspect of Conservative policy.27 In introducing a newly localised
geography of regulation, the rapid shift from the HIDB to LECs reflects the broader
re-scaling of the state. In effect this involved the creation of new scales of
governance28 as new organisational units (LECs) were established to co-ordinate
processes of economic development (cf. Swyngedouw, 1997; Brenner, 1998;
MacLeod and Goodwin, 1998, 1999). While LECs were to varying extents based on
pre-existing administrative units and pre-constituted local identities, their role within
wider accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects meant that they nonetheless re¬
ordered and transformed established modes of institutional intervention, applying
themes like entrepreneurialism, competitiveness, and efficiency to distinctive local
conditions.
The perception that the HIDB had matured into an effective and approachable
organisation meant that there was little demand from within the region for change (see
quote on p.95) (Shucksmith et ai, 1996: 220-21). Although the HIDB was
established as part of a broader national programme of modernisation and regional
planning in the mid-1960s, the idea of a regional development authority had deep
roots within regional society (Chapter three). This ensured continuing support for the
principle of the HIDB, though specific policies and practices attracted heavy criticism.
For 'external' observers of the transition to HIE, the principles upon which the new
structure was based took little account of locally-embedded norms and practices:
I think that's just when it was beginning to work ...just before the change to HIE, it was a great
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pity, the HIDB was just starting to become user-friendly and then there was this sudden wipe-
out ... It was all change and in came this shiny new enterprise culture which doesn't really
relate to the way things are done in the Highlands ... it's quite alien like that.19
For this critic, then, the 'enterprise culture' which LECs were expected to nurture and
develop was not 'indigenous' to the region. The quote implies that the establishment of
the HIE network owes more to national political priorities than any local demand for
change.
Although prospective LEC boards were expected to work with the local
community, the business planning and bidding process was led by business
representatives and HIDB/ Training Agency staff. In most areas, business plans and
economic audits were compiled by staff seconded from the HIDB and Training
Agency, though business-people had input through steering groups. While the main
form of community involvement was through public meetings, these were often
unable to allay underlying suspicions of the LEC initiative:
We held many public meetings in all the main places ... but everyone was very apprehensive,
what was this thing, there was no enthusiasm ... After a lot ofdiscussion we sought nominations
from the floorfor the steering group that was going to take itforward... that went right through
the public and public meetings, but there was still a lot ofcriticism, who are they, what are they
doing, that sort ofthing. 30
One source of unease concerned potential conflicts of interest raised by a system
based on local business representatives making decisions about the allocation of
public resources among a wider population of businesses. 31 Many observers feared
that this would allow LEC directors the scope to bend the rules in order to channel
funds towards their own businesses.
While HIE (the strategic core), based in Inverness, is a statutory public body,
LECs are private companies limited by guarantee. As the local delivery mechanisms
chosen by the Scottish Office, LECs are contracted to deliver a set of services for HIE
on an annual basis. This structure is based on market analogies as LECs were
expected to compete with one another for HIE funds on the basis of performance and
efficiency. On another level, the expectation was that other groups of business-people
dissatisfied with aspects of LEC performance would be able to form rival bids to take
over the operating contract. Such forms of 'institutional Darwinism' (Jessop et al.,
1988; Jessop, 1994; Peck and Jones, 1995: 1374-5) were actively fostered and
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promoted by the Thatcherite state project as organisations were forced to compete for
funds in order to survive. This raises questions about the capacity of individual
organisations to moderate and contain the impact of competitive forces which are, in
turn, related to the broader issue of their scope to adapt and 'translate' central
imperatives.
Another consequence of LECs status as private companies limited by
guarantee is that they are legally required to select their own boards. In contrast,
directors of HIE are appointed by the Secretary of State under specified terms and
conditions.32 Although few appreciated the legal intricacies of the structure, the self-
perpetuating nature of LECs represented another source of public unease and
suspicion. Criticisms of LECs as unrepresentative cliques reinforced those based on
concerns about a system involving local business-people allocating grants to other
local businesses.33 These concerns have fuelled on-going debates on the relative
'openness' and 'accountability' of the enterprise networks in Scotland (Chapter seven).
Critics noted that the overwhelming focus on financial accountability to central
government meant that the system failed to incorporate any concept of LECs being
accountable to the communities they served (Danson et ai, 1989; 1990; 1993; Fairley
1992a). In addition, there were concerns that the new representational regime ignored
the pragmatic Scottish tradition of harmonious public-private partnership (Fairley,
1992b).
In 1988-89 the Thatcher government capitalised on propitious circumstances
to dismantle inherited state forms in favour of new institutional arrangements
modelled on neo-liberal principles. As formally-autonomous agencies contracted to
deliver services of behalf of the central state, TECs and LECs are based upon two key
elements: the empowerment of business elites and local decentralisation. The
privileging of business as a key part of the social base of the Thatcherite state was
balanced by the marginalisation of organised labour and local authorities. While
established institutional networks mediated the impact of reform in Scotland, they
were unable to prevent a radical restructuring of the representational regime of the
local state. Although the rise of 'business localism' was strongly orchestrated by the
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central state, the expectations created by the mobilising rhetoric of local autonomy
and flexibility set up tensions between local business representatives and state
managers.
4.5. Organisational Structures and Business Representation
While the establishment of LECs seemed to herald major changes in the
practice of development in the Highlands, the HIDB's earlier adaptation to the
business ethos of development policy in the 1980s provided a source of continuity:
I mean Bob Cowan would always have claimed I think that the way he went about leading HIE
was essentially a private sector way ... It's just I think that HIE has ... articulated it maybe more
... shrilly and also that you've also got more business people visible if you like on the board and
appointed to the board to say that sort of thing ... I think to suggest there was... a significant
fracture between the two [the HIDB and HIE] structurally or organisational managerially is
wrong, there was much more continuity there.34
Rather than reflecting a substantive break with previous policy, this exaggerated
rhetoric of business leadership stemmed from pressures to define the identity and
assert the authority of HIE as a new organisation formed as part of a broader process
of state restructuring. It also reflects changes in the representational regime as private
sector entrepreneurs took up their places on LEC boards. In many respects, the crucial
change stemmed from the establishment of ten LECs with which the HIE core had to
develop effective relationships. The mobilising rhetoric of business leadership and
local initiative structured the expectations of prospective board members who
anticipated having the scope to devise 'local solutions to local problems' without
interference from the state. Such expectations clashed with established modes of state
organisation. This section traces how these internal structures were adjusted in
response as a prelude to Chapter five's analysis of how the underlying tension between
local initiative and central control has been worked out within the HIE Network since
1991.
In terms of its substantive activities, HIE is responsible for business
development, adult and youth training, property provision, environmental renewal and
community development. It is far more orientated towards business development than
the English and Welsh TECs which are overwhelmingly concerned with the local
delivery of national training programmes. Financial assistance is largely provided
105
through the traditional grant and loan mechanisms, re-packaged in the more market-
friendly guise of the Finance for Business (FFB) programme. HIE's powers for social
development, inherited from the HIDB, are unique, not being part of SE's remit. They
are operationalised through a programme of Community Action Grants (CAGs).
Additional responsibilities for training and environmental renewal were taken on from
the Training Agency and SDA respectively. Table 4.1 shows the balance of funding
across the main programme areas at three points in the network's development. Four
main areas of activity stand out: the provision of grants and loans through the FFB
programme; training, involving mainly nationally designed schemes for school leavers
and the adult unemployed; the provision of industrial and commercial property; and
developing marketing initiatives and major strategic projects.
Table 4.1. Funding by Main Programmes
1991-2 1993-4 1996-7
Finance for £16.3m £17.lm £14.6m
Business
Property £8.0m £11.2m £11.7m
Marketing and £12.lm £13.3m £11.8m
Projects
Environmental £4.9m £5.3m £4.7m
Renewal
Training £ 19.0m £20.lm £19.2m
Community Action £l.lm £1.2m £1.2m
Management £10.7m £10.5m £10.5m
Taxes n/a £0.6m £1.2m
Total £72.lm £79m £74.9m
Source: HIE, First Report: 4; Third Report: 3; Sixth Report: 3.
The inheritance of a pre-existing set of functions from the HIDB suggests that
LECs were incorporated into an established organisational system. This impression is
reinforced by the direct inheritance of a funding system based on seven main blocks,
from the HIDB and Training Agency.3' Block one covers the main development
programmes including FFB, Property and Projects and it normally accounts for a high
proportion of the overall budget of a LEC (over 50 per cent). Block two is made up of
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the small-scale 'enterprise' programmes inherited from the Training Agency (Business
Start-up and Business Enterprise Training). Block three contains the environmental
renewal funding while blocks four and five provide funding for adult and youth
training. This leaves blocks six and seven which cover CAGs and wages and
operating costs respectively (SALE, Business Plan, 1991-2).36
HIE also inherited an organisational structure based upon functional divisions
between key sectors and operational areas (industry, natural resources, tourism,
training, etc.) from the HIDB. Integrating training and economic development proved
more difficult in practice, however, particularly at the LEC level, than the official
rhetoric surrounding the HIE launch implied:
It was two very diverse cultures meeting at the outset, the Training Agency ... was quite
mainstream civil service and fairly bureaucratic and disciplined by the rule book ... whereas the
HIDB was a more flexible organisation, not bound within the confines of civil service rules and
procedures and certainly a bit more pro-active.37
There was certainly a strong sense in which the introduction of LECs had little real
impact on training, with the same programmes being administered by the same (ex-
Training Agency) state managers, leaving little scope for private sector input through
LEC directors.38 Over time, however, LECs have re-organised their internal structures
in an effort to increase integration by encouraging communication and cooperation
between operational teams. The rhetoric surrounding these changes centres on the
need to provide a service that is closer to what the 'customer' needs than what is
convenient for public agencies to provide.39 Following an official review, HIE's
internal structure was re-organised in November 1993.40 The new structure based on
three main operational divisions41 was designed to increase inter-working between
divisions, breaking down established divides and rivalries in an effort to improve
internal communication and flexibility.42 It also sought to reflect the key functions
retained by the HIE core following the accelerated decentralisation of resources to
LECs in 1992-3.43 In sum, these changes seem to reflect managerial efforts to re¬
model public services on (imagined) private sector norms of efficiency and flexibility
rather more than they reflect the immediate demands of private entrepreneurs on LEC
boards.
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Although the emphasis on local decentralisation received considerable support,
many expressed concern that this would erode existing strategic capacities (Danson et
ai, 1989; 1990; 1993; Moore 1989; Danson and Lloyd 1991; Fairley 1992a; Lloyd
and Black 1993). Critics anticipated a process of institutional fragmentation as
resources were transferred to the local level, leading ultimately to duplication and
competition as LECs introduced similar initiatives and sought to attract investment. In
this sense, decentralisation would reduce the capacity to formulate and implement
long-term strategies addressing entrenched social and economic problems.
In the event, the first year of the HIE Network saw resources retained at the
centre before an accelerated process of decentralisation in the second year (1992/93).
As a result, 80 per cent of the budget is spent by LECs in the delivery of the main
programmes leaving the central core responsible for developing broader pan-Highland
projects, setting the strategic framework within which LECs operate, and monitoring
LEC performance against specific targets. This does not necessarily signify, however,
an equivalent transfer of power and influence to the local level. For the
decentralisation of resources raises more fundamental questions about where the
policies framing and informing these allocative decisions are designed (Stewart,
1995). While non-elected local agencies like LECs act as agents of the centre in
adapting the delivery of government policy to local conditions, this role also exposes
them to local political influences.44 The establishment of TECs and LECs was not
without risks for the government, containing the potential to unleash forces beyond its
control if local business representatives were to 'go native' and criticise policy (Peck,
1992).45 In this way, the Conservatives could become the victims of their own
ideology. Consequently, LECs became 'objects' of regulation as state managers in the
Scottish Office and HIE monitored and ordered their activities in an effort to contain
potential tensions. The adjustments of organisational structures outlined above can be
interpreted in this light, as measures designed to incorporate LECs within established
procedures and mechanisms.
Building a relationship with autonomous LECs represented a key challenge
for the HIE core, demanding a change in organisational culture away from the
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relatively centralised style and approach of the HIDB.46 As demonstrated above,
internal structures were adjusted to accommodate these demands as the network
developed. Beneath this, however, there were substantial continuities in terms of
personnel, key programmes and funding categories. While individual LECs enjoy a
nominal autonomy, the adjustment of state structures to the incorporation of business
representatives ensures that they work through similar practices and norms. Although
LECs were established as part of a broader national political agenda, one effect of the
new structure was to grant official recognition to the increased economic diversity of
the Highlands. The relationship between this economic diversity (see Appendix 2)
and institutional 'sameness' - in the sense that LECs, despite being autonomous
agencies have a common structure and range of responsibilities - is explored in
succeeding chapters through the analysis of data collected from three study areas
(Chapter One, p. 16, Appendix 2). These investigate whether the organisational
structures underpinning this 'sameness' allow LECs the scope to develop distinctive
initiatives to address the diverse challenges of their local economies.
4.6. Conclusion.
This chapter has argued that the transition from HIDB to HIE can only be
understood within a broader political and strategic context. HIE was introduced as part
of a Thatcherite 'state project' that sought to dismantle the social and organisational
bases of Labourism and social democracy while mobilising the strategically
significant sections of the population making up its own social base (Jessop et al.,
1988; Jones, 1997b). The replacement of tripartite arrangements by a new bipartite
relationship between the state and business led to the emergence of a new local-elitist
mode of representation (Peck, 1992; 1995). As 'institutional metaphors' of
Thatcherism, LECs embody many central features of this shift towards a 'post-
corporatist' state (Peck, 1995; Peck and Jones, 1995). These include: the requirement
for two-thirds of their boards to be drawn from the private sector; a corresponding
marginalisation of established 'stakeholders' such as organised labour, elected local
authorities and the voluntary sector; a reliance on detailed financial and contractual
arrangements with central government agents; and an insulation or 'enclosure' from
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local democracy, leading to concerns about 'openness' and accountability. Moreover,
LECs are part of a broader re-scaling of the state channeled through the strategic
localism that occupied such a prominent position in the discourses of 'radical' and
'late' Thatcherism.
In Scotland, however, the impact of neo-liberalism was mediated by
established institutional networks (Moore and Booth, 1989; Paterson, 1994).
Subsequent changes can be seen as products of the interaction between underlying
forces of state transformation and the pre-existing structure of regional governance.
From 1982, the HIDB sought to adapt to Thatcherite imperatives in order to guarantee
its survival. The crucial changes in the practice of economic governance associated
with this process of adaptation laid the basis for more radical reforms between 1988
and 1991. The constitutive role of regional actors and institutions in processes of
institutional restructuring ensured that the new enterprise networks demonstrated
considerable continuity with previous arrangements, particularly through the role of
SE and HIE as strategic regional tiers of the state. But while important, this role is one
of mediation and adaptation; in a centralised state like the UK local actors are unable
to resist the logic of central imperatives.
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the establishment of LECs
was the product of an externally-derived political agenda rather than local 'demand'.
The local elites forming LEC steering groups and boards were mobilised in response
to this central agenda as they came to realise the inevitability of change. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that LECs are not open to local demands and priorities.
Indeed, discourses of business leadership created expectations that LECs would have
the scope to address local priorities without central interference. As section 4.5
showed, however, LECs were soon constructed as 'objects' of regulation and routine
state practices deployed to order their activities. In addressing the issue of LEC's
operational autonomy from central government, Chapter five examines how this
central tension between local initiative and central direction has been worked out
within the HIE Network since 1991.
Notes
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1 This draws on Hay's distinction between 'failure' - as a reflection of the inherent
properties of a system - and 'crisis' - as a political and discursive representation of
failure (Hay, 1995, 1996a, b). From this perspective, the 'New Right' successfully
converted state failure into a political-economic crisis that created the space for radical
Thatcherite 'solutions'.
2 Tripartism refers to institutional arrangements based on the representation of state
elites, private capital and organised labour as 'partners' in economic management.
These were a defining feature of a broadly social democratic state regime in Britain in
the 1960s and 1970s.
3 This follows from the dual role of local state agencies as both agents of and obstacles
to the centre (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988).
4 Former HIDB official, interview 28.10.97.
5 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.11.97.
6 Interview 7.11.97.
7 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.11.97.
8 Local newspaper editor, unrecorded interview 3.7.97.
9 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.11.97.
10 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.11.97.
11 For Jones (1996a; 1997a), this element of compulsion represents 'trainingfare', a
specifically British variant of the more general trend towards workfare, in which the
unemployed are forced to participate in training programmes in return for state
benefits.
12 The 1987 general election manifesto had contained the promise of more radical
measures on training. Subsequently, the MSC was restructured into the Training
Commission with the loss of its employment services division to the Department of
Employment (Evans, 1992: 90-96).
13
Though the fact that these local agencies were to be business-led was ironic since
employers' failure to invest in training was the root cause of this lack of skills (Peck,
1992: 335; Evans, 1992: 144; King, 1993: 230).
14 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.11.97.
15 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.11.97.
16 Senior LEC official, interview 26.6.97; LEC director, interview July 7.7.97.
17 LEC official, interview 5.3.97.
18 The funding for West Moray, Badenoch and Strathspey (previously part of the
HIDB area) comes from HIE while that for the more populous East Moray area
(previously part of SDA territory) comes from SE
19 LEC official, interview 6.3.97.
20 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.7.97.
21 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
22 LEC boards were drawn largely from small locally-dependent businesses in the
service and tourism sectors. This pattern, reflecting the structure of local economies,
contrasts with SE LECs where representatives of large multi-national investors were
often active (see Chapter seven, p. 198-99).
23
Despite initial mobilisation, the small size of Highland LECs relative to the
Lowlands raised doubts about their long-term viability. The entire HIE network is
only the size of a medium-sized SE LEC, covering a population of about 370,000.
Ill
SALE is the smallest LEC in Scotland, covering an area with a population of 11,000
and responsible for a budget of just over £2 million. This contrasts with the Glasgow
Development Agency, covering an area of 650,000 people and with a budget larger
than HIE's.
24 LEC official, interview 26.3.97; LEC director, interview 5.8.97.
25 LEC director, interview 7.797.
26 HIE official (ex-HIDB), interview 25.11.96.
27 Also former HIDB board member, interview 25.11.96.
28 Or 'new institutional spaces' in Jones' (1997a) terms.
29 Local business proprietor, unrecorded interview 31.5.97.
30 Local councillor, unrecorded interview 26.6.97.
31 Local newspaper editor, interview 3.7.97.
32 LEC director, interview 7.7.97.
33 Local newspaper editor, interview 3.7.97; LEC director, interview 7.7.97.
34 Former HIDB board member, interview 7.11.97.
35 This system has recently been re-organised. The new regime is based upon the three
objectives - growing businesses, developing people and strengthening communities -
emphasised in HIE's current strategy (HIE, 1996) and which also structure the
business planning process (see Chapter five).
36 LEC official, interview 6.3.97.
37 LEC official, interview 6.3.97.
38 Council official, interview 5.3.97.
39 LEC official, interview 5.3.97. In an extension of this process, some LECs have
recently introduced an 'account manager' system in which certain officials take
responsibility for a portfolio of companies across the range of services provided by
LECs (Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97).
40 This structure is now itself being re-organised to reflect HIE's strategic objectives
(see note 35 and Section 5.2)
41 These are Network Strategy, responsible for strategy review across the network,
corporate planning and economic research and analysis; Network Operations,
responsible for providing back-up for LECs and monitoring their performance; and
Projects and Marketing, responsible for developing pan-Highland initiatives and
marketing support. They are supported by an Executive Office and a Finance and
Administration division. (HIE official, interview 1.11.96).
42 Senior HIE official, interview 1.11.96.
43 A former senior HIE official and ex-HIDB board member suggested that the re¬
organisation was also designed to reduce staffing levels in the wake of this
decentralisation process. Interview 7.7.97.
44
Although their unelected nature and the fact that the structure of representation
(based on a two-thirds business majority) is specified by the centre prevents them
from being 'captured' by oppositional interests.
45 This provides an example of how form can problematise function (Offe, 1975;
Jessop, 1990b: 249; 1995a: 325; Jones, 1997b: 853). By exposing them to local
political influences, the institutional form of LECs (and TECs) holds the potential to
undermine their functionality as agents of government promoting capital
accumulation.
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Shaping the HIE Network: Local Initiative versus Central Direction
5.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the shaping of local-central relations within the HIE
Network since 1991. While the arguments of the previous chapter suggests that LECs'
operational autonomy will be heavily constrained, analysis of local-central relations
requires that detailed attention be paid to key parameters of the operating regime and
strategic framework within which HIE and LECs work. This chapter takes the
existence of a crucial tension between local initiative and central direction - identified
in the quote that opens this thesis (Chapter 1, p.l) and confirmed by other
respondents' - as its starting point, and examines how this has been worked out in
practice. The analysis is informed by accounts of the TEC network which stress the
tension between demands for local autonomy and established systems of public
accountability as a defining feature of the relationship between local agencies and
central government (Evans, 1992: 147- 57; Peck 1992: 348-9; 1993: 294-9; Jones
1997b).
One crucial difference between institutional structures in Scotland and
England concerns the role of the Scottish Office and HIE core as regional tiers of the
state. Chapter four stressed how the HIE Network emerged from the interaction
between processes of state restructuring under Conservative governments and the pre¬
existing structure of regional governance, based on the HIDB. This chapter extends
that analysis to consider how the relationship between LECs and central government
is channeled and mediated by the accumulated knowledge and experience of state
managers within the Scottish Office and HIE. It examines HIE's capacity to
implement its own strategic priorities and to adapt and translate central initiatives to
its own purposes. In particular, the chapter investigates whether the technical expertise
and local knowledge concentrated within local and regional institutions can be
deployed to mediate the impact of neo-liberal technologies of government (see chapter
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2.5) - financial controls, targeting, audit.
The material is structured in three main sections. Section two considers the
question of strategic autonomy: to what extent are HIE and the LECs able, within the
limits set by financial and operational rules, to determine their own priorities and
identify appropriate areas for intervention? Section three focuses on key features of
the operational regime structuring LEC activity. Attention is paid to the role of
targets as a means of relating budgetary allocations to performance. Moving to the
micro-level, the fourth section considers the flexibility LECs have to interpret central
guidelines in the appraisal of applications by individual businesses for financial
support. Finally, a brief conclusion summarises the main findings.
5.2. Strategy Formulation and Implementation
As the principal channel through which development policy is formulated and
delivered, the strategies of the HIE Network have a major impact on the Scottish
Highlands. This section focuses on the respective roles of each institutional tier -
LECs, the HIE core, the Scottish Office - in processes of strategy formulation and
implementation. It addresses three inter-related questions linked to this theme. How
much scope is HIE granted by the Scottish office and central government to determine
its own strategic priorities? In what ways are LECs involved in this process? Is their
role confined to implementing a strategy formulated by national or regional
institutions? Such questions cannot be answered by citing formal divisions of
responsibility, but require an analysis of the often messy and complex processes
through which strategy is developed and put into practice. The section also considers
whether HIE possesses the necessary strategic capacity to address the structural
problems confronting the region.
One of the initial tasks of those officials charged with preparing the ground for
the launch of the HIE network in April 1991 was to formulate a strategy to guide and
structure its early activities. The modern state derives much of its legitimacy from its
capacity to increase the living standards of its citizens by promoting particular models
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and strategies of economic growth (Painter and Goodwin, 1995), and HIE's role in
promoting economic development in the Highlands assumes particular importance in
this respect because of the region's history of underdevelopment. While state
strategies will often support powerful private interests, they are commonly justified
and legitimated by some wider notion of the 'public interest'. The formulation and
implementation of economic strategies for local and regional spaces allows state
agencies to regulate and order the economic process by channeling resources towards
designated sectoral targets, co-ordinating the activities of the various economic actors
involved in these sectors and directing the benefits towards favoured social groups
(see Lange and Regini, 1989: 4-5). To the extent that these interventions identify
specific extra-economic conditions for growth and define growth models for regional
economic spaces, they conform to Jessop's notion of an accumulation strategy (Jessop,
1990b: 198; 1997b: 61). At the regional and local levels, the strategic interventions of
state agencies will tend to be promoted by particular discourses of the 'local' or
'regional' that draw upon selected local traditions and conventions and construct the
local economy in certain ways (Pratt, 1991; Jessop, 1997d). While such strategies
ultimately construct an 'illusory community' of interests, to function effectively they
must be seen to be addressing the interests and concerns of key groups within this
community.
Economic strategies are shaped and conditioned by underlying constructions
of the local economy as a key 'object' of regulation (Chapter two, p.41-42). Like those
of the HIDB in 1965, the effectiveness ofHIE's strategic interventions depended on its
capacity to transform the complex web of economic and social relations in the
Highlands into a coherent and manageable economic 'space' (c/ Jessop, 1997b). The
parameters of this process were set by previous interventions by the HIDB, whose
pre-existing strategies formed crucial resources for HIE in identifying certain sectors
and areas as priorities. Another closely related influence was the structure of the
regional economy. Its particular patterns of concentration and specialisation
simultaneously enabled and constrained HIE's strategic options, directing it towards
certain areas of strength and others in which a potential for expansion could be
identified whilst ruling out a concentration on other areas in which the conditions for
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growth were absent. Yet while these pre-constituted strategies and structures were of
crucial importance, the constructions of the regional economy which HIE's initial
strategy drew upon were particular to that moment.
The discursive reconstruction of the Highland economy associated with this
key moment of transformation was framed by the broader imperatives of state
restructuring under the Conservatives. Elements drawn from neo-liberal discourses
structured HIE's strategy and associated patterns of intervention. HIE was quick to
assert a key premise underlying the institutional reforms of the late 1980s and early
1990s:
The fundamental principle governing the operation of the HIE network is the pre-eminent role
of private capital and entrepreneurship in creating a healthy economy and society (HIE, 1991:
4).
Although this did not signal a substantive break with previous policy,2 it represented a
crucial founding statement, drawing much of its force as a rhetorical claim from wider
political imperatives underlying the establishment of unelected local agencies.3 This
statement reflects a number of specific aspects of this agenda: the promotion of
business interests by Conservative economic policy; the efforts to re-model the public
sector on private sector principles and practices; the emphasis of Thatcherism as a
hegemonic project in promoting the 'entrepreneurial society' and popular capitalism;
and, perhaps most directly, the incorporation of local business elites into the
representational regime of the state through local agencies like LECs.4
In association with this emphasis on the superiority of private sector modes of
organisation, HIE produced a 'boosterist' discourse of the Highlands as a vibrant and
dynamic economic space:
Our common interest lies in the future prosperity of the area. Many of the seeds of this
prosperity are already planted in today's Highlands and Islands, and are already growing. The
Highlands and Islands is in the process of rapid change, energetically turning around its long
legacy of economic decline. A new confidence is evident in many corners of our area. (F.
Morrison, HIE chairman in HIE, 1996:2).
These claims are embedded within the wider discursive formation surrounding local
economic development in the 1990s (Hay, 1994: 25). Characteristically, this produces
positive images of growth, change, innovation and flexibility to market places to
potential investors and increase confidence within the indigenous business
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community. Like all economic discourses, HIE's efforts at regional 'boosterism' relies
upon a selective appropriation of past trends (Jessop, 1997d). HIE highlighted the
resilience and adaptability of the regional economy, seeing this as rooted in a diverse
range of small businesses, and citing high rates of new business formation in the
1980s and 1990s as evidence (HIE, 1991, Third Report 1993/4: foreword; Sixth
Report 1996/7: iii-iv). Trends relating to growing business confidence in the region
and increased rates of self-employment were also emphasised (HIE, 1991, 1996, Sixth
Report 1996/7: 6-7). This mode of presentation constructs what can be termed an
aggregative perspective focusing on dominant economic and demographic trends at
the regional level." In addition to the trends cited above, HIE's Sixth Report
emphasises falling unemployment, population growth and a rising level of exports as
'objective' evidence of success (HIE, Sixth Report 1996/7: 6-7). This form of
representation has the effect of conveying an overall image of growth and vitality
whilst glossing over many of the social and economic problems affecting the region.
The 1991 strategy stated HIE's overall aim of enabling "the people of the
Highlands and Islands to realize their full potential" through its efforts in each of its
main areas of activity (HIE, 1991: 3). From the overall aim seven more specific
objectives were derived.6 In terms of the selection of policies for individual sectors,
and the substance of policies towards these, the continuities between HIE's approach
and that of the HIDB reflected its inheritance of the latter's strategic resources and
capabilities. At the same time, the way in which these 'objects' of regulation were
constructed and presented reflected HIE's role in delivering Conservative policy.
The strategy emphasised the role of manufacturing and high-technology export
services since this sector, still under-represented in the Highlands, was seen as
offering scope for expansion (HIE, 1991). The completion of an advanced ISDN
(Integrated Services Digital Network) network, a result of a joint initiative between
HIDB/HIE and British Telecom, was seen a major boost to the region's
competitiveness in terms of both attracting high-technology services and promoting
indigenous growth. Although the attraction of 'appropriate' forms of inward
investment remained important - extending the HIDB's shift way from large-scale
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industrial projects - it was overshadowed by the rhetorical emphasis on stimulating
indigenous enterprise. HIE noted the region's continuing deficiencies in this regard,
pointing to the failure to develop a critical mass of small-to-medium enterprises (HIE,
1991). This category of companies was identified as a key 'object' of regulation in
preference to the smaller number of large firms as HIE stressed the need to improve
the provision of support services, especially training, to dynamic firms with growth
potential.
While manufacturing and high-technology export services were stressed as key
sectors in which to stimulate enterprise, the problems of 'traditional' industries were
also considered. The historic importance of agriculture and fishing in particular as
sources of income and employment demanded that their problems were addressed.
This formed one key way in which the pre-existing structure of the regional economy
shaped HIE strategy. In terms of rural adjustment, one emphasis, drawn from broader
policy discourses, was economic diversification with HIE seeking to help established
and new rural enterprises identify and exploit alternative market opportunities (HIE,
1991/92, A Strategy for Land-Based Enterprise). An increasingly important form of
diversification during the 1990s - strongly promoted by HIE - concerns the growth of
new forms of work based on information technology, such as tele-services and
teleworking. The decision to maintain the HIDB's emphasis on the potential of
tourism as a priority sector was another way in which previous strategies and
economic structures influenced HIE strategy. Tourism accounted for some 20 per cent
of the region's economy - in GDP terms - leading HIE to identify it, despite major
fluctuations in its growth path during the 1970s and 1980s, as the best non-industrial
growth prospect for the region (HIE, 1991a).
Given its social development powers, HIE's assessment of the extra-economic
conditions for growth assumed a particular importance in shaping its accumulation
strategy. Again it inherited key aspects of its approach, including the specific
programme ofCommunity Action Grants, from the HIDB. While the official rationale
for the social development function stresses the need to provide social and community
facilities in order to retain and attract population, the effect has been that development
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agencies have sought to engineer changes in social and cultural relations. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the HIDB's programme of industrial development sought to 'modernise'
underlying attitudes and values, implicitly viewing local cultures as barriers to
development (Section 3.3.2). In the 1990s, HIE is also working to change the attitudes
and values of Highland society, but in ways shaped by current demands and
expectations. It sees social and community development as underpinning 'enterprise'
in terms of the effects of community involvement in development projects in
increasing skills and boosting self-confidence and thereby creating the conditions for
local 'entrepreneurship' to flourish (HIE, 1991; 1991/92, Community and Economy).
This particular construction reflects HIE's origins as part of a wider Thatcherite
hegemonic project promoting ideas of popular capitalism and the entrepreneurial
society (Jessop et al., 1988; Gamble, 1988). While the HIDB had earlier appropriated
elements of this entrepreneurial discourse, the latter exercised a more direct influence
over HIE's early statements, giving these greater force and coherence (Fairclough,
1992). In part, HIE's deployment of entreprenerial language - particularly marked in
the early years - stems from the need to establish an institutional identity and outlook
that differentiated it from its predecessor (the HIDB).
By 1995, a need for a strategic review had been identified as events overtook
the 1991 strategy which had been written before the LEC network became
operational.7 In 1993/94 HIE's local knowledge and technical expertise gave it a key
role in the formation of the Highlands and Islands Objective 1 strategy,8 thus
strengthening and extending its strategic capabilities. The process of strategic review
culminated in a revised strategy, launched in January 1996. It was orientated around
three strategic objectives: growing businesses, developing people, and strengthening
communities (HIE, 1996). HIE also re-defined its sectoral approach, focusing its
efforts on four key sectors: food and drink; manufacturing and production; tourism;
and knowledge, information and telecommunications (HIE, 1996). The last of these
has become a major growth area since 1991 with a range of tele-servicing projects
attracted to the region.
The production and implementation of these regional strategies raises
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questions about the input of the different institutional tiers. In response to this issue,
well-placed officials tended to emphasise the relative autonomy enjoyed by HIE as the
key strategic actor:
Last January HIE prepared their strategy document and we were invited to comment on it, but
it's their document. In a sense, if you set up a body like HIE there's not much point second
guessing them, but there is strategic guidance come up from the Secretary of State every year.
But I'd tend to think it's more bottom-up from HIE to us, saying this is what we think, and you
know they were going to concentrate on certain sectors, that wasn't the Secretary of State's idea,
they're on the ground.9
I mean the strategy is developed by us, and it's more that it has to meet the requirements of our
board and our ... Local Enterprise Companies and so on than the Scottish Office ... Certainly
you know the whole point of having an agency in the Highlands is not for the Scottish Office to
tell us this is your strategy, we come up with the strategy and the Scottish Office basically
accept it.10
These represent clear statements that HIE strategy is not the product of direct
instruction from government through the Scottish Office, reflecting instead a view of
HIE as a development agency empowered to develop solutions appropriate to the
requirements of its particular regional space. This again points to the state's reliance
on its regional and local agencies to develop credible responses to local issues and
demands (see Section 4.3.2 on the HIDB). Central government lacks the knowledge
and capacity to respond directly to local 'problems'. In this case, the accumulated
reserves of local knowledge and technical expertise that HIE inherited from the HIDB
give it the capacity to formulate and implement regional economic strategies. These
resources are deployed in routine processes of reflexive monitoring (Giddens, 1985)
through which HIE collects and analyses data on social and economic trends. This
knowledge is then both fed into processes of strategy production and used to mediate
the implementation of strategy in the face of changing local conditions.
Yet the strategic autonomy enjoyed by HIE is circumscribed. The first of the
two quotes reveals that the Scottish Office has an opportunity to provide input as the
strategy is formulated and that it grants formal approval to the final document. HIE's
strategic choices are embedded within a wider shared understanding of what is
appropriate. Such understandings are developed through contacts and exchanges,
often on an informal level, within the institutional networks linking local and regional
sites to the Scottish Office. In this sense, routine processes of institutional interaction
tend to create and reproduce 'structures of expectations' (Paasi, 1991) that allow
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regional and local actors to anticipate what will prove acceptable to government. The
key point here concerns the need to ensure that initiatives do not conflict with central
government policy (Moore and Booth, 1989).
The change of government in May 1997 provides insights into the relationship
between government policy and regional strategy. It is encouraging a period of
strategic appraisal and revision:
The new government has asked us to consider whether our strategy still meets ... the agenda that
they have. Our view is that generally ... if you read the three key things - growing businesses,
developing people and strengthening communities - you can fit the Labour agenda into those
broad headings. There are some new things obviously which aren't in the strategy, and the Land
Unit is a good example, ... also Welfare to Work there's no mention, but I think we can
incorporate those in, I mean the Land Unit fits very well into strengthening communities, giving
communities greater control over their resource and capacity building and so on. So you know
we're reasonably confident that with some tweaks around the edges, we are looking at this
actually, that the strategy is reasonably robust.'1
The claim HIE can accommodate Labour's agenda with little difficulty reflects the
tendency for regional strategies to be cast at a fairly general level, identifying broad
objectives - such as the 'three key things' above - with which it is difficult to
disagree.12 In this case, it also reflects the relative lack of substantive difference
between Labour's economic policies and those of the previous Conservative
government. The key difference in terms of Highland development is their respective
approaches to issues of land ownership and distribution with Labour emphasising the
potential of community land purchase. Accordingly, in June 1997, it instructed HIE to
establish the Community Land Unit referred to above (WHFP 27.6.97). More
generally, the 'Welfare to Work' programme for young unemployed groups is an
important new initiative. The above quote claims that these new initiatives can be
accommodated within the existing objectives of'developing people' and 'strengthening
communities'. Beyond these specific initiatives, however, any revised strategy will be
the product of HIE's efforts to 'tweak' existing priorities to current policy agendas
rather than direct instruction from government.
The relative autonomy enjoyed by the HIE core raises questions regarding the
involvement of LECs in the process of strategy formulation. Do they have the scope
to feed local priorities and concerns into the process? From an HIE perspective, one
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official stressed the importance of ensuring that LECs were closely involved:
We went round every LEC and spoke at length both to their Boards and their senior staff in the
process of writing that strategy ... that was very important to us, that it was a strategy for the
Network and that they be seen to visibly have signed up for it ... Now that was very, very
important to us ... Although the LECs now deliver everything that's local to their area, we still
have to emphasise that the Highlands has more in common that identifies it than divides it, even
though Shetland and Barra apparently have very little in common, they have more that unites
them than divides them, we would argue. So that there's still this important pull from the centre,
that the Highlands be identified as a complete region in its own right, it's very strong.'3
This suggests that the commitment of individual LECs to a single regional strategy is
crucial in avoiding local fragmentation and enabling the HIE Network to function
effectively. It also provides an insight into how the institutionalised practices work to
re-produce the Highlands as a coherent regional space. LEC representatives also
stressed their involvement in processes of strategy formulation:
There was a whole series of meetings took place, within HIE teams, up in Inverness, the chief
executives debated it at a workshop ... the chief executives as a group, the strategy department
in HIE came round to the Board of every local Enteiprise Company and debated strategy with
the LECs, the LEC chairmen reviewed and discussed the strategy, all this went round the loop,
I'm sure for a year, before this new strategy was finally cast into concrete.14
This again presents a picture of an integrated network in action as regional strategy is
developed through close cooperation and communication between HIE and the LECs.
LECs relationships with HIE allow them to feed local priorities into emerging
strategies, thus ensuring that they are grounded in local assessments of local economic
conditions. At the same time, however, it is important to emphasise that the HIE core
retains ultimate authority and responsibility for strategy formulation.15
Another key issue concerns the flexibility granted to LECs in adapting this
regional strategy to the conditions of their distinct local areas. As one LEC official
pointed out, the basic structure of the Network forces HIE to rely on LECs for
implementation.16 He represented the translation of strategies from national to regional
to local in terms of a "filtering" metaphor:
We have a contract with HIE obviously to deliver all their services, and the provisions of that
contract usually refer us to ... strategies, particularly for individual sectors, we're basically
working to that. There are, I think increasingly ... local versions of the strategy being produced
... The one that I'm most familiar with is the tourism sector and we are at the moment producing
a tourism strategy ... In effect what we have is an action plan for the next five years which
everybody has signed up to and that follows on from the national tourism strategy and then the
Highland tourism strategy which have been produced over the last two years. So yeah I mean
the principle of it is that these national strategies filter down into regional strategies which then
filter down into local strategies.
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Although LECs have a contractual obligation to work to HIE strategy, the "filtering"
process creates space for the provisions of central strategy to be translated into terms
that recognise the requirements of individual areas. Since the publication of HIE's
current strategy in January 1996, LECs business planning increasingly follows the
framework set out there, with programmes categorised in terms of the three key
objectives and funding allocations for the four key sectors specified in advance
through the Finance for Business (FFB) programme.
Despite the requirements of this structured framework, however, LEC officials
insist that the process allows the diversity of local economic conditions to be
reflected:
It's the essence of a Local Enterprise Company Network that we are able to emphasise these
areas that are more important to our area, so in our area because the fish-farming sector is of
great significance and the tourism sector is the best part of 30 per cent of our GDP ... we will
put much more emphasis on tourism than perhaps Shetland ... The local area will emphasise its
staff time and its money to reflect... the needs of its own economy.17
I mean ... different areas have different attributes ... we've got a low manufacturing base here
whereas places like Inverness are much more intensive in that sector. We're stronger on the
indigenous industries, industries based on the sea, tourism is strong as well, so there are
18
different emphases in different LEC areas depending on the opportunities.
Within FFB, each LEC can determine the distribution of funding between the main
sectoral categories according to its reading of local requirements. This reveals that
LECs do have some scope to shape their own priorities within the basic structures of
the funding regime. For example, Western Isles Enterprise (WIE) can concentrate on
fish farming within the Food and Drink priority while Skye and Lochalsh Enterprise
(SALE) can shape its FFB spending to reflect the importance of tourism to the local
economy (WIE, Business Plan 1996/7; SALE, Business Plan 1996/7). Given that the
categories with which they work are established by the HIE core, however, the role of
LECs is to adapt the provisions of the strategic framework set regionally to the needs
of their respective areas. They are not in a position to independently determine their
own priorities. Yet instead of viewing the HIE strategy as constraining, in terms of
pressuring them to work with certain categories, LECs seem to regard it as enabling,
providing them with additional strategic resources to frame individual programmes. In
this sense, being part of a broader institutional network increases LECs' operational
effectiveness and overall credibility.
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While the above discussion clarifies the role of respective institutions in
developing and implementing strategy, it says little about the capacity of HIE's
strategies to address the structural problems of the Highlands and Islands. The
adoption of an aggregative perspective focused on dominant economic and
demographic trends at the regional level seems to limit HIE's capacity to tackle the
key issues confronting the region. Regional 'boosterism' reflects HIE's role in
promoting the region to potential investors, as well as its need to provide evidence
that its efforts are having a positive impact on the regional economy. One effect is to
marginalise the experiences of low-income groups dependent on marginal forms of
employment or welfare benefits and the problems of depressed local economies.19
This has been a key source of tension between HIE network and local authorities who
see themselves as promoting the interests of less affluent groups (WHFP 21.8.97).
While HIE's official discourse stresses the need to encourage 'indigenous'
development, some 'external' observers remained less than convinced by this
commitment. Many residents seem to still regard LECs as concentrating their funds
on large-scale forms of development (Shucksmith et al., 1996: 219-226). In particular,
a perceived concentration on conventional fonns of inward investment was criticised:
Why people have never really, certainly in LECs and HIE ... grasped this properly, I don't
know, Easter Ross had had a smelter, classic inward investment, it's had Nigg, more classic
inward investment, more recently the company just down the road here, Ky-Lin, the textile
company ... It doesn't work because ... the companies will come for the grants, companies are
much more mobile now than they ever used to be ... In two or three years time, if there are
better grants ... whatever, companies will have no hesitation in closing down here and going
elsewhere."0
These claims are ironic, pointing to a gap between 'internal' and 'external'
perspectives, since official narratives stress that development strategy has moved
away from the industrial modernisation characteristic of the HIDB's early years
towards a focus on encouraging local initiatives.21 Criticisms of the focus on inward
investment were more common, however, in the more central areas around the Inner
Moray Firth where it has been a crucial part of the effort to regenerate areas of
industrial decline such as Easter Ross.
In outlying areas, efforts to stimulate smaller-scale projects, particularly in the
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tele-servicing and IT sectors, raised fewer objections. LECs ability to respond to local
needs and priorities is often seen, however, as limited because of their role as
government agencies:
Another thing with the LECs is that they're not self-determining, they can't just do what they
think for the local economy, it's all... set down for them by government rules, they're in there
with a political agenda and you have to recognise that... It's like with the LECs national policy
always seems to be at odds with the ways things are done in the Highlands, it doesn't reallyfit...
How often do you hear them saying we can't do that because ofgovernment regulations? That's
the thing with LECs, they lack the freedom of action to do things ... it's all about central
22
government guidelines.
For some local activists, then, the continuing weight of central direction prevents
LECs from promoting and supporting distinctively 'local' initiatives. At the same time,
however, LEC personnel working within these structures are seen as genuinely
motivated and doing a 'good job' in assisting development across a range of sectors.23
The above comments provide some insight into the local reception of
economic strategy. As Jessop (1997d: 30-32) has emphasised, the reception of the
institutional discourses that promote particular strategies is conditioned by their
resonance with the personal narratives that shape individual outlooks. In the
Highlands, reception of HIE strategy is shaped by its perceived success in addressing
underlying structures of expectation. The quote on page 129 suggests that HIE
strategy still tends to be read through the experience of HIDB policy in the 1970s
while the emphasis on LECs' limited autonomy is shaped by particular impressions -
to varying degrees a reflection of personal experience24 - of LEC bureaucracy. The gap
between internal and external perspectives points to the limited impact of institutional
strategy with local residents seeming to retain an underlying scepticism - grounded in
experience- that resists interpellation within organisational narratives.
One fear widely expressed when the initial proposals for LECs were
introduced was that the shift towards local business-led agencies would dilute the
strategic capacity accumulated by the HIDB. While the more coordinated and
integrated approach adopted by HIE relative to SE has ensured that fears of LECs
competing against one another to attract inward investment have not been realised,25
there is evidence of a strategic gap within the HIE Network:
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There wasn't enough care taken to ensure that the people retained by HIE were the strategic
thinkers ... so there's actually very limited strategic capacity now within HIE ... You could have
retained a very strong strategic ... staffing within HIE ... but you'd have had to keep some key
individuals ... What happened to some of the strategic people is they actually just left, went off
to other things or went off to Scottish Enterprise where I think they saw a bigger, a bigger
role.26
Uncompetitive pay rates and a perceived lack of interest for key strategic thinkers
have led to recruitment problems, creating a situation in which HIE seems to have
become the poor relation of SE. More fundamentally, however, the relative strategic
weakness of the HIE network appears to be a function of the interaction between the
demands of central government and the management style HIE has adopted and
promoted. In the context of central measures of effectiveness and performance such as
targets, HIE has focused its efforts on maximising operational efficiency. This
orientation towards short-term outputs reduces HIE's capacity to address the
underlying problems of the region in the longer-term by discouraging critical appraisal
of strategy. The focus on operational efficiency and performance is reinforced by
HIE's top-down management style which, working through a 'management group' of
key officials, encourages staff to concentrate on running the main programmes and
initiatives. It has been suggested that strategic deliberation is seen as a distraction
from these operational imperatives.27 The net result of this focus on efficiency and
perfonnance has been to reduce the scope for strategic innovation since the days of the
HIDB.
The official HIE strategy is not designed to act as a coherent strategy for
regional development, in the sense of defining the key problems confronting the
region and identifying means of solving these. Rather, it seems to function more as an
operational plan, with one key official describing it as a "framework to manage the
business".28 Instead of acting as a broader accumulation strategy for the Highlands, its
role is largely internal, providing a framework to structure LECs' activities.29 This is
clearly evident from the way in which the three strategic objectives and four sectoral
priorities are now used to frame LEC's programmes. The business planning process
(see Section 5.3) is now structured by the HIE strategy, requiring LECs to link their
programmes to HIE's overall objectives. Indeed, the system for allocating funding to
LECs is currently being restructured according to the three key objectives identified in
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HIE's 1996 strategy.30 In this sense, the strategy functions as an organisational 'fix'
allowing HIE to order and regulate the ways in which the network intervenes in
underlying processes of economic and social change. The result of this narrow role of
'strategy' as ordering framework, underpinned by an aggregative perspective on
regional development and encouraged by the demands of central targets, is a strategic
thinness which limits HIE's capacity to address underlying structural problems.
Pressures to maximise operational efficiency and accentuate the positive impact of
programmes leave little room for 'difficult' issues such as long-term unemployment,
social exclusion and economic dependency to be addressed.
This section has shown that while there is scope for LECs to both feed local
priorities into the process of strategy formulation and adapt the provisions of the
'strategic' framework to local conditions, the HIE core dominates the process of
'strategy' formulation. Although HIE enjoys a relative autonomy from direct state
interference in the area of strategy formulation, it has increasingly used its strategic
resources to develop managerial tools to order and frame LEC's activities. This
conception of strategy as organisational framework requires LECs to work within
established categories, and represents one key way in which state managers constrain
local autonomy and flexibility. The analysis now moves on to consider the
operationalisation of strategy through the formation of business plans and allocation
of funding. The next section focuses on how key features of the operating regime
govern the translation of 'strategy' into practice, offering a detailed assessment of the
impact of neo-liberal technologies of government such as targeting, auditing and
financial controls on the relationship between local initiative and central direction.
5.3. Putting It all Into Practice: an Examination of the Operating Regime
Despite their official status as private companies, LECs are dependent on the
state for funding.31 While the Treasury remains the ultimate source of LEC funding,
both the Scottish Office and the HIE core play crucial roles in determining the precise
allocations of individual agencies. Although the allocation of funding from the
Treasury to the Scottish Office is determined by a set fonnula (the Barnett formula),
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the Scottish Secretary has discretion to determine the allocation of funds between
functional responsibilities.32 Along with other public agencies, HIE submits a bid for
funding, in the form of an Operating Plan which details how the money will be spent
in terms of specific programmes and initiatives. The Scottish Office then allocates
funding from its block grant in accordance with its assessment of the significance of
economic development as a political priority. This process tends to work on the basis
of previous experience. Variations in funding levels are always set against an
established "baseline".33 The effective functioning of the bidding and allocation
process depends upon the underlying knowledge and experience of key actors in that
the stabilisation of key norms and expectations allows them to overcome uncertainty
and anticipate outcomes.
The methods HIE uses to allocate funding to LECs vary across the seven
blocks. While the budgets for adult and youth training are calculated by formulas
based upon the number of adult unemployed and school-leavers in an area
respectively, block 1 funding is allocated by a formula share method. This begins
from a population baseline, giving each LEC a share of funding in direct proportion to
their share of the overall population of the HIE area. This is mediated, however, by a
calculation of economic need, based upon the identification of two kinds of priority
areas: fragile areas and regeneration areas (HIE, 1991). The fragile areas category is
designed to reflect conditions in traditional peripheral areas suffering from the classic
symptoms of economic marginality (Fig 5.1). The calculation is therefore based on a
formula taking account of a range of economic, demographic and physical variables,
including population change and out-migration, unemployment, long-term
unemployment, the proportion employed in agriculture, the percentage of single track
roads.34 The regeneration area category recognises the problems of areas suffering
from major unemployment losses which face problems of short-term adjustment (HIE,
1991). The calculative process works in a similar way for regeneration areas, though it
is based more narrowly on labour market trends such as unemployment and the
employment levels in large employers.35 The Western Isles and North-west Sutherland
are examples of fragile areas (Fig 5.1) whilst Easter Ross (based on the Dingwall
travel-to-work-area), Wick/Thurso and Forres are classified as regeneration areas. The
129
resultant map of priority areas is then used to alter the initial pattern of allocation
based on population (Fig 5.1). The intention is to re-distribute funds away from the
relatively prosperous areas around Inverness towards peripheral or depressed areas
like the Western Isles, Caithness and Sutherland and Easter Ross (Table 5.1). The
proportion of the population of a LEC area resident within these priority areas is used
to calculate a priority factor which is applied to the population base to give a
percentage share of funding (Table 5.1). 15.0 percentage points are subtracted from
Inverness and Nairn's population share and 1.0 per cent added to each area for every
10,000 population resident within a priority area (Table 5.1) (HIE, 1991: 28). Thus,
since the entire Western Isles is classified as a fragile area (Fig 5.1), it is given a
priority factor of 3.1 on the basis of its 1991 population of 30,630 (Table 5.1). In
1996/7, the formula share was applied to some £30 million of block 1 funds out of the
total Network expenditure of £74.9 million (HIE, Sixth Report: 75, 85)
Table 5.1. The Formula Share
LEC Area Population Population Priority Factor Formula Share
(1991) Share
Argyll and the 71,390 19.4 +3.1 22.5
Islands
Caithness and 39,520 10.7 +2.9 13.6
Sutherland
Inverness and 72,490 19.7 -15.0 4.7
Nairn
Lochaber 19,110 5.2 +0.2 5.4
Moray, Badenoch 33,670 9.1 - 9.1
and Strathspey
Orkney 19,400 5.3 +0.3 5.6
Ross and 48,310 13.1 +4.2 17.3
Cromarty
Shetland 22,170 6.0 +0.4 6.4
Skye and 11,590 3.2 +0.8 4.0
Lochalsh
Western Isles 30,630 8.3 +3.1 11.4
Total 368,280 100.0 100.0

















& the Islands AE
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Figure 5.1 HIE Fragile Areas, 1997
In practice the formula share acts more as a guide, however, as there is scope
for allocations to be varied according to the perceived merit of the proposals set out in
LEC business plans. This incorporation of local need is crucial in containing local-
central tensions. The absence of any overt conflict between LECs and HIE reflects
the success of key actors in constructing an integrated network. Although power is not
equally distributed, local-central relations are characterised by considerable mutual
dependence with LECs obviously depending upon HIE for funding while HIE relies
on LECs to supply information on perfonnance and anticipated demand on which to
base its allocative decisions. Crucially, as experience has been accumulated, the
effects of routine processes of institutional interaction in consolidating certain
'structures of expectation' have removed some of the early tensions:
Now I suppose we're sort of five-six years into it, it becomes very much more sleek ... In the
early days there was a lot of tooing and frooing ... but I think ... a lot of that debate has passed
now and we're very much in a good understanding of what the situation is in each of the areas
and there's perhaps not so much of a need for ... great discussion on that. Having said that ...
you ... make a strong case and usually ... you ... get a good hearing.36
It's very slick, we've been doing a few years now ... if you look at the historical pattern of splits
between the LECs and the HIE core and if you know the overall figure you've got a pretty good
feel for what you're allocation might be and then it's just a matter of negotiating ... to maximise
it. So it's ... a very amicable thing, it's not an aggressive arrangement at all ... We do a plan and
it goes across to Highland Enteiprise, we talk to someone over there, we send our plan to them
and we give a bid as does each LEC, and they have to look at the respective merits of each plan
37
and make a decision on what's allocated.
In this sense, competitive pressures have been regulated and contained as modes of
allocation are gradually institutionalised and normalised. Business planning is a
protracted process, beginning in July-August as LECs review the take-up of key
programmes.38 There is mutual exchange of information from an early stage as HIE
conveys its expectations of overall budget allocations from the Scottish Office and
their implications for individual LECs. The first draft is submitted in late November-
early December, leaving four months for negotiation and adjustment before the start
of the financial year in April when an operating agreement is signed, allowing LECs
to deliver programmes on behalf of HIE. All this is set within a historic pattern of
allocation based on the formula share and subject to further adjustment in response to
local market conditions.39
Respondents were anxious to stress that the initial start-of-year allocations to
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LECs, agreed through the business planning process, represented merely a starting
point. The need for flexibility was strongly emphasised:
If anyone thinks that a plan that they draw up at the beginning of any year is going to be valid
for the whole year they're a fool ... It's one thing having a plan, but you've got to be flexible,
you've got to understand ... how the strategy and the tactics will vary as it as meets demands,
it's a bit like fighting a battle ... you're subject to the vagaries of the economy generally, you're
not working in a vacuum ... You're always in the business of monitoring and evaluating ... that's
where I go back to the Management Group ... at HIE level the Management Group are the key
to keeping this thing on the rails, or navigating it through the stormy waters, whatever ... sort of
similie you want to take.40
The important thing is we are a network, and if we at RACE (Ross and Cromarty Enterprise)
have been allocated too much money in a particular block and it is evident to us towards the
end of the financial year that we're not going to hit that ceiling that's been given to us, it's duty-
bound on us to report back to HIE ... And vice-versa if we're over-heating we can go back to
HIE and say this is the situation, ifwe had more money we could do this and if elsewhere in the
network is light then there's the possibility we can get the money. So there's a lot of co¬
operation ... although we're independent there's a huge amount of communication between
ourselves and HIE.41
These quotes offer insight into what Jessop (1997b: 60-1) has called the 'governance
of complexity'. They recognise that many factors shaping the actual spending of
allocated funds are beyond the control of HIE and LECs and indicate the ways in
which HIE seeks to regulate its interventions. The military and nautical metaphors
deployed by the HIE official represent the process as one of struggle as HIE strives to
maintain overall coordination and direction through the 'command centre' of the
Management Group.42 Responsiveness to rapidly changing circumstances is
paramount. Detailed monitoring and evaluation is regarded as the key to this,
requiring LECs to continually assess how local conditions affect the take-up of
programmes and then to convey this infonnation to HIE. The integrated structure of
the HIE Network is important here in giving the network the capacity to respond by
facilitating rapid communication between LECs and HIE. As a result, funds can be
transferred quickly to areas of greatest need. While LECs are in many respects the
targets of this process, being required to report any shortfalls or surpluses, the second
quote suggests that underlying organisational imperatives tend to be internalised by
LEC personnel in the sense of becoming normalised within routine practices. The
prospect that individual LECs could be the recipients of surplus funds from other parts
of the network is important in giving them a stake in the process.
Such responsiveness to changing conditions can be seen as a function of the
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'vertical' flexibility of the HIE network, enabling HIE to move funds rapidly between
LECs. This, however, appears to contrast with a 'horizontal' rigidity in terms of LECs
capacity to transfer money between funding categories. As emphasised earlier,43 LEC
funding is structured in seven blocks. Their scope to shift funds between these blocks
in response to changing conditions is limited:
Within block 1 where you've got the Finance for Business and Project block generally, yes one
could in fact move money about, move money between individual project headings, but you
can't move it between blocks 1 and 3 ... And you can't do any of this without permission of HIE
in any case really.44
Thus, while LECs are able to determine their own priorities within funding blocks,
tight rules set by HIE prevent them from viring anything more than a minimal sum
between blocks. Once the business plan has been agreed and the Operating Agreement
signed, LEC funding is committed to the specified programmes. The limited scope for
inter-block virement affects local service provision. For instance, the existence of
central rules determining funding levels for national training programmes constrains
LECs' ability to provide training schemes tailored to the needs of local business:
The difficulty is that you've actually got monies being ring-fenced in fact for delivering
Skillseekers, Training For Work and small business support .... and you're given a specific
budget to deliver these three programmes and at the end of the day you haven't got very much
other money left for training the private sector for example.4"'
LECs dependence on HIE for permission to vire funds is indicative of the latter's
financial control over LECs. HIE's ability to gather and compare information gives it a
knowledge of LEC performance and local conditions across the Highlands which
individual LECs lack, thereby enabling it to control the flow of allocative resources
across the Network.
HIE's control over LEC's funding regime has not, however, been sufficient to
shield the HIE Network from the impact of the shift towards output-rated funding.
The focus on outputs and targets is part of the 'new managerial ism' in the public
sector, introduced in the early 1980s as part of the Thatcher government's concern to
ensure accountability over public funds (see Section 4.2) (Gray, 1997: 342-3). By the
early 1990s, a pervasive 'rhetoric of accountability' (Power, 1994) was representing
targets as a key way of ensuring value for money within the context of a continuing
squeeze on public money. The launch and early development of TECs and LECs was
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accompanied by substantial cuts in training budgets (Jones, 1997c), linked to
measures designed to increase scrutiny over remaining funds.
As part of a broader neo-liberal agenda, targets serve to foster processes of
inter-organisational competition. According to Peck and Jones (1995), relating
funding to performance measures based mainly on efficiency criteria and represented
in forms such as league tables creates a "pseudomarket" forcing TECs to conform to
the government's cost-cutting agenda. Failure to meet specified output criteria could
have a severe impact on individual TECs, resulting in substantial loss of funding. The
increasing use of targets subjects local agencies to increasingly detailed forms of
surveillance as state managers monitor their procedures and performance across a
range of criteria (Giddens, 1985). All this raises crucial questions about how these
general trends are worked out within the specific context of the HIE Network. Does
the concentration of key 'authoritative resources' within the Scottish Office and HIE
core as intermediate tiers of the state allow these bodies to 'translate' central directives
- adapting them to their own purposes - thereby making it more difficult for central
government to exert direct control over LECs?
Since LECs have a wider remit than TECs, they are subject to a broader range
of targets. Table 5.2 provides an example of the range of targets a LEC is expected to
meet on its main programmes in return for funding. While the table captures the
'horizontal' dimension of targeting, in terms of showing the range of targets facing
LECs across the main programmes, it is necessary to add a 'vertical' dimension by
considering the role of successive institutional levels (LECs, HIE, the Scottish Office)
in setting targets and monitoring performance.
At the pan-Highland level, the Scottish Office expects HIE to deliver certain
outputs in return for public funding. The key document here is HIE's Operating Plan,
which is submitted to the Scottish Office as the basis of its bid for funding and
provides details of how funds will be distributed between specific programmes. This
is then the subject of detailed negotiation between HIE and Scottish Office officials.46
Although HIE is heavily involved in these discussions, ultimately the Scottish Office's
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role as the core funder allows it to set the targets it expects HIE to deliver. The
requirements of the Scottish Office are in turn structured by Treasury guidelines
specifying the main types of outputs, if not their precise levels, that a regional
development agency like HIE is expected to deliver.
Table 5.2. Western Isles Enterprise, Main Targets 1996-7.
Programme Measures Targets
Finance for Business Spend ('000) 1,900
Jobs Created/Retained 285
Cost per Job (average) £4,100
Leverage 1:3
Property Spend ('000) 1,800
Site Acquisition 3
New Units (m2) 750
Occupancy Rate 85%




SVQs per 100 leavers 45
Training for Work Spend 201
Training Weeks 4454
ORF points 300
SVQs per 100 leavers 21
Investors in People Commitments 50
Community Action Grant Cases Approved 33
Rate of Assistance 40%
Source: WIE, Business Plan 1996-7: 10-12.
Given its basic structure, HIE is unable to deliver key targets directly, forcing
it to rely on the combined efforts of its constituent LECs. LEC business plans are
linked to HIE's Operating Plan from an early stage with 'shadow' targets attached to
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the main programmes in anticipation of the outcomes of negotiations with the Scottish
Office.47 HIE's knowledge of both central demands and local conditions (through
LECs) enables it to pay a crucial mediating role, translating the emerging
requirements of the Scottish Office into the detailed programmes of action inscribed
in LEC business plans. It divides the main targets among the 10 LECs, requiring each
to deliver a share of the overall pan-Highland targets (Table 5.2). Through its
integration into the business planning process, targeting has become institutionalised
within the HIE network in the sense of being framed and structured by the embedded
norms and expectations governing day-to-day interaction.
Although LECs have some involvement in setting their own targets, HIE
retains ultimate authority:
I mean the targets are largely set by, certainly by HIE, sometimes a little bit unrealistically but
you know there's a bit of discussion obviously goes on but at the end of the day it's them that
would set the targets which we have to sort of you know just accept and get on with ... There's a
bit of come and go, put it like that, but at the end of the day they're the masters so they can
decide.48
The inscription of agreed output measures in the operating agreement incorporates
targets within the broader contractual relationship between HIE and LECs.
Accordingly, individual LECs performance against key targets is closely monitored
throughout the year with LECs being required to submit a monthly report to HIE. This
points to the role of targeting as technology of surveillance (Giddens, 1985) that
enables state managers to accumulate increasingly detailed information on key objects
of regulation (LECs). As Rose and Miller (1992: 187) observe, requiring individuals
and agencies to account for their actions like this is a means of exerting control over
them. What the HIE example also shows, however, is that the distinct managerial
rationalities associated with targeting tend to be internalised by the actors who are at
the same time its targets. Targeting has been comfortably accommodated within the
routine practices of reflexive monitoring deployed by HIE to collect and interpret
information on aspects of economic development in the Highlands whilst becoming
part of the everyday vocabulary of LEC personnel as they monitor their own
performance against specified targets.
In this way, calculative technologies deployed by the centre to regulate the
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activities of local and regional organisations become articulated with an autonomous
set of internal rationalities. The 'authoritative resources' of the HIE core, grounded in
the knowledge and experience inherited from the HIDB, enables it to act as a 'centre
of calculation' (Latour, 1987) in which data on a range of phenomena pertaining to
HIE's remit - business profitability, unemployment, labour market processes,
demographic trends - are collected, compared and aggregated. These processes of data
collection and reflexive monitoring rely upon mobile technologies of inscription and
calculation. The effect is to render the domain for which HIE is responsible
"susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention" (Rose and Miller, 1992: 185).
Processes of targeting are important in extending this beyond aspects of 'external'
reality (i.e. local economies) to construct LECs themselves as objects of government.
In this sense, HIE's 'allocative resources' (Giddens, 1984) as the agency which
controls the distribution of LEC funds enables it to assess and compare their
performance through specific forms of inscription and representation (for instance,
league tables) and structure its interventions accordingly. Similarly, the Scottish
Office can be thought of as a centre of calculation at a higher level which collects and
aggregates information on aspects of HIE's performance. The Treasury, in turn, is
perhaps the ultimate centre of calculation in the British political system, able to
determine the allocation of funding among government departments and monitor how
it is spent.
While the growth of targeting has played an important role in the re-modelling
of the public sector in the 1980s and 1990s, other technologies of government have
also had a significant impact. Like targeting, audit is a technology of mistrust whose
spread is justified by a pervasive 'rhetoric of accountability' (Power, 1994). As
unelected local agencies modeled on neo-liberal principles, LECs are subject to
stringent audit procedures:
We are audited very, very carefully ... we have so many different layers of auditing, we have the
National Audit Office, we have HIE's internal audit team who are very stringent, and we have
our own Board's audit team who are also very careful and very stringent ... We have to be
absolutely sure, that side of things the FFB side of things, and a bit with CAGs as well, are
horrendously audited, you really have to have all your bases covered ... We're pretty confident
that we can defend most of the figures, and the principle is if you can't defend it don't do it, I
think people stick to that quite rigidly.49
We have a monitoring and aftercare officer in the admin, team ... and she looks over individual
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cases, programmes, ecetera, and looking at the effectiveness ... We also are audited and
monitored by a variety of organisations, starting with HIE internal audit but going to the
Scottish Office who look quite frequently at what we do, we have European auditors who look a
the European programmes, and annually we have the National Audit Office looking at both
compliance and value-for-money aspects of the Programmes, so we're audited to death basically
... There's never a day when someone doesn't come in, and we've got our own auditors, Ernst
and Young accountants who do the statutory audits for us as well ... meeting all the statutory
conditions.50
These comments clearly emphasise the density of audit in terms of the multiple layer
of evaluation which administrative practices are subject to. Audit not only assesses
performance and efficiency against a set of apparently objective standards, it is also a
constitutive force in shaping administrative practice. As the first quote states,
'defensibility' in the face of independent auditors is an important factor framing key
decisions. The spread of audit is a function of its mobility, allowing diverse and
distant organisational sites to be linked by standardised procedures that reflect
underlying calculative norms (Rose, 1996a). As the quotes indicate, however, the
norms of audit tend to be internalised by target groups, leading HIE and LECs to not
only establish their own system of internal audit, but also anticipate the demands of
audit during routine decision-making processes. Such intemalisation stems from the
force of the underlying rhetoric of accountability; as Power (1994: 304) observes, to
resist or oppose audit is to "support non-accountability". But the use of audit as a
guarantee of accountability depends upon an idealisation of independent validation
which is actively de-politicising, placing trust in the hands of technical experts whose
actions are governed by managerial rationalities rather than democratic norms. The
details and results of audit are rarely made public, reflecting a situation in which
legitimacy is derived not from specific outputs but from the public perception that
'independent validation' has taken place. Beneath the rhetoric of openness and
transparency, then, audit remains invisible to the publics it claims to serve (Power,
1994; 304-6).
Targeting also functions as a 'responsibilising' technology of control which
imposes a structure and logic on the activities of local and regional actors, forcing
them to link their activities to broader political programmes. It seems to enable the
central state to assert a form of distant control over the HIE Network:
I mean the LECs often ... complain I think that you know HIE set those targets ... but the targets
come from the Scottish Office and we're just translating them into what has to be done at the
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local level, to that extent it's a fairly top-down process ... The whole question ... of targets ... I
guess it's a measure of control in some ways ... The Scottish Office control us by saying we
must deliver these targets, likewise there's an element of central control here you know in
saying to the LECs you must do this, but that's the whole nature of the Enterprise Network, they
have contracts that they have to comply with.3'
This presents a picture of a hierarchical structure with each institutional tier using the
process of targeting to assert control over the subordinate tier. It is the relationship
between targeting and the allocation of funding that gives it its utility as a managerial
tool. Given that institutions will invariably seek to maximise their funds, attaching
conditions in the form of targets to these funds gives the funding authorities a
directive capacity over their activities. This top-down process, controlled by state
managers in the Scottish Office and HIE, is one key way in which the activities of
LECs as local business-led agencies have been incorporated within a broader set of
institutional rules and procedures. The constitutive role of targeting in shaping the
structure of the HIE Network points to the persistence of hierarchical mechanisms of
control and suggests that emerging forms of local governance in the Scottish
Highlands continue to be underpinned by structures of government.
The use of the term 'translating' in the above quote suggests, however, that
neither HIE nor LECs are passive actors in the process of targeting. As has been
shown, both the initial formula share and the system enabling funds to be transferred
during the financial year are mechanisms devised by local experts which, rather than
allocating funds according to perfonnance, seek to channel them to areas of greatest
need. HIE's role as a centre of calculation with a relative monopoly of the technical
expertise and regional knowledge required to assess and compare local priorities
enables it to control this funding regime. The impact of targeting has been 'filtered'
through pre-existing structures and practices. In particular, the existence of an
integrated network based on close co-operation and communication has enabled HIE
to contain the threat of'institutional Darwinism':
I think what was originally intended and what eventually happened are not quite the same. I'm
not aware of any LEC that's had its funding reduced because its performance has been less
than... expected. At once stage it was anticipated that that might be the case... I think what
has happened instead is that there is rigorous monitoring of performance, I mean literally
monthly Reports from LECs ... and as soon as any problems start to arise ... the corrective
action is put in, so you're not waiting until the end of the year and then realising that some
LEC has ... either major under-performance or over-performance in any areas, its more to turn
quite closely on it as we go along ... There's been no real financial penalties to LECs for
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performance ,52
There is little sense then in which the prospect of matching funding to performance
has fostered competition between LECs. Although HIE compiles league tables to
assess performance across a range of quantitative indicators (Table 5.2), no LEC has
had its funding reduced as a result of unsatisfactory perfonnance. Rather, LECs are
required to monitor the take-up of programmes closely and to convey this information
to HIE at regular intervals. While this requirement could be viewed as a form of
control through surveillance, the effect is to give the HIE Network the institutional
capacity to 'translate' central directives by accommodating their logics within its own
institutionalised norms and procedures.
This section has assessed how key aspects of the operating regime govern the
translation of strategy into practice. While neo-liberal technologies of government
such as financial controls, targeting and audit have shaped this operating regime, it
would be inaccurate to state that they allow the centre to govern the HIE network at a
distance (Rose, 1996a). The logic of these 'responsibilising' technologies does require
HIE and LEC personnel to account for their actions to external authority, but the force
of underlying rhetorics of accountability has seen these actors internalise key norms.
As a result, these norms have been institutionalised within routine practices and
procedures. This can best be described as a merging of internal and external
(government) rationalities, with HIE's 'response' structured by a management culture
that privileges operational effectiveness over strategic deliberation. At the same time,
HIE retains a relative autonomy from government, and its possession of certain
'authoritative resources' inherited from the HIDB give it a capacity to 'translate' central
directives into its own terms. For LECs, however, institutionalised rules and
procedures limit their capacity to address local priorities:
The flexibility's not there, at the moment you're looking at things, whether it's training or
Finance for Business or whatever, all these things are so linked to national targets, at the local
level it just kind of disappears ... this whole thing about not being not being able to vire and
over-emphasis on a few main targets ... In a way that's kind of where the fundamental conflict
comes ... The issue as far as LECs are concerned is that the whole Local Enterprise Company
Network was based on the fundamental ... premise that local businessmen ... know best what the
economic policy for that area or economic development approach for that area should be. Now
people may disagree with that fundamentally but if... that is the basis for it then freedom to vire
money into whatever the board believes are the priorities ... should be there.5"1
This suggests that the tension between central direction and local autonomy -
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identified in the quote which opened this thesis - is being resolved in favour of the
former. But in order to explore this issue further, it is necessary to consider how the
key strategic themes and features of the operating regime discussed above are
operationalised and put into practice at individual project level. The following section
focuses on the appraisal of individual applications for financial assistance in order to
consider how the themes considered above frame allocative decisions at the micro-
level.
5.4. Exercising Local Flexibility? The Appraisal of Business Applications
Finance for Business (FFB) is the main programme for business assistance.
Compared to the main training programmes, which LECs deliver according to
national rules, it appears to be one of the areas offering more scope for local discretion
and flexibility to be exercised in decision-making processes. As such, it provides an
appropriate empirical focus for this section. The official rationale for FIIE offering
grants and loans to business is based upon an identification of market failure as the
cause of the economic problems of the Flighlands.54 The failure of capital markets, due
to the perception that the region offered few opportunities for profitable investment, is
particularly important in this respect (HIE, 1996b). The resultant lack of business
finance has impeded economic development.
In terms of appraising individual applications for assistance, the Treasury
offers substantial guidance, specifying key criteria in order to ensure 'value for
money'. The specific documentary forms in which key criteria such as viability,
displacement and additionality are inscribed can be seen as crucial material resources
binding and stabilising institutional networks. They enable the day-to-day decisions of
investment managers in local micro-sites to be linked to a centre of calculation like
the Treasury (Barry et ai, 1996). While the use of these criteria is clearly bound up
with a managerialist agenda emphasising the need to ensure 'efficiency' and 'value-for-
money', they cannot be reduced to simple reflections of underlying neo-liberal
rationalities. More accurately, they are the product of the ways in which neo-liberal
state projects have appropriated and transformed pre-existing rules and norms. Criteria
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such as viability and displacement were taken into account by the HIDB and their
current role within the HIE network can be seen as result of the interaction between
procedures inherited from the HIDB and the demands of the 'new managerialism'. One
important way in which the latter acts upon LECs is through the audit practices
discussed earlier. Characteristically, auditors inspect case papers and records to assess
whether key criteria were taken into account in the appraisal process.
A key measure against which the effectiveness of the HIE Network is
measured is job creation, and the primary consideration for LEC officials is the
number of jobs that a project is likely to create or secure. This emphasis on a state
agency's capacity to create employment reflects the importance of economic growth
and development to the legitimacy of the modern state. On the FFB programme, a
system of delegated authority is in operation with a structure of financial ceilings
establishing which part of the Network has responsibility for allocative decisions
(Table 5.3). Since the majority of cases are relatively small scale (under £30,000),
they are dealt with at LEC level.55 Many of these will be under the £30,000 ceiling,
meaning that LEC staff make the decision on whether the project should be offered
assistance.56 Even for those cases that go to the board, officials carry out the appraisal,
gathering a range of information in report form, complete with a recommendation for
directors on whether or not assistance should be offered. The board's function is
largely strategic, overseeing and monitoring progress against objectives and reviewing
the policy priorities which frame allocative decisions.
Table 5.3. System ofFinancial Ceilings














Source: SALE, Business Plan 1994-5; Senior HIE official.57
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The appraisal process works on the basis of information on cash flow, turn¬
over, profit, funding sources, employment levels, etc., provided by the applicant
through a formal business plan. LEC staff then calculate the likely number of outputs
on the basis of this information. In this sense, individual businesses become 'objects'
of regulation as soon as they apply for assistance. A large part of what HIE and LECs
'regulate' as development agencies is access to grants and loans. While the information
supplied by the applicant shapes the appraisal process, the LEC case officer retains
ultimate authority in calculating and recording the number of outputs:
Our investment managers agree with the client on Finance For Business, it's the only area, apart
from LEADER, where we actually count jobs. We have to be convinced ... that the jobs being
claimed by the applicant are in fact real, that they are not just plucked out of thin air. So if we
put down on a Finance For Business form 2 jobs created and 1 retained the investment manager
needs to be able to say I'm confident that that's achievable, and at certain times we discount
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what our client says and we only allow for a smaller amount ifwe think that's the real number.
This authority is rooted not in the individual official, but in the institutionalised rules
and procedures that reflect both the accumulation of experience under the HIDB and
requirements of central government. These give LECs the 'authoritative resources'
required to calculate outputs as a basis for allocative decisions. For more significant
cases, LECs will draw on the specialist expertise of HIE officials to calculate indirect
and induced employment.'19 Given that it is perhaps the key target against which LEC
performance is measured, the primacy of job creation / retention as an underlying
criteria is fixed. Although LECs retain some discretion in deciding which projects to
support, these decisions are structured by a business plan agreed in advance with HIE,
thus situating them within broader categories used across the Network.
Although institutional rules and norms impose certain requirements on
applicants, they are not passive actors in the process. In order to be considered for
assistance, they must submit information on existing activities and future plans. The
emphasis on business plans reflects the ways in which recent processes of state
restructuring have sought to re-model the public sector according to private sector
practices and norms. State resources are more or less accessible to individual
applicants according to the strategies they adopt to gain assistance (Jessop, 1990b).
Successful strategies are likely to be those that emphasise a project's potential to
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address key concerns of state agencies like LECs. In this sense, LEC's objectives can
be appropriated by business applicants and used as a bargaining tool in subsequent
negotiations. One business manager felt compelled to emphasise the importance of his
company to the local economy, using the LEC's tendency to publicise the business as
a success story to lever further support:
We've had to work very hard at it... Almost every week I've been doing presentations and on the
phone to them eveiy second week, just that so ... they can justify supporting us ... Now that we've
got them trained... I think we've convinced them that we're here to stay ... We try to do things in
the local community too, and they're now using us as an example ... showing what can be done
in places like this. They're always coming round here with people, every MP who comes up is
shown this place.60
In this sense, previous investments in an enterprise give LECs a stake in its continued
success. This provides the managers of such enterprises with crucial resources in their
efforts to gain further support. Such a capacity is clearly conditioned by the
importance of the business to the local economy since it is only if a significant
number of jobs would be threatened in the event of any difficulties that any real
pressure can be exerted on a LEC. The perceived accessibility of LECs' resources to
local residents seeking assistance seems to be an important factor influencing their
credibility and legitimacy within local communities (see Section 7.4).
The Harris Tweed sector provides another example of how private operators
can appropriate LECs' objectives as tools with which to negotiate support. Since its
establishment in 1991, HIE has staked substantial material and symbolic resources in
regenerating this declining industry.61 By this stage, the contraction of the processing
side of the industry had left one company - Kenneth MacLeod (Shawbost), (the KM
Group) - in a dominant position. HIE put together a funding package worth some £10
million over five years, investing £4 million of its own funds in combination with a
similar level of EU funding and a smaller contribution from the private sector (WIE,
1992/3). This has been used to finance a shift from single-width to double-width
looms in order to produce a lighter cloth in tune with market demand. The package
enables weavers to purchase the new looms and the remaining mills to modernise.
Given the changing structure of labour relations in the industry, however, this
programme of investment has strengthened the position of the dominant private
operator.62 The KM Group can harness the restructuring strategy to its own agenda,
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while HIE's financial and symbolic commitment leaves it vulnerable to further
demands for assistance given the continuing climate of uncertainty facing the
industry. Consequently, the company can use this previous commitment to negotiate
further support for its marketing efforts.
The emphasis on the number of jobs likely to be created by a project tends to
discourage considerations of their quality and status. There is no explicit measure or
target in the operating regime, in which all jobs of similar status (full time, part-time,
seasonal) are counted equally, encouraging LECs to make job quality a key criteria
shaping investment decisions. While LEC officials express their support for high-
quality jobs, stating that this is taken into account at the individual project level, their
conception of their role as one of 'enabling' the market limits their scope to impose
standards. In response to the question of whether LECs took job quality into account,
one official stated:
That's a tricky one that because theoretically whoever's coming in will pay the going rate or they
won't get anyone working for them, but it's a major consideration, but it's difficult to tell ...
without legislation being imposed, we'll only help you if you guarantee a minimum wage rate of
whatever ... It is one I think where we have let market forces run with that, it's a very, very good
question and I'm not really sure that we've got the answer to it at the moment.6''
This statement is informed by advanced liberal nonns of limited government which
work to constrain and channel government agencies' interventions in a self-regulating
market (Rose, 1996a). In particular, it reflects the largely reactive nature of LECs'
regulatory practices. Rather than going out and initiating projects themselves, LECs
respond to formal applications for assistance. Furthermore, they are unable/ unwilling
to influence the take-up of jobs among different social groups (unemployed manual
workers, young people, women, etc.) since this tends to be regarded as something
outwith the proper scope of LEC activity, best left to the sovereign employer. In the
absence of any formal recognition of the importance of job quality, these
considerations tend to be crowded out by narrowly quantitative targets which
encourage a focus on short-term outputs. There are signs of change, however, with
HIE recently announcing that it is considering making pay and conditions a key
criteria influencing investment decisions (WHFP 7.5.98, 20.11.98). While this
proposal seems to be part of HIE's efforts to adapt to the change of government in
May 1997, it also reflects practical difficulties encountered by initiatives such as
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Investors in People which seek to increase employees' commitment and skills without
any corresponding effort to improve pay and conditions.64
The aggregate job created/retained figures cited in LEC annual reports - used
to measure progress against targets - are accumulated on a project-by-project basis
through the year from investment managers' estimates of probable outputs. Since the
claimed jobs figure is calculated in advance of the real processes of investment and
growth which actually create jobs, however, it exists only on paper. For some
observers, there is an underlying tendency for this method to over-estimate outputs:
I'm very cynical sometimes about some of the figures, I mean the job creation figures I think are
inflated ... they're not inflated by malevolence or as a kind of con trick but ... inherently ... the
way that they're calculated is over-optimistic ... Somebody ... says I want to build a factory or
whatever, so you say to them okay, amongst many other things how many jobs are you going
to create, they say well we're going to create 10, and so after much tooing and frooing 10 jobs
goes down on the sheet as it were, and then that will go down in the Annual Report as 10 jobs
created against the target of in our case of 200 or 150 or whatever it tends to be in any given
year, and then that will in turn show up in the HIE figures of 3500 or whatever they are for the
whole of the Highlands and Islands.67
Other officials claim, however, that the figures are relatively accurate, citing
evaluations which measured claimed jobs against actual by asking for information on
employment levels from companies assisted. One showed that approximately two-
thirds of claimed jobs had actually been created after taking into account additionality,
displacement, linkage and multiplier effects (Begg et a/., 1997). Given the adverse
economic conditions found in the Highlands, this fairly standard figure for business
assistance initiatives is regarded as providing support for the programme.66 Another
way ofmonitoring the actual employment impact of the business support programmes
involves aftercare systems. HIE does operate such a system, maintaining contact with
assisted companies and requesting information at regular intervals, but only in the
event of a major gap between expected and real outcomes would there be any
investigation.67
Another key criteria emphasised by LECs - closely related to employment - is
the financial and business viability of the proposal. Through the FFB programmes
HIE and LECs intervene in economic processes in an effort to change the behaviour of
selected companies as 'objects' of regulation. In the terms of Begg et al., (1997), HIE
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aims to develop the 'enterprising behaviour' of companies by attaching conditions to
the funding packages it offers. Specifically, it encourages a more strategic approach
among businesses, equipping them to better identify emerging opportunities such as
new markets or products. In this way, it can address its strategic objective of'growing
businesses' by boosting competitiveness and profitability. Again, the business plan is a
key mechanism of intervention here:
It can actually change the structure of businesses quite radically because one of the key things
you have to do, the only piece of paper that has to be written down ... is a business plan and
many businesses don't have a business plan, so you suddenly confront them with this shock that
they've got to plan where their business is going and that sometimes creates great internal
upheaval, quite emotional stuff at times.68
While this imposes requirements that are often at odds with the way small businesses
in particular operate, the emphasis on commercial viability and sustainability is
encouraged by measures of efficiency such as cost per job. HIE highlights its success
in consistently reducing its cost per job figures, claiming to have halved the cost from
that of the first year of operation.69 This has been accompanied by a corresponding
increase in the leverage ratio (the amount of private investment attracted to projects by
LEC funding). While these figures represent conventional measures of success, they
also express an underlying contradiction. Improvements in cost per job and leverage
figures indicate that the private sector is creating jobs and that the initial market
failure is being 'corrected'. In reducing the need for intervention, this clashes with the
underlying logic of institutional reproduction that compels HIE to periodically justify
its own existence (HIE, 1996b). For HIE to proclaim too loudly its success in cost per
job terms, then, would be to also undermine the conditions for its own existence.
The emphasis on business viability has also fuelled criticism that LECs
privilege narrow economic aims over broader social considerations.70 This was one
accusation levelled at HIE following its refusal to support the Harris Tweed weavers
co-operative on the grounds that their plans were not financially viable (WHFP
30.5.97). These criticisms are not new: similar points were made about the HIDB's
support for big business during the period of economic modernisation in the late
1960s and early 1970s. They reflect underlying structures of expectation (Paasi, 1991)
which demand that development be focused on projects that benefit 'locals' rather than
established business interests. For one LEC official, however, it is vital that
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investment decisions are made according to commercial rather than social criteria;
since businesses operate within a highly competitive market-place they need to be
"successful in their own right".71 The role of a private-sector board is important in
bringing an awareness of commercial disciplines and the conditions for business
success. In practice, however, it is largely officials who apply these criteria in
assessing cases, with only a minority of applications considered by the board and even
then being structured by an officer's prior assessment.
The emphasis on displacement requires that case officers consider whether
increased employment in the target company is likely to be at the expense of
employment losses in another company (Begg at ai, 1997: 9). Displacement is likely
to be highest where several businesses serve the same small local market. The effect
of Treasury guidelines on displacement on the pattern of business assistance in the
Highlands and Islands is that service-sector activities dependent on local markets (i.e.
the retail sector) are ineligible for support.72 LECs routinely take the effects of
displacement into account when making investment decisions, and for larger and more
complex cases they are supported by the technical expertise of specialists within the
HIE core. At the same time, however, officials insist that the way displacement is
balanced out against other criteria leaves scope for individual judgment and
discretion:
Well, displacement is a funny ... animal ... The purist would say you shouldn't fund it if there's
any displacement... or you should only fund according to the amount of displacement there is ...
it's easier seen in things like pure retail ... In an outlying area ... we do assist what is a lifeline
service ... but then that would be on social and economic grounds, not just economic grounds
and because we've got social powers as well as economic powers we can make these decisions.
We can actually ... tailor our assistance and the harshness or severity of our judgments on these
things ... extreme cases are always easy, it's the ones in between.73
This quote indicates that the guidelines on displacement are sufficiently flexible to
allow officers to tailor decisions to the needs of particular local areas. In particular,
there is scope for the rules to be relaxed to allow LECs to support 'lifeline' services in
fragile areas. From the perspective of applicants and potential applicants, however, the
scope for exercising local discretion is less apparent and the refusal to support certain
sectors is a source of resentment, particularly since that same activity may be eligible
for support in another LEC area (depending on local market conditions). Such
resentment is fueled by the perceived lack of transparency surrounding rules on what
149
activities are eligible for support, leading to the circulation of conspiracy theories
regarding the LEC's motives and potential conflicts of interest.74 While rules on
displacement ostensibly reflect the need to avoid stimulating duplication and
competition in the 'real' economy, they also function as part of the internal ordering
procedures of state bureaucracy.
Another condition which LECs are required to take account of in making
investment decisions is additionality. This refers to the need to ensure that LEC
funding is additional, meaning that the project couldn't go ahead otherwise (full
additionality) or couldn't proceed according to the same time-scale or on the same
scale (partial additionality). To the extent that these guidelines are designed to protect
taxpayers' money and to ensure that investment has maximum impact, they reflect
underlying managerial rationalities. The emphasis on additionality is again informed
by neo-liberal norms stressing the need to limit intervention and ensure that
institutions confine their activities to the correction of market failures. One way in
which this principle is operationalised is through exit strategies, the importance of
which has been heavily stressed by government guidelines:
We are not in the business of continuous subsidy, that's the first thing, we are not a subsidy
operation, we're a development operation, that means we will go for exit routes ... Now there is
a great deal of debate what these exit routes should be, traditionally they're 3 years or shorter ...
I'm sure there's a debate in there some place about what ah the appropriate strategy should be,
but given the fact... that we have a 5-year parliamentary cycle, we are agents of government, it
would be unlikely that we would ever go beyond 5 years.7'
The stress on not being a "subsidy operation" draws upon embedded norms of limited
intervention to construct an appropriate role for HIE. Exit strategies avoid subsidy by
requiring LECs to specify how they will withdraw from a funding commitment in
advance of them making the actual commitment. Typically, this involves funding
projects at declining annual rates of assistance (50 per cent the first year, 25 per cent
the second year, etc.,). Another aspect of this need to avoid offering "subsidy" is the
characteristic refusal to support the revenue costs of a project, designed to ensure that
it is commercially viable from the outset.
As earlier observations suggested (p. 144-46), applicants' capacity to meet the
demands of the appraisal process vary. This follows from the principle of strategic
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selectivity. This holds that the interventions of state agencies will tend to favour the
interests of some groups over others, though the eventual outcome will tend to be
shaped by the strategies adopted by those groups (Jessop, 1990b; 1997b). Generally,
business representatives saw LECs' decision making processes as highly structured,
forcing applicants to work with a series of elaborate rules and regulations.76 While
these affect all applicants, small businesses tend to find the process particularly
demanding:
A lot of it's to do with the means ofapproach ... A lot ofsmall businesses tend to say when they
go the LEC lookingfor assistance, this is what I want to do and I want to do it tomorrow, that's
the way they think ... The key seems to be to get their approval before you do anything at all and
a lot ofsmall businesses just don't operate like that, they see things like business plans as a
waste of time, they say they have just have a hunch, a gut feeling that this will work, well that
won't work with someone who has to justify himself to the Audit Commission ... For the systems
they work to at the moment you need professional business planning, to do that you need all the
specialist advice, the consultants, the accountants, small businesses just don't have these people,
big businesses will have a finance department, accountants ... all these specialists, that's what
they do.11
In this sense, appraisal practices seem to be 'biased' towards the interests of larger
businesses. Small business lack the organisational and financial resources to put
together the detailed outputs and projections required in business plans. The effects of
this would seem to undermine HIE's strategic emphasis on stimulating growth among
small-to-medium enterprises. It is also one of the factors fueling fairly extensive
criticism of the enterprise networks within the small business community (FSB,
1996). Smaller businesses tend to be disproportionately concentrated in sectors that
are not eligible for assistance (sue as retail and local services), and the broader
structure of state support for industry seems to be orientated towards larger businesses
who can promise to employ significant numbers in single investments and find it
easier to meet displacement and additionality criteria.78 This deep-rooted perception is
reflected in the FSB's plans to lobby the Scottish parliament to make major changes to
the operations of the enteiprise networks (Scotland on Sunday, 18.10.98).
This section has shown that there a number of underlying principles or norms
framing LEC's investment decisions. While criteria such as viability, displacement
and additionality can be seen as part of a managerialist agenda that constantly
'responsibilises' local actors to the claims of the centre, they have, in common with
practices of audit and targeting, been institutionalised within the routine procedures of
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the HIE network. This internalisation means that it would be mistaken to claim that
these principles allow central government to exert control 'at a distance' (Rose,
1996a). While these rules increase the centralisation of the operating regime by
providing the categories which structure routine decision-making processes, HIE and
LECs do have some flexibility to adapt them to the needs of local areas.
Much of this flexibility stems from the sheer difficulty of delimiting
'displacement' and additionality in the face of changing local conditions. In the
absence of any knowledge of what would have happened if a project had not been
funded, additionality is notoriously difficult to assess. Consequently, virtually all
forms of assistance carry an element of'deadweight' - the proportion of a package that
was not required because either the investment would have taken place in any case or
more finance was provided than was necessary to produce subsequent benefits (Begg
et al., 1997: 9). And, as the quote on page 154 suggests, assessing displacement is
often difficult in practice: most cases involve some displacement. While assessments
of the significance of these criteria in the light of local conditions characteristically
deploy calculative procedures, decisions ultimately depend on the qualitative
judgments of the relevant case officer (see Table 5.3). The requirement for them to
weigh up these criteria against one another when undertaking appraisals is, in itself, a
source of flexibility. It relies upon accumulated local knowledge and technical
expertise, much of it inherited from the HIDB. Given that central authorities lack this
local knowledge, this gives HIE the capacity to adapt central guidelines to its own
agenda. LECs work within a context of structured flexibility: while the government's
and HIE's dependence on them to apply underlying principles to particular local
contexts gives them some scope to address their own priorities, their decisions are
nonetheless directly structured and regulated by institutional rules and procedures.
5.5 Conclusion
If you tell businessmen they're in charge they're dim enough to understand that's what you mean
whereas what you really mean is you're in charge old boy but you're still under the Treasury's
control and HIE are going to hold the purse strings, and after a while even the dimmest of them
seemed to realise that that's what had happened ... I think there was a genuine feeling at one
point that the LECs had been told by people like Ian Lang basically ... you're in charge and civil
servants had gone around telling them you've got enormous responsibility and power. The
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reality was that they were going to be held to account by HIE who in turn were going to be held
too account by Scottish Office who therefore weren't going to let them too far off the leash.7;
In the early days particularly there was a lot of tension between LECs generally and HIE ...
What has undoubtedly happened over the years is that the LEC are today more under the control
so to speak ofHIE than was initially envisaged by 1 think many of the people who got involved.
I mean today I think most people at the LEC level have accepted that, some more reluctantly
than others, but they have on the whole accepted it and it now goes along fairly smoothly, but in
the early days it kind of caused quite a bit of tension.80
This chapter has attempted to detail the mechanisms linking local and regional
institutions to central government, pointing to the importance of technologies of
government such as audit, targeting and financial controls in imposing a managerialist
agenda on the Network. While leading actor-network theorists take power as an
outcome rather than a cause of action (Latour, 1986, 1997; Callon, 1986), the
evidence presented in this chapter questions this distinction, suggesting that power is
both outcome and cause. The inheritance of 'authoritative resources' from the HIDB
has structured the 'power geometry' (Massey, 1991) of the HIE Network since 1991.
As a result, it is misleading to talk of a relatively centralised operating regime
enabling the centre 'to govern at distance' (Rose, 1996a; Rose and Miller, 1992).
Rather, the institutionalisation of underlying managerial norms within routine
practices reflects a merging of internal and external (neo-liberal) rationalities. For
LECs, as the above quotes suggest, this means that the regulatory process is
characterised by its immediacy rather than distance. It is HIE, not central government,
that is perceived to be 'in control'.
HIE's 'authoritative resources', rooted in the technical expertise and local
knowledge inherited from the HIDB, gives it some scope to adapt and 'translate'
central measures to its own distinct purposes. Its adherence to a needs-based formula
for allocating funds to LECs in the face of central pressures to make funding reflect
performance provides evidence of this process of translation as does the existence of
mechanisms that enable local priorities to be incorporated into strategic frameworks.
This capacity for translation is a product of the centre's dependence on the HIE core's
technical expertise and local knowledge in order to legitimately govern the Highlands
within the confines of a liberal political order. Perhaps the key theme is that of
integration, referring to the close contact and cooperation between HIE and LECs,
manifest in terms of strategy formulation and implementation, funding allocation and
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project appraisal. While, as the above quotes indicate, the distribution of power across
the HIE network certainly undercuts the localist rhetoric that accompanied the LEC
initiative, local-regional integration ensures a reasonable level of flexibility in
addressing local issues. This 'structured flexibility' tends to be exercised by key
officials (state managers) through routine practices rather than business
representatives, demonstrating that the input of LEC directors is channeled and
constrained by structures of state organisation. The role of key managerial
technologies in enabling the centre to monitor and steer the network provides
empirical support for Jessop's recent observations on local governance. It points to the
continuing importance of hierarchical structures, demonstrating how local / regional
governance in the Scottish Highlands continues to be underpinned by government
(Jessop, 1997c, 1997d).
While the creation of LECs was part of a broader state project designed to
breach bureaucratic 'enclosures' in the public sector and create specialist agencies to
deliver Conservative policy, more recent initiatives have encouraged 'partnership' as
an institutional framework for economic development (Peck and Tickell, 1994b;
Bailey et al., 1995). The next chapter pursues the theme of local initiative by
examining the dynamics of partnership in the Scottish Highlands, focusing on the
relations between HIE/ LECs and local authorities. It considers how underlying power
relations structure actual partnerships, and assesses how they are shaped by the
underlying tension between centralisation and decentralisation. Chapter six thus
examines the role of LECs within the broader institutional structures of governance in
the Highlands, specifying how the 'authoritative resources' of the HIE Network are
operationalised and put into practice through partnerships.
Notes
1 LEC director, interview 5.8.97; former HIE official, interview 7.11.97.
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154
to LECs in 1992/93 (Section 4.5) - and the need to minimise bureaucracy by dealing
with cases and inquiries quickly and efficiently (Scottish Office official, interview
18.12.96).
4 On this last point, see the earlier quote by a former HIDB board member and HIE
official (Chapter four, p. 107).
5 This term is adapted from Pat Hudson's critique of orthodox interpretations of the
industrial revolution (Hudson, 1989).
6 These were: to increase incomes; to increase the profitability of private businesses;
to improve training and learning opportunities; to create the conditions for long-term
sustainable economic growth; to strengthen and diversify the economic base of local
areas; to improve the attractiveness of the region's heritage; to develop social and
community facilities and maintain cultural values (HIE, 1991a).
7 HIE official, interview 25.11.96.
8
European Programme official, interview 19.11.96, see Section 6.3.3.
9 Scottish Office official, interview 18.12.96.
10 HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
11 HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
12 This degree of generality is in many respects necessary since a strategy's
effectiveness is partly dependent on its capacity to appear acceptable to a broad range
of interests.
13 HIE official, interview 25.11.96.
14 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
15 LEC official, interview 26.3.97.
16 Interview 5.3.97.
17 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
18 LEC official, interview 31.7.97.
19
Though HIE would argue that it is only by attracting investment and stimulating
confidence that such problems can be addressed.
20 Local business manager, interview 21.5.97; also local business proprietor,
interview 30.5.97.
21 Senior HIE official, interview 1.11.96.
22 Local business proprietor, unrecorded interview 30.5.97.
23 Local business manager, interview 8.7.97; local development agency official,
interview 30.7.97; local councillor, interview 30.7.97.
24 While some respondents tended to suggest that public criticism of LEC bureaucracy
and red tape was often a product of critics' lack of involvement in terms of seeking
assistance or advice, representatives of community groups and businesses who had
been directly involved also potrayed LEC procedures as heavily structured and
cumbersome.
25 Former HIE official, interview 7.11.97; HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
26 Former HIE official, interview 7.11.97.
27 Informal conversation with LEC official, August 1998.
28 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
29 Indeed, the lack of input from local authorities in particular has been a source of
tension between them and HIE (see chapter six) (HIE official, interview 14.11.97).
30 See Section 4.5.
155
31 In addition to core government funding, HIE is also able to generate funds from
receipts from activities such as property rentals and loans to individual businesses. In
the financial year 1996-7 out of total funding of £74.9 million, £59.1 million took the
form of Grant-in-Aid and the remaining £15.8 million was generated from receipts
(HIE, Sixth Report. 3).
32 Scottish Office official, interview 18.12.96.
33 Scottish Office official, interview 18.12.96.
34 HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
35 HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
36 Senior LEC official, interview 26.6.97.
37 LEC official, interview 30.7.97.
38 LEC official, interview 12.3.97; senior HIE official, interview 13.11.97.
39 One effect of the establishment of LECs as autonomous bodies has been to make the
allocation of funds to local areas more open than under the old centralised system.
While the HIDB did not release figures on where its funds were spent, fuelling
accusations of secrecy, information on LEC funding is publicly available and
accessible (LEC director, interview 7.7.97).
40 Senior HIE official, interview 13.11.97
41 LEC official, interview 14.5.97.
42 This is a key executive forum, below the HIE board level, which directs operations
across the network. It is made up of the Directors of the main divisions of the HIE
core and meets weekly to decide on applications for assistance at a certain financial
level (Table 5.3) and discuss strategic and operational matters.
43 See Section 4.5.
44 LEC official, interview 26.3.97.
45 LEC official, interview 26.3.97.
46 Scottish Office official, interview 18.12.96; HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
47 HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
48 LEC official, interview 6.3.97.
49 LEC official, interview 5.3.97.
50 LEC official, interview 6.3.97.
51 HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
52 Senior HIE official, interview 1.11.96.
53 LEC director, interview 5.8.97
54 The wider role ofHIE is supported by a broader analysis of the situation which also
stresses the importance of factors such as distance from markets and high transport
costs as constraints on growth (see IDS, 1987).
55 A range of business start-ups and expansions are eligible to seek assistance through
FFB.
56
Generally, grants now form the main form of assistance, preferred to loans because
lower commercial interest rates make HIE loans less competitive. Also, grants are
thought to enable LEC to have a greater impact in putting together a funding package
and levering in private funds whilst avoiding some of the financial and legal costs




58 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
59 Indirect employment is the employment created in supplier firms as an effect of the
increased level of purchases by the target company. Induced employment derives from
the increased spend stemming from the increase in aggregate incomes as a result of
employment growth in the target company (the income multiplier). (HIE official:
Interview 14.11.97).
60 Local business manager, unrecorded interview 7.8.97.
61 The Harris Tweed industry is concentrated in rural Lewis, involving approximately
400 independent weavers as well as the mills in which the tweed is prepared and
finished.
62 This issue has been highlighted by a number of controversial episodes, most notably
HIE's refusal to assist a weavers' co-operative that had been set up on the grounds that
its proposals were not financially viable and the conflict over the 'Premier Weavers'
scheme which the KM Group introduced in an attempt make weavers sign personal
contracts undertaking not to undertake work for any other company.
63 LEC official, interview 14.5.97.
64 Local business proprietor, interview 30.5.97.
65 LEC director, interview 7.7.97.
66 HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
67 LEC official, interview 14.5.97.
68 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
69 Senior HIE Official, interview 13.11.97. The published figures do not, however,
support this claim. They do show a steady decrease in the cost per job achieved, but
only from £3,200 in the 1991/2 to £2,700 in 1996/7. However, this latter figure is
approximately half of the 1991/2 target, £5,500 which was hugely exceeded (£3,200).
70 Senior council official, interview 23.9.97.
71 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
72 Senior HIE official, interview 13.11.97.
73 Senior HIE official, interview 13.11.97.
74 Senior Council official, interview 23.9.97. A typical example would be the claim
that a project wasn't supported because it threatened to compete with an enterprise in
which a LEC director, or a relative or friend of a director had a stake.
75 Senior HIE official, interview 13.11.97.
76 Council official, interview 5.3.97; Council official, interview 21.5.97; Local
business manager, interview 21.5.97; Local business proprietor, interview 27.5.97;
Local business proprietor, interview 30.5.97; Community activist, interview 27.5.97;
Senior council official, interview 23.9.97.
77 Local business proprietor, unrecorded interview 27.5.97; also local business
proprietor, interview 4.7.97.
78 Local business proprietor, interview 30.5.97.
79 Former HIE official, interview 7.11.97.
80 LEC director, interview 7.7.97.
157
Chapter 6
Partnership in Practice: The Effects of State Restructuring on Inter-
Organisational Relations
6.1. Introduction
In recent years, the concept of 'partnership' has assumed increased
significance, becoming the subject of inter-party consensus (Bailey et al., 1995).
Following the impact of earlier reforms in fragmenting the public sector through the
creation of specialist agencies and initiatives, national and European funding
initiatives have promoted partnership as a means of organisational co-ordination (see
Chapter one: 7-8). This chapter examines this phase of policy development. It
explores the practice of partnership in the Scottish Highlands and assesses how
specific examples have been structured and conditioned by underlying power relations
between key agencies.
While Chapter four examined the design and establishment of LECs and TECs
and Chapter five concentrated on the internal shaping of the HIE Network, this
chapter focuses on how LECs have adapted to the local political environments within
which they operate (Peck, 1992; 1993; Bennett et al., 1994; Hart et al., 1996;
Haughton et al., 1997; Jones 1997b). State initiatives have constructed partnership as
a set of formal relationships requiring new institutional arrangements, but much recent
research suggests that the success of such initiatives depends on the quality of
informal relations between local agencies and interests. Drawing upon a
'socioeconomic' perspective that stresses the importance of trust and 'institutional
thickness' as conditions for economic success (Amin and Thrift, 1994a, 1995; Storper,
1995, 1997), this chapter assesses how formal partnership arrangements are shaped by
informal relations between organisational actors.
Broadly, the chapter argues that while informal relations shape the success of
partnerships, it is more difficult for the state to encourage and nurture partnerships in
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this relational sense. The next section locates the rise of partnership within the wider
context of state restructuring, and clarifies the distinction between partnership as
formal structure and partnership as informal relations. A third section considers inter-
organisational relations at a regional level, and assesses the Highlands and Islands
Objective 1 programme as a specific example of partnership. The fourth section
focuses on local partnerships, identifying key factors shaping relations between LECs
and local authorities before the conclusion summarises the main arguments.
6.2. The Rise of Partnership and the Re-figuring of State Regulation
While local practitioners have long practiced partnership by working closely
with other organisations, its recent promotion by the central state and the EU has
given partnership a new prominence. Indeed, there is a sense in which local actors
efforts have been appropriated and re-packaged as the basis of a new 'way forward', as
the model for local economic development (Syrett, 1997).
The emphasis on partnership and coordination was first manifest in City
Challenge, and then more importantly through the introduction of the Single
Regeneration Budget (SRB) as the primary means of securing urban regeneration in
1993/4 (Bailey et al., 1995: 64-67; Jones and Ward, 1997; Ward 1997). This brought
together 20 initiatives stretching across four separate government Departments -
themselves to be subject to local integration by the formation of 10 Government
Offices for the Regions (Bailey et al., 1995: 68-70). For Stewart (1994: 143-4), the
'new localism' which initiatives such as the SRB encourage is based on three key
elements. First, while partnership is justified in terms of its capacity to increase co¬
ordination and integration, in practice it involves a managerial localism based on
detailed output measures and the development of sophisticated monitoring techniques.
Second, it encourages a competitive localism which forces localities to adopt place-
marketing strategies to attract investment and gain access to diminishing central
resources. Third, in bringing together different local organisations and interests to bid
for funding, recent initiatives encourage a corporatist localism which tends to distance
policy-formation from the democratic process.' Typically, these elements come
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together in the form of 'boosterist' discourses as partners conceal internal differences
beneath a unifying rhetoric in order to attract external funds and investment (Ward,
1997).
While partnership is a long-stranding theme of urban policy, what is of most
interest is its current 'export' to other policy areas. After announcing the formation of
the Scottish Rural Partnership, made up of a national and local rural partnerships, in
the 1995 Rural White Paper, the Scottish Office launched a Rural Challenge Fund
early in 1997 (Scottish Office, 1995; 1997a), designed to encourage local people,
working through newly-formed partnerships, "to draw up a range of projects which
find new ways to tackle particular local problems or to create a wider range of
opportunities in rural areas" (Scottish Office, 1997a: 2). It is based upon a competitive
bidding process which effectively forces local partnerships to compete for limited
central funding.
The apparent agreement on 'partnership' as the most appropriate model of local
economic development tends to conceal substantive differences between key interests
over particular structures and strategies. The ambiguity and elasticity of 'partnership'
as a concept allows these differences to be masked beneath a veneer of consensus and
'boosterism' (Ward, 1997; Syrett, 1997). 'Partnership' is attractive to politicians not
only for its capacity to diffuse responsibility among an array of actors, but also
because of its utility as a mechanism for incorporating other sources of finance and
expertise (Bailey et al., 1995: 39). In this sense, 'partnership' is bound up with the
restructuring of the state. A model of partnership designed to enhance the self-
regulating properties of local communities by involving local interests and
organisations in the process of governing represents an active phase in the on-going
dis-engagement of the state from welfare (see Scottish Office, 1995; Bryden and
Mather, 1996; Rose 1996a; 1996b; Murdoch, 1997).
The rural White Paper's rhetoric of 'community' reflects the influence of
contemporary neo-liberal governmentalities in engineering this retreat from welfarism
and social democracy in favour of a process of'governing through community' (Rose,
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1996a; 1996b; Murdoch 1997). Instead of seeking to equalise provision across a
nationally-defined countryside, the Conservative government stressed the need to
conserve and promote the self-regulating capacities of rural communities:
"Our rural communities have a rich and varied life which has to be celebrated. The mood in
much of the world is to recapture the diversity of our many different communities ... as a way of
re-invigorating rural life ... This document outlines a general policy framework which enables
rural communities to move forward. We are determined that the people of these communities
should be enabled to take control of their lives, with the assistance of networks of experienced
organisations, to meet challenges and secure the opportunities (Scottish Office, 1995: 31).
While, on one level, this celebration of difference amounts to little more that a
recognition of diversity and a desire to allow local groups to determine their own
priorities, it is, on another, structured by a discourse of dis-engagement, by
assumptions that limit the legitimate object of government to that of 'enabling' and
'supporting' (Murdoch, 1997). 'Partnerships' are important because they represent a
means of involving rural communities in governing themselves, by enabling them to
take the initiative whilst at the same time retaining the support and expertise of a
"network of experienced organisations".
The rhetorical power of the term 'partnership' is, like that of 'enterprise' and
'community', rooted in the positive connotations it has acquired within established
linguistic frames of reference. Government policy tends to represent partnership as an
unambiguously positive development, implying relations of mutuality and equality
between agencies as resources are pooled, ideas shared and understandings developed
(Peck and Tickell, 1994b). While the emphasis on community involvement and
representation is crucial in justifying and legitimising partnerships, an
unacknowledged silence continues to surround questions of democratic legitimacy and
local accountability (Peck and Tickell, 1994b). By removing policy from formal
political institutions, the neo-corporatist arrangements associated with partnership
encourage a blurring of interests and organisations that confuses issues of
accountability and representation (Stewart, 1994: 143-4). Given the key role of
unelected agencies in particular, there is a need to challenge the rhetoric of inclusion
and equality which constructs partnerships as a pragmatic and politically neutral
response to economic and social change (Syrett, 1997: 104).
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The previous chapter's emphasis on HIE's scope to develop strategic initiatives
and adapt central initiatives raises questions about how this relative autonomy is
operationalised through partnerships. It argued that this autonomy is grounded in the
concentration within the HIE core of certain 'authoritative' resources derived from the
combination of technical expertise and local knowledge inherited from the HIDB.
Emerging institutional arrangements based on partnership are distinctive to the extent
that they seek to create a broader base of expertise by integrating the specialist
knowledges of individual agencies. More interestingly, partnerships often attempt to
enhance state capacity by incorporating and 'governmentalising' (rendering them
practical and technical) the less formal local knowledges of groups beyond the
boundaries of the state itself (i.e. community groups and the voluntary sector).
While central policy initiatives tends to construct partnerships as formal
institutional arrangements, there is a sense in which they depend upon the informal
relations developed through routine practices. On this issue, recent 'institutionalist'
work on the extra-economic conditions for regional growth in a global economy
provides some useful insights (Amin and Thrift 1994a, b, 1995; Storper, 1995; 1997).2
Amin and Thrift introduce the central concept of 'institutional thickness' in an effort to
direct attention to the social and cultural factors underpinning regional growth. Four
levels of'institutionalisation' are identified: the number of key institutions present; the
degree of inter-institutional interaction; the formation of coalitions; and the
development of a common agenda incorporating key institutions and actors (Amin
and Thrift 1994a). The main claim here is that the development of institutional
thickness through informal interactions generates legitimacy and 'nourishes' trust,
seen as critical factors in local economic development. The pool of collective
resources formed by this process of institutionalisation facilitates entrepreneurship and
innovation. Similarly, Michael Storper refers to these extra-economic conditions as
'untraded interdependencies', rooted in the routine relations and conventions that bind
organisations together in place, arguing that they hold the key to the 'resurgence of
regional economies' (Storper, 1995, 1997). He defines the conventions that frame
economic action as "taken-for-granted rules and routines between partners in different
kinds of relations defined by uncertainty" (Storper, 1995: 208). What these studies
162
suggest is that the quality of routine institutional interactions is at least as important as
formal structures and arrangements in shaping the success or failure of partnerships.
This chapter investigates this issue, focusing on how underlying relations between
organisations influence the development of partnerships.
Before considering the dynamics of partnership in detail, it is necessary to
offer a working definition. While its elasticity and fluidity explains much of the
current popularity of 'partnership', this does not remove the need to specify what is
being referred to by the use of the term in the following analysis. Following Bailey et
al., (1995: 27), partnerships are defined here as the "mobilisation of a coalition drawn
from more that one sector to prepare and oversee an agreed strategy for the
regeneration of a defined area". In addition, this definition incorporates Mackintosh's
emphasis on "additional social benefit", which precludes initiatives designed to meet
purely commercial objectives (MacKintosh 1992: 211-12). In the context of the
Highlands, I interpret this as excluding joint-funding packages for business
development. The emphasis is on institutional arrangements designed to formulate
proposals for the development of a defined area, either the region as a whole or a more
localised area.
The following sections examine how the practice of partnership in the Scottish
Highlands is conditioned by wider processes of state restructuring. The analysis
assesses the importance of informal contact and interactions in shaping the
effectiveness of formal institutional structures. The next section examines the
development of strategic relations and partnerships at the regional level.
6.3. Shaping Regional Partnerships
6.3.1 Structures of Regional Governance
While the construction of the Highlands as a 'problem' region has led to a
plethora of specialist agencies being established to promote regional development in
the twentieth century, the combined effects of strong lines of accountability to central
government and a certain lack of local capacity and initiative have tended to work
against the development of effective partnerships (Magnusson, 1968). Given this lack
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of coordination, organisational actors have been unable, in Amin and Thrift's (1994a)
terms, to convert a strong institutional presence into 'institutional thickness' through
sustained interaction and the development of a common agenda. Nonetheless,
individual organisations have tended to promote the distinctive identity of the
Highlands and the corresponding need for special policy solutions to engineer their
survival against external interference.
This distinctive regional identity is reflected in the practice of local politics,
coloured by particular local conventions and norms. Local government in the
Highlands has long been shaped by a tradition of political independence (Dyer, 1978).
An established discourse of public service represents independent councillors as in
tune with local needs and party politics as somehow inappropriate and 'unlocal':
I remember one councillor speaking about another and he insulted him by calling him a
politician because ... I mean there's a strong tradition of independence here, someone being
political with a big P is deemed to be not quite right, it's the incursion of the nasty party political
system.3
While most councillors continue to stand as independents, in recent decades local
government in rural areas such as the Highlands has been transformed by processes of
institutionalisation and professionalisation (Woods, 1997a). Local government has
become an increasingly contested and fragmented terrain as processes of socio¬
economic change bring new pressures to bear on established social and political
relations. Broadly, state managers appear to have acquired increased power at the
expense of local representatives in local government.
LECs were established in a period of two-tier local government, based on a
division of functions between regional councils with strategic responsibilities and
district councils responsible for local service provision (Section 3.3.3). The
corporatist origins of this system aroused Conservative suspicions, leading them to
propose re-organisation (Scottish Office, 1991). The government drew upon notions
of the 'enabling' authority to argue that smaller, single-purpose Councils should
replace large regional councils (Scottish Office, 1992). In the Highlands, HRC seized
the initiative, arguing the case for a single unitary authority for the region (HRC,
Minutes of Meeting 11.7.1991). The Conservative government was ultimately
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persuaded by this argument and the White Paper, published in July 1993, proposed the
creation of a single Highland Council (Scottish Office, 1993). Consequently, the
outcome of local government reform in the Highlands was markedly different from
the rest of Scotland.4 This reflects a situation in which the government's political
agenda of breaking-up the Labour-controlled regions was less applicable to Highland
councils' dominated by an independent tradition.
One of the conditions attached to the government's support for a single
Highland Council was the implementation of an extensive decentralisation scheme
(HRC, 1993). Accordingly, the council works through area units - based on the eight
districts - with a core of key officials serving Area Committees which involve all
local councillors across the main services (Highland Council, 1996a). Although this
two-tier structure parallels that of the HIE Network, each institution continues to
function separately. While chapter five showed how HIE's official strategy functioned
as a framework structuring service delivery, it is clear that Highland Council's
Operational Plan offers even less in the way of strategic appraisal, acting as more of a
guide to the types of financial support available (Highland Council, 1996b, 1997).
There also seems to be little 'strategy' or planning framing the Western Isles Council's
(WIC) delivery of economic development services. The Highland Council's protest at
the lack of consultation regarding the development of HIE's current strategy is
symptomatic of this lack of strategic integration (Scottish Office, 1996).5 In a
contribution no doubt inspired by the perceived opportunity for re-casting the
organisational relations arising from the change of government in May 1997, the
convener of Highland Council criticised the degree of institutional separation created
by the current structure (Peacock, 1997). Such institutional separation at the policy
level is balanced, however, by a number of project-based partnerships, a situation
characteristic of the current state of local governance in Britain (Hay, 1994). The two
key partnerships involving HIE and local authorities at the regional level are centred
on the Objective 1 programme and the University of the Highlands and Islands (UHI)
project. They clearly involve fonnal institutional arrangements, but, as analysis of the
former demonstrates (Section 6.3.3), their effectiveness is strongly dependent on the
quality of the informal relations between key partners.
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6.3.2. Institutional Roles and Rivalries
Partnership is the in word ... you almost have to jump on a bandwagon ... but actually you've
got to go into them veiy carefully, it's got to satisfy the objectives of the individual partners as
well as the collective objectives of the partnership and see if it's stronger with joint working or if
it would be better with just individual agencies working, you shouldn't just automatically set up
a partnership ... Often it does work if eveiyone knows their role, but others are more
automatically set up ... it's not just a panacea it's sometimes seen as ... Partnerships work if
there's common objectives, it everybody agrees a focus and it achieves their individual
objectives as well... but if there's not common objectives or individual partners don't feel that
they have an equal share then that's when things go wrong.6
For this official, partnership has become an "automatic" response to local economic
problems. The quote suggests some crucial pre-conditions of effective partnership
working, stressing the need for initiatives to meet the objectives of individual partners,
for organisational roles to be defined in advance, and for common objectives. It also
implies a need to avoid internalising unequal relations between partners within
partnerships.
This section assesses whether relations between HIE and local authorities
promote the informal co-operation required to develop shared objectives and define
clear organisational roles. Inter-organisational relations have been shaped by state
restructuring, a process that established HIE as the favoured institutional channel for
the delivery of economic development policy whilst imposing considerable financial
and operational constraints on local authorities. This produces resentment among
Council representatives who feel that their efforts go unrecognised:
I think under the previous government ... the Enterprise Network ... were definitely the blue-
eyed boys and ... we were perceived as the old bureaucratic dinosaurs that ... had to be kept at
arms length ... the Enterprise Network was the engine of renewal in the Highlands and Islands.7
The fact that LECs are not required to consult local authorities over their business
plans and strategies while councils are forced to consult LECs over their economic
plans seems to reflect a basic inequality in the relationship (COSLA, 1995; Scottish
Office, 1996). It was this sense of being an unequal partner that prompted local
authority calls for a restructuring of the system in the run-up to and aftermath of
Labour's General Election victory in May 1997. Council personnel argue that LECs'
orientation towards central targets can discourage partnership working which would
require them to share the credit for achieving specified outputs.8 Inward investment is
one source of tension in this respect, with councils claiming that HIE is unwilling to
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involve other agencies in projects because it needs to accumulate "kudos" by
announcing x number of new jobs for the Highlands.9 On the other hand, HIE and
LEC personnel tend to dispute councils' track record in economic development and
remain sceptical of councils' capacity to make commercially viable decisions.10 In
many ways, then, the unequal relations which underpin formal structures of local
governance fuel informal tensions.
When considering inter-agency relations in the Highlands, however, several
respondents drew a distinction between operational and political levels:
The conflicts are all at policy level and what goes on there ... but it doesn't work through to the
service on the ground ... It's difficult politically and it's individuals at that level and when
you've got individuals you get personality clashes ... I think our people work very closely with
the LECs in all the areas, relations are very good ... It's all at the policy level that the conflicts
are, it doesn't come out in the delivery ofservices at all.11
The staff from all the local agencies work together day in, day out ... I think there are certain
tensions at senior level, and the local Councils have an economic development unit as well, and
sometimes there may be a perception that we should be working more closely ... The senior
officials may think that, but in the real world on a day-to-day basis we work very, very closely
with each other all the time.12
From an official perspective, this distinction serves to push the tensions into the
background as 'political', as somehow 'up there' and not affecting informal co¬
operation on a day-to-day level. The first quote particularly stresses that 'political'
tensions do not affect the delivery of services to 'clients' in the sense that agencies still
co-operate to put funding packages together, while the second stresses the reality of
routine co-operation. The fact that all public agencies are confronted with increasing
resource constraints is an important factor encouraging partnership.13 By combining
funds, agencies can maximise their impact and 'additionally'. Both HIE and Council
representatives were strongly aware of how cooperation and communication were
necessitated by limits on individual agencies' powers within a plural system of local
governance.14 They stressed the basic complementarity between the roles of the HIE
Network and local authorities with the former often better placed to provide the
finance while Councils can offer guidance on planning requirements and pull in other
services providing infrastructure for development.
While overall strategic integration remains limited, there have been some
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sectoral strategies developed through partnerships. For instance, HIE, the Highlands
of Scotland Tourist Board (HOST) and Highland Council worked together to produce
the Highlands of Scotland Tourism Strategy, launched in August 1997. For one key
official, these formal documents give some basis for co-operation but do not guarantee
success without individual effort:
I think having the ... structure of national, regional and local policy documents is a good basis
for keeping people together, and building a system of regular liaison, contacts, is again another
... safety net to make sure that things actually do happen, but the real engine for keeping it all
going is efforts at individual level ... Unless you have the key players prepared to make the
effort to work together and keep in contact, the structures alone wouldn't deliver ... You've got
have the parameters set by the structures and that also gives you a fall back, if you do have
individual failures at least something does happen, but it does happen a lot better if you've got
good individual working relations and these don't just happen by accident, they've got to
worked for ... Knowing the ... way different agencies work is quite important, to be able to
visualise things from their point of view ... things like cross-membership of boards can be a help
there ... Although the Highlands is a big area, it's an area where personal networking is well
established and contacts tend to be very good there compared to other parts of the country and
that does work in our favour, as long as it's not taken for granted and still put the effort into it.
But it's one of the great benefits of the Highlands that you do keep stumbling across the same
personalities in different contexts and it's not as easy to lose contact.15
In this sense, individual action is required to 'activate' the provisions set out in strategy
documents. Formal structures need to be made to work by individuals if routine
institutional practices are to generate good informal relations. The quote also stresses
the importance of what Jessop (1998a) has called 'noise reduction': reducing
misunderstandings and tensions by developing an appreciation of the positions and
interests that other organisations adopt and represent. That institutional structures tend
to be dominated by a small number of 'movers and shakers' in the Highlands favours
the development of such an appreciation by creating a stability and continuity which
encourages good informal working relations. In other cases, when co-operation is
threatened by political disputes, the efforts of individual officials are vital in
maintaining contact:
When ... we do fall out at a political level, at officer level we have to keep going, we have to
remember that ... no good will ... come of public fall-outs, we have to ... work together. I mean
it was interesting that our last tiffwith Highlands and Islands Enterprise was the day that [ LEC
Chief Executive] [was] negotiating here about how much they would put in as matching funding
to the Sound of Barra ferry ... It would have been too easy for them to say well ... how can we
work with you people, that's it, you've blown your four hundred thousand, they didn't and I
think ... that shows that there is ... some kind of an ethos of community and public service...
Obviously for us as officers of each organisation we have to respect the political ... views that
come out and sometimes these political views are not always helpful to getting the job done ...
We have to as officers sometimes take risks in terms of... what's more important... do you want
to get the job done or do you want to ... spin with Council's political line ... that's something
that senior officers have to juggle with.16
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In this sense, political tensions create barriers which officials must overcome to
maintain operational effectiveness. For this official, the fact that funding
commitments tend to be maintained in the face of on-going disputes demonstrates that
disputes are often mediated and contained by shared discourses of community service
and local development. These discourses cannot fully disguise, however, the ways in
which underlying contradictions and tensions encourage institutional rivalry and
competition.
Councils feel that they have little influence over HIE as an unelected 'quango'
whose key decisions tend to be made in-house. One obvious tactic available to
Councils is to reinforce perceptions of HIE and LECs as closed unaccountable
bodies, at the same time stressing their own democratic legitimacy and accountability.
This discursive strategy takes much of its moral and political force from wider notions
of defending local democracy against the 'quangoisation' of the state:
The Tain Councillor ... said the other day in the Highland Council that he felt that we've got far
too many Quangos and I certainly agree with that, Quangos are unaccountable and
unpredictable ... they make all sorts of rales that are not democratically made. I certainly think
that there should be more elected members on the LECs ... there should be ... more democracy
in some of their decisions.17
The force of the arguments for greater accountability and democracy can give council
representatives considerable leverage in their dealings with HIE and LECs:
When I go to meetings with the LEC and I'm saying something nasty, I can say ... it's
democracy, I'm sorry, that's the way it is ... I need them to put cash in, they have access to far
larger pots of money, therefore I try to make things so they put money into projects which ...
need to progress. So one of my functions is to try and use the accountability pressure on the
LEC for them to better meet what the Council sees as better service ... sometimes they're pissed
off with it... they've got their own agendas and sometimes we coming in and saying how about
doing this instead is not welcome, but they can't simply say no very easily because ... there are
local... small p political issues they which need to consider.18
In this sense, Council officials seem to tactically deploy this discourse of democracy
and accountability, within tacit limits set by local political relations, to exert pressure
on HIE and LECs to develop their services in directions favourable to the council's
political goals. Sometimes this pressure is resented and resisted, but the force of
"small p political issues" makes it difficult for LECs to reject these arguments.
HIE's attitudes towards local authorities tend to be structured by the
'managerialist' discourse through which the re-organisation of the public sector was
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channeled in the 1980s and 1990s. For some HTE representatives, the interventions of
councils are invariably 'political', and any proposal to expand local authority powers
threatens to undermine established modes of decision-making based upon commercial
and technical criteria.19 This emphasis upon the technical expertise and objective
authority underlying allocative decisions indicates the extent to which the
managerialist discourse adopted by HIE officials represents HIE as a neutral site of
rational authority suitably 'enclosed' from local political pressures.
The unequal relations between HIE and local authorities create tensions that
make it difficult to generate trust and mutual understanding. This suggests that some
of the crucial pre-conditions for effective partnership working are absent from inter-
organisational relations in the Scottish Highlands. It seems that local authorities as the
less equal 'partner' feel the dilemmas of partnership more acutely than HIE. In order to
assess how the effectiveness of formal arrangements is shaped by underlying
relations, the chapter considers the development of a specific partnership in detail.
6.3.3 The Highlands and Islands Objective 1 Programme: A Strategic Regional
Partnership
In recent years, two regional strategic partnerships have assumed particular
significance in the Highlands: the Highlands and Islands Partnership Programme, set
up to administer the allocation of EU structural funds through the Objective 1
category, and the UHI initiative, which brought regional interests together to secure
resources for the development of a university in the region. Given the Objective 1
Programme's specific focus on economic development and intention to address the
marginality of the Highlands, I focus primarily on it Objective 1 Programme rather
than UHI. This section considers inter-organisational relations within the formal
structure of the Objective 1 partnership. It assesses the role of key partners and
examines how the informal conventions framing the attitudes of key organisations
influence relations within these formal structures.
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The Highlands and Islands attracted attention from the EC as early as 1975
during the preparatory work for the establishment of the Europan Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) (HIDB, Eighth Report, 1973). During the 1980s the
HIDB continued to cultivate links with Europe, though the campaign to secure
Objective 1 status in 1988 failed.20 As the process of allocating funds for the second
1994-99 programming period got underway, HIE and local authorities formed a
partnership to promote the claims of the Highlands and Islands. The development of
the partnership was shaped by regional agencies readings' of how best to present the
region to European institutions:
We have a very strong policy that says work in partnership at the strategic level, and at the
practical level, particularly in Europe if you can go along and say it is not just us, it's all the
local authorities as well... it presents a united front which is definitely a plus point in Europe. In
Europe if you can present a regionally ... based partnership, you win every time ... what they
look for is an indication that this is what the local structures will actually support ... If you're
doing something with the grain it usually works, and they know to their cost in Europe if you
try and superimpose something that doesn't really work with local institutions, it doesn't work.
So what they want are ready made partnerships that they don't have to get involved with, we
21
hand them a partnership on a plate.
This demonstrates how central requirements tend to be internalised by regional
institutions, leading in this case to the formation of an integrated partnership in order
to present a "united front" to the EU. Such collaboration is motivated largely by
"budget enlargement" in the sense of a shared interest in securing extra funding
(Mackintosh, 1992).
It appeared initially as if the campaign for Objective 1 status would again
prove unsuccessful. A crucial factor in improving the region's prospects was the
British government's demands for more of the structural funds to be directed to
marginal areas of the UK. Given relative levels of economic prosperity, this placed
the Highlands and Islands in a strong position. It did not, however, remove the fact
that the region failed to meet the key qualifying criteria of having a GDP level below
75 per cent of the EU average. Eventually, however, after negotiations in which the
Commission took account of the sparse population distribution of the Highlands,
relaxing the 75 per cent rule, its case was accepted. In July 1993, the Council of
Ministers finally agreed the Highlands and Islands' eligibility for Objective 1 funding
(European Commission, 1994).
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Table 6.1. The Highlands and Islands Single Programming Document
Priority EU (ml ECU) National Private Total
1. Business development 72.2 72.2 152.03 296.23
2. Tourism, heritage and 24.2 24.2 43.55 91.95
cultural development
3. Environmental 16.3 16.3 2.00 34.6
preservation/
enhancement
4. Primary sector 68.7 125.59 79.84 274.13
5. Community 46.9 46.9 0.00 92.36
development
6. Communications and 79.7 119.55 17.7 216.95
infrastructure
7. Technical assistance 3.1 3.1 0.00 6.20
Total 311.0 406.3 295.12 1012.42
Source: European Commission, 1994, Highlands and Islands SPD: 114-5. All figures
are in million ECU, conversion 1£ = 1.2 ECU.
The next task was to formulate a regional plan in the form of a Single
Programming Document (SPD). This involved three separate institutional tiers: the
local 'partners' who supplied the bulk of the information, central government which,
through the Scottish Office, has formal responsibility as the implementing authority
for the programme, and the European Commission which has ultimate sanction. The
strategy was drawn up by a 'plan team' made up of Scottish Office, HIE and local
authority officials.22 This process relied upon the deployment of particular
governmentalised techniques and procedures which gathered relevant data as a means
of representing the region, of 'rendering it visible', in order to enable intervention
(Ward and McNicholas, 1998a: 34). The plan was submitted by the Scottish Office in
November 1993, but, following criticism from external assessors, the Commission
demanded changes (Bryden, 1996: 146-7). Protracted negotiations between the
Commission and Scottish Office delayed the start of the programme with the SPD not
being finally approved until July 1994. Despite provisions for 'public consultation',
the process was dominated by state agencies, and the delay and lack of local
community involvement fuelled criticism from local authorities and elected
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representatives.
As a regional strategy, the SPD can be seen as a strategically selective form of
intervention, identifying certain sectors and areas as priorities. It identified six main
priorities for funding, each of which is made up of several sub-measures (Table 6.1).
Allocations for each of these are based upon the principle of match funding, a
requirement designed to avoid EU funds being used to replace existing levels of
public provision.
Table 6.2. Composition of the Programme Monitoring Committee
Institution Representation
Scottish Office






Highlands and Islands Airports
Voluntary sector
Further education
4 including Chair (2 Development and 2
Agriculture, Fisheries and Environment)
1
1 (advisor)







Source: Highlands and Islands Partnership Programme, Information Sheet (undated).
The formal arrangements for administering the programme involve three
institutional tiers.24 The Programme Executive is composed of officials employed by
the Programme to carry out routine administration and detailed case-work. Second,
there are three Advisory Groups covering priorities one and two, three and five, and
six respectively.25 These are made up of "technical experts" drawn from the relevant
agencies: HIE, local authorities, SNH, the area tourist boards, etc.26 They meet four
times a year, twice for each round of funding in order to recommend projects for
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approval. Quantitative procedures are deployed in order to rank and analyse projects
against specified outcomes and criteria approved by the European Commission. Third,
the Programming Monitoring Committee (PMC) carries ultimate responsibility within
the local partnership, meeting four times a year, twice to approve projects
recommended by the Advisory Group, and twice to review the progress of the
programme against its objectives. The structure of the PMC reflects the EU's neo-
corporatist concept of partnership, incorporating public agencies as the main
'stakeholders' (Syrett, 1997) (Table 6.2). The Scottish Office tends to play a dominant
role through its chairing of the PMC and status as the key source ofmatching funding
for most projects (Bryden, 1996: 150). The lack of direct private sector representation
reflects, in part, the difficulties of involving business in peripheral regions where
development has historically been state-led (Syrett, 1997). The interests of the
voluntary sector and community groups are also marginalised by a 'representational
regime' structured by the interests of state agencies.
The tensions and lack of trust that tend to characterise relations between HIE
and local authorities at the regional level affect the workings of the Objective 1
partnership. These tensions were fuelled by Scottish Office rules preventing elected
councillors from being represented on the Monitoring Committee. In leaving local
authority places to be filled by senior officials, these rules increased councillors' sense
of being marginalised from key decisions affecting their areas. Given the relatively
fragmented structure of local authorities in the Highlands relative to the HIE Network,
this perception prompted action from council leaders:
We have another grouping ... we call it the Conveners meeting ... It's a grouping which came
together largely to talk about Objective 1 and to make sure that the local authority voice in the
Highlands and Islands was being ... expressed ... On the LEC side of the relationship there are
the 10 LECs and then there's Highlands and Islands Enterprise with a strong strategic core, on
the local authority side ... there are I think 7 local authorities that are in the Highlands and
Islands Enterprise area and some are larger than others, there's no one if you like that's
27
mandated to speak for everyone.
The direct comparison between the respective positions of local authorities and HIE
suggests that the terms of councils' engagement with the Objective 1 programme were
shaped by their perceptions of being on the receiving end of the reforms which
established unelected 'quangos' like HIE. This fuelled fears that democratic
representatives would be further marginalised if the formal institutional structures for
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administering Objective 1 funding were dominated by the Scottish Office and HIE.
Partnerships held together by 'budget enlargement' considerations often
experience difficulties in maintaining cohesion when confronted with questions of
how best to distribute these resources internally (Peck and Tickell, 1994b). In the
context of the Highlands and Islands Objective 1 programme, this contradiction has
been expressed in terms of tensions between local areas and central authority.
Significant differences in the take-up of funds between different areas are apparent
(Table 6.3). While these disparities do not necessarily reinforce the basic pattern of
intra-regional inequality, with the Western Isles attracting more than its per capita
share of funding (though this is due to a few large infrastructural projects), they have
nonetheless created political problems. Inequalities in the take-up of funding threaten
the aim of internal cohesion - the reduction of intra-regional disparities - one of the
twin objectives driving the programme (European Commission, 1994). The problem
of internal cohesion is a product of regulatory procedures based upon the competitive
allocation of funds. Since different places have different capacities and strengths, the
volume and quality of applications varies. Fundamentally, the role of the central
machinery is reactive, responding to individual applications by measuring them
against specified quality criteria. The institutionalisation of these regulatory practices
blocks the adoption of a more interventionist approach which would identify areas of
need in advance and channel funds accordingly. The uneven take-up of Objective 1
funds shows not only how processes of public investment are actively re-constituting
geographical inequalities in new ways, but also provides further evidence that
competitively-allocated funding initiatives invariably tend to increase such
inequalities (Peck and Tickell, 1994b).
These problems were, to some extent, anticipated and accommodated into the
structure of the programme. Through a system of geographical targeting, each area
was given a floor-level allocation based upon a formula share calculation. These
targeting procedures appear to have failed, however, as areas which perceive
themselves to have been less successful criticise the programme, disputing the terms
of their initial allocation:
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The areas that haven't done so well will say ... hold on ... you're only talking about the level of
commitment, you're not talking about actual level of spend, and secondly they'll say the floor
level allocation that was devised for us is far too low anyway ... It's a really contentious issue ...
I mean some areas are doing very well... Other areas ... have never really done quite so well...
and they're really quite critical of the Programme because they're not really seeing the benefits
from it.28
Crucially, this process of differentiation is cumulative: disparities increase over time
as successful areas accumulate the practical expertise required to get applications
through the system whereas less successful areas lacking this knowledge become
increasingly marginalised. Representatives of less successful areas, particularly those
associated with local authorities and voluntary groups, tend to criticise the system for
relying on a cumbersome bureaucracy that seems designed to protect the interests of
the Scottish Office and HIE.29
Table 6.3. Take-up of Objective 1 Funds by Area (ERDF and EAGGF)
Area Population share Share ofERDF and
EAGFF (Mar 1996)
Argyll and the Islands 19.4 10
Caithness and Sutherland 10.7 8
Inverness and Nairn 19.7 5
Lochaber 5.2 9
Moray, Badenoch and 9.1 4
Strathspey
Orkney 5.3 3
Ross and Cromarty 13.1 8
Shetland 6.0 11
Skye and Lochalsh 3.2 4
Western Isles 8.3 22
Pan-Highland 16
Source: Highlands and Islands Partnership Programme, Information Sheet (undated).30
The strength of local partnerships has been identified as a key factor shaping
local rates of take-up.31 Areas where relations between LEC and Council are uneasy
face difficulties in claiming funds from a programme which requires evidence of
matching funding and in which practical co-operation reduces the burden on
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individual organisations, enabling more high-quality applications to be submitted. In
this sense, areas' success in attracting funds is directly shaped by the quality of
informal working relations between key organisations. Those areas where shared
interests and objectives have generated the trust required to stabilise inter-agency
relations seem to have been more successful. The success of Lochaber, for instance, in
gaining levels of funding in excess of its population share (Table 6.3) was held to
reflect the strength of local partnerships.32 In Caithness and Sutherland, by contrast,
the effects of strong underlying tensions between the LEC and Council in blocking the
formation of partnerships accounts for much of the area's failure in attracting
Objective 1 funds (Table 6.3).33 Along with the Western Isles, also one of the main
beneficiaries of the Programme, Lochaber was quick to set a special Objective 1 group
representing the main agencies to identify priorities for funding and encourage co¬
operation.
This model of co-operation has since been exported. Each area now has its
Local Area Group. While these have been promoted as a way of involving local
communities more closely, thereby containing local-central tensions, they encourage a
form of local corporatism dominated by key officials from the main public agencies.
Much of the Western Isles' success in claiming a disproportionate share of funds for
large infrastructural projects stems from the early formation of a Local Group to
identify key priorities. The role of local groups has since been expanded to ranking
projects in order of preference for the second Advisory Group meeting. Prom the
perspective of the central executive, however, there is a danger that this will
encourage the politicisation of the programme:
There's a political angle to it as well because councillors come into these Objective 1 groups and
they obviously look at what's going to get them votes ... what pathway needs done, and I think
some of the Council officials ... they've got to be quite diplomatic ... that's not really what the
Objective 1 programme's about ... Whilst not all councillors are like that ... there is evidence of
that creeping in, and it's not really to the benefit of the programme at all.34
Local Area Groups are thus seen as introducing parochial pressures which clash with
the technocratic logic of the Programme, threatening to disrupt and undermine
established decision-making procedures. In this sense, local groups are seen as being
too involved; in another sense, however, the constraints on their role limits their
utility as a mechanism to contain local- central tensions. Because local groups have no
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formal status, Advisory Groups are under no obligation to follow their
recommendations, and a failure to do so can often magnify tensions, given that the
procedures for assessing applications and final approval tend to lack transparency.
Local interests commonly react to the rejection of a favoured project by criticising the
decision-making procedures of the partnership, highlighting its lack of democratic
legitimacy and local accountability (MacKinnon 1997).
Since the calculative techniques and procedures deployed to assess
applications reflect the routine practices of the Scottish Office and HIE, the effect is to
extend their influence into the heart of the Objective 1 programme. Interestingly, the
more innovative measures relating to business research and development have been
characterised by slow take-up relative to those focused on infrastructure and business
sites and premises (Segal Quince Wicksteed, 1997: 44-45). This seem to reflect, in
part, the managerialist ethos of a Programme which is essentially reactive in assessing
projects against specified criteria. In this sense, the focus on short-term outputs blocks
long-term capacity building in a peripheral region lacking an advanced business
sector. Thus, managerial procedures undermine the underlying emphasis of EU
regional policy on equipping regions with the innovative capacity enabling them to
compete in a global economy (c/ Morgan, 1998)
In many respects, the rules blocking councillors from sitting on the
Monitoring Committee have displaced political tensions to the margins of the
partnership. The effect is a situation of partial 'enclosure': the lack of democratic
representation seals the central machinery against local political pressures, confining
these to the 'vertical' channels that connect the centre to local groups. While this
struggle to protect the centre can never be fully successful, the combined resources of
the main authorities - the Scottish Office, European Commission and HIE - are
sufficient to contain the main sources of tension, thereby enabling the programme to
operate effectively. The capacity of the Scottish Office and HIE to govern the
Programme is rooted in their formal authority and technical expertise as government
agencies. These 'authoritative resources' are embedded in the regulatory practices
routinely deployed to assess applications and monitor progress against specified
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objectives. The efforts of local interests to contest these procedures, however,
highlights the paradox that a funding programme designed to promote coordination by
involving local organisations in partnerships has necessitated the establishment of new
structures which lack democratic accountability and add another layer of complexity
to institutional relations in the Highlands.
This analysis of the Highlands and Islands Objective 1 programme has shown
how the institutional arrangements for administering the programme have tended to
reinforced tensions rooted in unequal power relations between HIE and local
authorities which, in turn, reflect the differential effects of state restructuring.
Programme delivery is crucially shaped by national priorities and the respective roles
of the Scottish Office as implementing authority and HIE as the specialist economic
development agency have enabled them to dominate the programme. The combined
effects of a representational regime structured by the Scottish Office and the
regulatory practices deployed to allocate resources in forcing local authorities to work
through governmental procedures that do not function in their interests have
compounded Councils' feelings of marginalisation. The subsequent tensions have
tended to constrain the scope for developing trust within the partnership, limiting
informal co-operation between key interests.
As the remaining funds are committed, attention is shifting towards funding
prospects for the post-1999 period. This is fuelling internal tensions with some
representatives ofWest coast areas arguing for the more prosperous Inner Moray Firth
area to be excluded so as to maximise the prospects of the remainder of the region
(WHFP 12.9.97). Since this proposal clashes with established institutional identities
invested in the Highlands as an integrated region, it is unlikely to gain official support.
Indeed, the partnership formed between HIE and the local authorities in late 1997
aims to secure another Objective 1 programme for the region as a whole.35 While the
proposal to split the region is unlikely to be formally accepted in the uncertain climate
created by the impending enlargement of the EU, it reflects intra-regional tensions
fuelled by the unequal distribution of European funds, and indicates the pressures
faced by key institutions as they struggle to re-produce the Highlands as a coherent
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regional space.
6.4. Inter-organisational Relations and Local Partnerships
Section 6.3 showed how partnerships are shaped by the informal relations
between key organisations. It argued that the tensions created by state restructuring
impede the development of trust and shared expectations required for effective
cooperation. This section focuses on inter-organisational relations at the local level,
arguing that, while forces of structural change have created certain tensions, the ways
in which these tensions are worked out is shaped by a range of locally-specific factors.
The subsequent variation in inter-organisational relations across different local areas
represents one key research finding. This section outlines the nature of this
differentiation and considers the key forces shaping inter-organisational relations at
the local level.
Section 6.2 emphasised that national and supra-national funding initiatives are
increasingly requiring evidence of partnership formation. Two of the most important
recent initiatives in this respect are the EU's LEADER programme, and the Scottish
Office's local rural partnership programme (Black and Conway, 1996; Ray 1997;
Scottish Office 1997a; 1997b). Local 'responses' to these initiatives are crucially
shaped by the existing quality of relations between key organisations and interests.
The effectiveness of formal institutional arrangements for delivering local economic
development therefore depends upon whether underlying conventions can generate
informal trust and co-operation between partners.
The tensions created by the establishment of specialist 'quangos' filter through
to the local level. For one well-placed observer, the localisation of economic
governance through LECs fuelled local tensions:
You could argue that relationships got more tense after the LECs were formed ... because ...
having a [HIDB] board member come up from Inverness from time to time was different from
having a chairman of a LEC on your doorstep all the time ... [Councils' thought] with some
realness initially that they were going to be undermining the position of the local authority or
trying to claim legitimacy for themselves that... the local authority would normally have had ...
I think there was also the fact that once you did break down a structure to district or island
council level, then you had the question why are there two bodies, and then they obviously had
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to build a relationship on that basis, and it was a time when local authorities were being
squeezed for cash themselves.36
These 'turf politics are generated by underlying organisational rivalries with local
authorities tending to view LECs as a threat to their status and authority in the context
of financial cuts and the removal of key functions from local government control. The
emphasis on LECs' financial and contractual accountability to central government
(Chapter five) masks the reality that their capacity to achieve their objectives is
heavily dependent on the quality of relations developed with other local organisations
and interests (Bennett et al., 1994: 47). The intensely local forms of politics
characteristic of many Highland communities subjected LECs to very particular
demands:
Small areas like this have the politics with a small p ... The politics here are very pervasive but
they're very parochial and the LECs are drawn into that, sometimes they can play it well and
sometimes they don't.37
In terms of the three study areas, Skye and Lochalsh was characterised by
strong inter-agency relations with close cooperation and communication between
SALE and the district council / area unit of the Highland Council.38 By contrast,
relations in the Western Isles were marred by on-going disputes between the Council
and LEC. The situation in Easter Ross fits in between these two experiences in that
mild political tensions coexist with strong operational links. Of the other five areas
visited, on-going political disputes made relations between Council and LEC relations
particularly tense in Caithness; in both Inverness and Lochaber strong and cooperative
working relations had developed; and in Moray, Badenoch and Strathspey and Argyll,
relations between LEC and Council are mixed with practical forms of cooperation
unable to fully overcome underlying tensions. This variety of local responses to the
restructuring of economic governance requires that the key forces shaping local
outcomes be identified and explained. Three key factors - organisational boundaries,
local authority representation on LEC boards and associated partnerships, and
individual attitudes - are considered in turn.
The first issue concerns the basic local geography of governance. LECs were
introduced into a structure in which elected councils' had established authority within
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the local areas they covered. Given the range of contingent factors that shaped the
ultimate configuration of LEC boundaries, ensuring correspondence with established
local authority units was always likely to prove difficult. As a result, the coincidence
of organisational boundaries emerged as a significant factor shaping working
relations. Although the leading role of the Scottish Office in drawing up the initial
map and maintaining overall coordination ensured a higher degree of local coherence
relative to the complex and fragmented structures created in England and Wales by
the more 'bottom-up' processes of TEC formation, difficulties still ensued:
There's all these sorts of boundaries and they don't all coincide, it is a bit of a nightmare really I
have to say for people ... even for ourselves sometimes ... which again doesn't... always make it
easy to work things through, because you're having to deal with different bodies ... Moray
certainly is difficult because it seems to be split all sorts of ways.35
I think it's a big help if your local authority area and your LEC are contiguous ... if they're not
then it complicates things. Western Isles and Orkney and Shetland are in the same position, their
Tourist Board, their local authority and their LEC all cover exactly the same area and that's a
big advantage.40
Areas around the margins of the region are worst affected by these difficulties. The
situation in Moray, which the first quote is referring to, is complicated by the LEC
stretching across two council areas, Moray and Badenoch and Strathspey. Moray, now
an independent unitary authority, was formerly part of Grampian Region, while
Badenoch and Strathspey is an area unit of the Highland Council. Argyll has similar
problems, both council and tourist board covering wider areas than the LEC, while in
Caithness and Sutherland, in which the second quote is grounded, the LEC covers two
separate areas of the Highland Council (formerly district councils). These difficulties
are contrasted with the organisational coherence characteristic of the island groups,
where boundaries invariably coincide. The fragmenting and complicating effects of
overlapping boundaries suggests, however, a conditioning rather than determining
influence on inter-agency relations. The existence of tensions in areas with a high
degree of organisational coherence (the Western Isles) and the establishment of strong
working relations in areas where boundaries are not coterminous (Skye and Lochalsh)
indicates that local organisational geographies interact with other forces to shape the
politics of local governance.
A second key influence concerns the issue of local authority representation on
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LEC boards, almost universally identified by councils as a significant area of
contention (Scottish Affairs Committee, 1995). These tensions stem from the nature
of LEC boards as directors are appointed on the basis of individual knowledge or
experience rather than as the representatives of any established interest or organisation
(Chapter four: 107). Councils therefore have no right to representation. In many cases,
however, pragmatism has prevailed with LECs inviting local councillors onto their
board in recognition of the importance of building a working relationship with local
authorities (Fairley 1992a; 1996; McQuaid 1993). Although this has improved
communication and informal working relations, a system in which LEC invite
selected individuals to become directors falls well short of local authority demands for
full statutory representation involving councils nominating their own representatives
(COSLA, 1995). This provokes frustration among Council personnel, some of whom
identify LECs' resistance to local authority claims as the cause of tension, arguing that
representation would lead to better relations:
I mean they're quite cute, they appoint people who co-incidentally are Councillors but they don't
give if you like the Council the choice over who that person would be so that they can say well
there is ... a person on the board ofWestern Isles Enterprise who is a Councillor, but that is co¬
incidental ... I think it's something that local people have realised that... the way you get a bit of
peace, and a bit of political peace with the local authority is to get them in, it's the old story,
they're better in the tent pissing out than out the tent pissing in.41
In seven of the areas visited, LECs had local councillors on the board, though never as
formal representatives and sometimes in other capacities (as business people or
community activists), making their role as councillors "co-incidental" to their
appointment.42 In one area in particular, the inclusion of key Council leaders on the
LEC board was identified as a key factor behind the development of close working
relations:
More important I think was the relationship with Skye and Lochalsh District Council which was
always very good and in fact ... the Chief Executive of the district council was on the board of
the LEC from day one and ... relationships here in this area between the LEC and the local
authority, both the Distr ict Council and the sort of local bit so to speak of Highland Region and
now Highland Council, the relationships have always been very good and constructive, we've
never had any argy bargy of any consequence.43
In Skye and Lochalsh, the appointment of council leaders has helped develop a level
of trust that has eased relations between LEC and local authority and ensured the
practical co-operation upon which local economic development depends.
183
The EU's LEADER programme forms another key context for the formation of
local partnerships involving LECs and local authorities. The participatory principles
set out in the Commission's 1988 White Paper, The Future ofRural Society (European
Commission, 1988) were put into practice through the LEADER I programme,
launched in 1991, and followed by an expanded LEADER II programme, covering the
period 1994-99 (Black and Conway 1996). Five of the six designated LEADER I
areas in Scotland were in the Flighlands and Islands: Western Isles, Skye and
Lochalsh; Lochaber; Argyll and the Islands; Caithness and Sutherland; and Shetland
(HIE, 1995).44 Although bids had to be submitted by Local Action Groups made up of
the main 'stakeholders', the funds are channelled through central government to the
Scottish Office and then to the LECs who were granted fonnal executive
responsibility for the initiative (Arkleton Trust, 1994). While this was a sensible
arrangement on a practical level, enabling cash-flow problems to be overcome and
LEADER to be administered according to established accounting procedures, it also
demonstrated the tendency for resources to be channelled through favoured
institutional networks. In some areas, the privileged role of LECs in delivering
LEADER made the establishment of an independent identity more difficult for
LEADER groups (Arkleton Trust, 1994: 21-6), exacerbating tensions created by state
restructuring.
Western Isles, Skye and Lochalsh (WISL) LEADER formed the largest of the
LEADER I programmes, spending £4.9 million in total. WISL LEADER covers two
distinct administrative areas; the partnership is made up of two LECs and two local
authorities in addition to the Scottish Crofters' Union and Comunn na Gaidhlig
representing the land and the language respectively. The initial formation of the
partnership was strongly shaped by "budget enlargement" considerations
(MacKintosh, 1992), offering another source of funding to LECs and local authorities:
For every pound of LEADER funding there must be a matching pound of UK public money ...
It fitted within the remit of the Local Enterprise Company and ... when they were sure of the
matching funding they went in for LEADER straight away. So it was of benefit to LEADER in
that... there was potential there of accessing matching funding, and it's of possible benefit to the
Councils and the Enterprise Companies in that they could double their money, for investments
of a pound you'll get another pound from LEADER in the budget, so it's a mutual arrangement45
The partnership is generally seen as a success, establishing new contacts between
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agencies and generating, according to one respondent, a strong sense of trust among
the main 'stakeholders'.46 There is a direct relationship between the Local Action
Group and the Western Isles Objective 1 Local Area Group with contacts developed
in the former generating the momentum to set up the latter.47 Individual partners seem
to share key objectives, internalising the LEADER ethos to agree on the importance of
fostering a participatory, 'bottom-up' approach to rural development.43 Internal
differences have been submerged beneath a unifying discourse emphasising the
uniqueness of the area's culture and heritage as the land and language in particular
have been used to forge an institutional identity for this new territorial unit (WISL
LEADER, 1995; Ray, 1997: 350-53).
Respondents in other areas also reported that LEADER partnerships were
working effectively, with individual partners having an interest in securing additional
funding which allows them to "do things you couldn't do any other way".49 At the
same time, however, the dominant role of LECs as the 'lead' agency seems to have
accentuated organisational rivalries:
Because RACE administer it LEADER seems to be just another ... budget of RACE ... whereas
it's usually RACE and the Highland Council that are the match funders ... the people who
administer the programme are employed by the Action Group I would say ... They would almost
say that... it was RACE employing them.30
In Lochaber as well, Black and Conway (1996:105) report that the dominance of the
LEG meant that LEADER lacked a separate identity, although these problems have
been addressed by the LEADER II programme. This perception of unequal
partnerships in the sense of the LECs running LEADER programmes builds on power
relations established by state restructuring and seems to impede the development of
trust and informal co-operation within formal structures.
Local Economic Forums represent another important form of co-operation
between the main agencies. They have an advisory function, acting as a forum for
communication between LECs and local authorities. The concept was pioneered in
Lochaber as a way of improving tense relations in 1992/3, and has since been
exported to Ross and Cromarty and Skye and Lochalsh. Whilst having no executive
powers, Local Economic Forums provide a valuable opportunity for 'noise reduction'
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(Jessop, 1998a), establishing a channel of communication for discussing key issues,
coordinating plans and gaining wider support for projects:
The forum itself really just has a watching brief on everything ... it doesn't take decisions ... For
example there was a scheme drawn up ... by ... Lochaber Limited.... it was put in front of the
fomm, the forum couldn't take it forward themselves ... they would just endorse the principle of
it and that then had its support which meant that each of the bodies within that forum would
support it and help it through, ... rather than ... one going one way and one going the other, that
way you don't get any progress.5'
Individual agencies can use forums for consultation on their policies, and forums have
been important in allowing local authorities input into LEC business plans.52
The influence of individual commitments and agendas is a third key influence
shaping inter-organisational relations. Crucially, individual action is required to
develop trust between key actors and establish a pattern of informal contact which
ensures that formal institutional structures function effectively. It is a key factor
explaining how similar institutional arrangements produce different outcomes in
different areas:
When you get down to local areas and you get down to partnerships, it's down to people,
absolutely people-driven. If personalities are hostile and confrontational you're on a hiding to
nothing, if personalities are co-operative ... you're on a gold seam, and I think Lochaber has
been outstanding in that sense. And I think that's reflected in the success of our LEADER
Action Group and the budgets we have for that, it's reflected in the scale of the Objective One
monies that Lochaber has attracted, it's reflected in the year-on-year additional funding that the
LEC in Lochaber gets beyond its formula share.53
There's been real problems in Caithness with inter-agency relations, well relations between the
LEC and the Council really ... and that's just some individuals creating these problems, the local
press as well they've given us a hard time, again that's just personalities. It was really just the
leader of the Council and one or two others who were very anti-LEC and quite vitriolic about it,
for example he would walk out of the room when our Chief Executive walked in, so that was
very difficult.54
In Lochaber, individual co-operation is stressed as the key factor behind strong inter¬
agency co-operation which is, in turn, given the importance of 'partnership' to the
formulation and financing of development projects, reflected in the area's success in
accessing extra funding. In this sense, the quality of informal contact has strengthened
formal structures in terms of both resources and effectiveness. In Skye and Lochalsh
too, another area characterised by positive relations between LEC and Council,
individual attitudes were cited as a key factor.55 These successes contrast sharply with
the situation in Caithness where personality clashes created serious tensions, making it
very difficult for Council and LEC staff to work together effectively. Individual
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attitudes only matter, however, in the context of the position held by individuals in
their organisations. In Caithness, it is Council leaders' perceptions of the LEC as a
threat to their authority that has made relations so difficult. In Lochaber, conversely,
the positive approach of the LEC Chief Executive was seen as a key factor
encouraging co-operation.56 Individual action, then, is often crucial in translating
underlying structures into effective working relations.
Recent events in the Western Isles usefully illustrate how these factors shape
inter-organisational relations. While the issue of council representation has fuelled
tensions, the way in which these tensions are worked out is shaped by personality
politics. It is clear that the respective attitudes ofWestern Isles Enterprise (WIE) and
Western Isles Council (WIC) are shaped by the wider context of state restructuring:
I think there's a general willingness ... from the LEC board members and the staff to work with
the Council, maybe that was ... coming from a position of strength under the previous
government, they knew LECs were not going to be abolished or changed in any way at all, so
there's been that kind of outward looking ... approach.57
In this sense, the LEC's position as the favoured channel for government policy makes
it the more equal partner, enabling it to adopt this 'outward looking approach'. Council
representatives express frustration, however, at the LEC's reluctance to grant them
formal representation on the LEC board:
I mean we, we are the largest employer in the Western Isles, we are an important business that
has a spend/ revenue capital over £100 million pounds a year ... and ... we have been unable to
secure a place on the board of the Local Enterprise Company as of right ... Now ... we think
that's kind of daft and as long as that resistance is there ... it's no wonder that we are going ... to
fall out.58
This feeling ofmarginalisation reflects the wider context of state restructuring and the
Council's perception that it has been on the receiving end of reforms designed to
remove functions from its control. That this is not the case empirically given that the
LECs took over the functions of the HIDB59 only serves to illustrate the extent to
which Council attitudes have been shaped by this wider context.
According to one respondent, meetings of a liaison group set up to improve
relations have been dominated by complaints from WIC about the way in which the
LEC was initially set up and recent funding decisions.60 This is seen as indicative of
the Council's negative, unconstructive attitude, reinforcing the LECs concern that
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Council representatives would seek to undermine the established practices through
which the board works. This suspicion is given further credence by the fact that until
recently one of the Council's formal political aspirations was to take over the
functions of the LEC.61 The gap between these stand-points reveals how institutional
rivalries are shaped by unequal power relations. While underlying tensions tend to
limit the effectiveness of informal relations, officials work to maintain practical co¬
operation in putting together funding packages and development initiatives.62 Specific
projects such as the LEADER programme have generated effective partnership
working. Nonetheless, recent public disputes between the LEC and WIC have a
serious effect on inter-organisational relations at a time when the economic
performance of the Western Isles relative to the rest of the Elighlands and Islands is
causing increasing concern.
In August 1997, HIE's Annual Report was launched in Stornoway. This
followed the established mode of presentation in painting an optimistic picture of
economic prospects in the Highlands and Islands, drawing on an aggregative
perspective emphasising overall regional trends (HIE, Annual Report, 1996-7). On
this occasion, these claims provoked an unusually fierce response. The vice-convener
ofWIC, Angus Graham, launched a blistering attack on HIE, accusing it of "distorting
the truth" in its efforts to emphasise the impact of its activities (WHFP 22.8.97). A
sequel took place in March 1998 at a conference on the 'economy in crisis' organised
by WIC (WHFP 20.3.98.). This was marred by a dispute over whether the economic
situation justified the term "crisis". The dispute was symbolised by the contrasting
arguments of Cllr. Graham, maintaining his emphasis on adverse economic trends and
the HIE chairman, Fraser Morrison, who attacked "defeatist talk" and stressed the
importance of projecting a positive image to attract potential investors (WHFP
20.3.98.). This on-going episode highlights not only the rivalries between particular
institutions, but also that conflict is centred on the discursive construction of the local
economy itself, as competing interests promote their conflicting representations of
local economic trends.
This section has emphasised how relations between LECs and local authorities
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are structurally rooted in the unequal relations produced by earlier processes of state
restructuring. Within this general context, however, local relations vary significantly,
largely according to the three key factors of organisational boundaries, council
representation on LEC boards, and individual attitudes and commitments. The precise
ways in which these forces interact locally are highly complex. What the Western
Isles example showed is that where 'political' disputes over issues such as Council
representation are reinforced and magnified by personality clashes, organisational
relations become tense. In these circumstances, nurturing the conditions for effective
partnership working becomes difficult. In other areas, notably Skye and Lochalsh and
Lochaber, the presence of crucial pre-conditions - coincident organisational
boundaries based on a strong sense of local identity, LEC recognition of councils'
concerns about representation and power, the positive attitudes of individuals
occupying key positions - generate the trust and understanding needed to clarify
organisational roles and develop common objectives. The result is a culture of
informal co-operation and successful partnership.
6.5.Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the current emphasis on partnership can only be
understood within the wider context of state restructuring. After a series of
institutional reforms re-modelled the public sector on private sector practices in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, introducing special-purpose agencies to mobilise local
business elites, the mid-to-late 1990s has witnessed a new emphasis on coordination
and partnership. The key research finding to emerge from this chapter is that the
impact of the first phase on inter-organisational relations tends to limit the potential of
more recent initiatives. The development of partnerships is structured by underlying
tensions stemming from local authorities' perceptions of being marginalised by the
creation of unelected agencies and the removal of key functions from their control.
While these tensions rarely impede routine contact in formulating funding packages,
they often limit the effectiveness of formal institutional arrangements by making it
difficult to develop the trust and co-operation required for integrated partnership
working. The official rhetoric tends to see partnership as a panacea, assuming that
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formal arrangements are enough and neglecting informal fonns of co-operation, which
this chapter suggests, are more difficult to develop and sustain. Inter-organisational
relations take different forms in different parts of the Highlands. Since the conditions
underpinning success in areas like Skye and Lochalsh and Lochaber are locally-
specific, their experience cannot be easily 'exported' to areas where relations have
proved more difficult. In these circumstances, partnerships are likely to remain fragile
coalitions driven by short-term financial pressures.
While the benefits of both LECs and partnerships have been promoted through
similar forms of localist rhetoric, the consecutive phases of state restructuring that
they represent have been driven by national priorities. In emphasising the managerial
'technologies' which make LECs accountable to the centre, Chapter five raised
questions about their local accountability and representativeness. This chapter has
highlighted the paradox that while partnerships are ostensibly designed to increase
organisational co-ordination and encourage local initiative, they can only do so at the
expense of creating complex institutional arrangements which appear to add another
layer of confusion and duplication. The limited local accountability and
representativeness of many partnership structures in which unelected agencies play a
key role raises a number of concerns about the democratic legitimacy of new fonns of
local governance. Chapter seven addresses these issues by examining LEC's
accountability and assessing whether institutional structures offer meaningful scope
for local initiative and community involvement.
Notes
1 Stewart uses the term corporatist here in a loose sense to refer to initiatives which
bring together a range of interests and organisations. This contrasts with the more
specific use of corporatism in chapters three and four of this thesis to refer to a social
democratic state regime which incorporated private capital and organised labour as
partners in economic management during the 1960s and 1970s. The use of the terms
corporatist / corporatism in this chapter to describe a central component of the 'new
localism' constructed by partnerships - the pressure it creates for organisations to
work together - does not imply that such arrangements are expressions of corporatism
in the broader political sense. In particular, it should not be taken to mean that capital
and labour are dominant 'partners'.
2 As Chapter two (p.31-32) made clear, however, this is not one of the key approaches
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informing the thesis as a whole. Rather, its function in this chapter is to frame
empirical analysis of this specific issue.
3 Council official, interview 7.3.97.
4 The three all-purpose island councils - Western Isles Council (WIC), Shetland
Islands Council and Orkney Islands Council - were left unaffected by the reforms.
5 HIE official, interview 14.11.97.
6 Council official, unrecorded interview 19.11.96.
7 Senior council official, interview 23.9.97.
8 Council official, interview 19.11.96; Local councillor, interview 5.8.97.
9 Council official, interview 19.11.96.
10 Senior HIE official, interview 1.11.96; LEC official, interview 5.3.97; LEC official,
interview 31.7.97.
11 Council official, unrecorded interview 12.11.97.
12 LEC official, interview 31.7.97.
13 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
14 Senior HIE official, interview 1.11.96; Council official, interview 12.3.97.
15 Senior area tourist board official, interview 28.10.97.
16 Senior Council official, interview 23.9.97.
17 Local councillor, interview 21.5.97.
18 Council official, interview 7.3.97.
19 Senior HIE official, interview 1.11.96; Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
20 Instead, the region was granted Objective 5(b) status in the programming period
1989-93. 1988 saw a major re-organisation of the structural funds, focusing on five
categories. Of these, Objective 1 focuses on the development of structurally backward
regions, defined as those whose GDP per capita is less than 75 per cent of the EU
average. Objective 5(b) is designed to promote development in lagging rural areas that
do not qualify for Objective 1. The Commission's Agenda 2000 proposals include
plans to rationalise the structure of seven objectives (since 1993/4) into three.
21 HIE official, interview 19.11.96.
22
European programme officer, interview 19.11.96.
23 These are: Highland, Shetland, Orkney, Western Isles, Argyll and Bute, Moray and
North Ayrshire.
24 Initially, they were four levels with an intermediate Management Committee
structure between the Advisory Groups and the Monitoring Committee. As the
programme developed, however, it became apparent that this 'layer' was unnecessary
and was therefore abolished.
25 Priority 4, relating to the development of the primary sector, is administered
separately by the Scottish Office Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department
in Edinburgh.
26
European programme officer, interview 19.11.96. The rest of this paragraph also
draws heavily on this interview.
27 Senior council official, interview 23.9.97.
28
European programme official, interview 19.11.96.
29 Council official, interview 5.3.97.
30 These figures are based only on applications up to and including March 1996; they
exclude the September 1996 and September 1997 rounds. Also, they are based only on
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allocations of ERDF and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGGF), the European Social Fund (ESF) is excluded as are national and private
contributions. ESF provides approximately a sixth of the total EU funds allocated to
the Programme.
31
European programme official, interview 19.11.96.
32 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
33 LEC official, interview 5.3.97.
34
European programme official, interview 18.11.96.
35 Council official, interview 12.11.97.
36 Former HIE official, interview 7.11.97.
37 Council official, interview 7.3.98.
38 The summary of local organisational relations in this paragraph is derived from a
range of interview transcripts and more informal observations and conversations.
39 LEC official, interview 6.3.97.
40 LEC official, interview 5.3.97.
41 Senior council official, interview 23.9.97.
42 This information is taken from recent LEC Annual Reports, supplemented by
interview material.
43 LEC director, interview 7.7.97.
44 There are nine areas covered by the expanded LEADER II initiative, these five plus
Ross and Cromarty; Orkney; Moray, Badenoch and Strathspey; and Inverness-shire
and Nairn.
45 LEADER field officer, interview 29.7.97.
46 Council official, interview 25.6.97.
47 LEC official, personal communication, August 1998.
48 LEADER field officer, interview 29.7.97.
49 Council official, interview 7.3.97.
50 Council official, interview 21.5.97.
51 Council official, interview 12.3.97.
52 In Lochaber the Economic Forum has taken on another role. As an established
partnership, it has provided a basis, through a specialist sub-group, for a bid for Rural
Challenge funding (LEADER field officer, interview 12.3.97).
x3 Senior LEC official, interview 12.3.97.
54 LEC official, interview 5.3.97.
55 LEC director, interview 7.7.97.
56 Council official, interview 12.3.97.
57 LEC director, interview 5.8.97.
58 Senior council official, interview 23.9.97.
59 LEC director, interview 5.8.97.
60 LEC director, interview 5.8.97.
61 Local councillor, interview 30.7.97.
62 Senior council official, interview 23.9.97.
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Chapter 7
Accountability in Question: Institutional Practices, Local Accessibility
and Community Relations
7.1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on LECs' accountability to local communities. Chapter
five emphasised LECs' accountability to central government, arguing that they work
within a context of structured flexibility. LECs are able to feed local priorities into
policy, and then adapt that policy to local conditions, within limits set by state rules
and norms. This chapter asks where these priorities come from: are they derived
purely from LECs' readings of local needs or are there genuine opportunities for the
broader local community to participate? In focusing on LECs' openness to community
involvement and local priorities, it addresses one of the principal research questions
(Chapter one, p. 13). The analysis is extended to cover emerging partnership
arrangements. As Chapter six argued, while partnerships involve a range of interests
drawn from different sectors, they tend to blur responsibility and confuse questions of
accountability and legitimacy (Stewart, 1994: 143-44).
The chapter's main argument is that while LECs are not accountable to local
communities, despite measures taken by HIE and LECs, they are accessible in the
sense of providing resources and expertise which community groups can use to help
achieve their own objectives. Although groups have to follow certain procedures and
adopt certain strategies to gain access to these resources, the scope for them to do so
can be seen as an important source of LECs' legitimacy. Consequently, the lack of
local accountability need not necessarily undermine the operational effectiveness of
the HIE network.
The argument is developed in three main sections. Section 7.2 clarifies the
concept of accountability and discusses community relations, noting how LEC
personnel deploy a rhetoric of'community' to claim legitimacy. Section 7.3 considers
193
the local accountability of LECs in detail, assessing the nature and effects of the
measures taken to counter criticism. Section 7.4 assesses LECs' accessibility to
community groups and the representativeness and legitimacy of 'partnerships'. The
conclusion summarises the key arguments.
7.2. Public Accountability and Community Identity
It's always the kind of obvious criticism that it is essentially a bunch of self-appointed
individuals ... Quangos generally are condemned as undemocratic but LECs are even more
undemocratic ... in the sense that ... when for instance I was appointed onto the board of HIE I
was appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland ... for a fixed term on stipulated conditions
... but members of LEC are not appointed by anybody other than themselves which is quite
bizarre in a way, I think you have to go back to the Town Councils of Scotland before the 1832
Reform Act to find ... a precedent... They ... are in a sense a sort of self-perpetuating clique.1
Much of the public debate on LECs in Scotland has focused on questions of
accountability and legitimacy. This reflects the 'democratic deficit' of the non-elected
local state in that the institutional design of LEC's privileges managerial forms of
accountability to central government over local political accountability. This design
contains in-built contradictions, however, as LECs and TECs have been forced to
adapt to the local political environments within which they operate in order to achieve
their aims (Peck, 1992, 1993; Bennett et al., 1994; Hart et al., 1996; Haughton et al.,
1997; Jones, 1997a). Since they operate within a broader system of local governance,
LECs are confronted with an array of conflicting demands and expectations from a
range of organisations and community groups.
As the above quote indicates, there are important distinctions between the
official status of HIE and that of LECs (Chapter four: 104). As a regional
development agency, HIE is formally classified as an (NDPB) Non-Departmental
Public Body (NDPB), and its members are appointed by the Secretary of State under
specific terms and conditions. By contrast, LECs enjoy formal autonomy as private
companies limited by guarantee (non profit-making) which take on responsibilities for
delivering public programmes by entering into contractual agreements with HIE.
Since LECs are private companies, they appoint their own boards, making them
essentially self-selecting and self-perpetuating organisations. Although the formal
autonomy of such 'local spending bodies' makes the imposition of codes of conduct
difficult, the Nolan Committee (1996: 17) argued that their self-perpetuating nature
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made 'openness' particularly important. Whilst they are subject to the Companies Act,
LECs are not subject to the full rigours of shareholder accountability. Since they are
companies limited by guarantee and have no capital or shareholders, established
systems of corporate governance are only partially applicable. There is no wider
membership to whom the board of directors are accountable.
The emphasis on public accountability is a product of modern political
arrangements. The norms of representative democracy demand that those running vital
public services are answerable to the wider 'community' on whose behalf they act
(Weir 1995; Hirst 1995). Day and Klein (1987: 26-9) draw a basic distinction between
political and managerial forms of (public) accountability. Political accountability is
the requirement for those running public services and spending public money to be
answerable to the electorate. Managerial accountability involves making those with
delegated authority meet agreed standards and criteria of performance (Day and Klein,
1987: 27). This often appears to function as a neutral, technical process and has a
number of dimensions, including financial regularity, ensuring that the correct
procedures and processes have been followed, and assessing whether programmes
have had the intended effects. The 'technologies' of government discussed in Chapter
five - targeting, audit and budgetary controls - can be seen as forms of managerial
accountability making LECs accountable to central government.
Political and managerial forms of accountability share two crucial aspects: that
those exercising delegated authority offer an account of their actions, and that they are
held to account for those actions (Day and Klein, 1987; Nolan Committee 1996, Hart
et al., 1996). Ofmost importance in addressing these requirements is the relationship
between political and managerial forms of accountability. The traditional assumption
is that managerial forms of accountability are subordinate to political accountability as
technical measures are deployed to evaluate administrative performance against
defined objectives arrived at through the democratic process. In Britain, the dominant
expression of this relationship has been the doctrine ofministerial responsibility. This
points to the importance of effective sanctions in underpinning real accountability
(Day and Klein, 1987: 34; Nolan Committee, 1996: 13). To exercise control over the
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actions of those holding delegated powers, the central authority must possess real
sanctions, ultimately being able to remove or replace the individuals or organisations
responsible for malpractice. As Day and Klein (1987: 34) argue, this leads to another
important distinction: that between strong forms of accountability, underpinned by
the threat of ultimate sanctions, and the softer notion of answerability, requiring only
that officials and organisations present an account of their actions.
The institutional design of LECs as business-led agencies makes them
unrepresentative of the local community. As Chapter four demonstrated, this design
owes more to the imperatives of state restructuring than any local demands for
change. The establishment of LECs can be seen as part of a 'hegemonic project'
designed to privilege the interests of business whilst limiting the access of groups
drawn from the public and voluntary sectors (Peck, 1992, 1993; Jones, 1997a; 1997b).
The privileged position of business elites is guaranteed by the statutory requirement
for two-thirds of LEC directors to be drawn from the private sector. The remaining
third of places is occupied by leading figures from the local community who support
the aims of the LEC. The fact that directors are appointed by the existing board,
however, has fuelled public unease (Scottish Affairs Committee, 1995; Nolan
Committee, 1996), leading to LECs being dismissed as "self-perpetuating cliques".
The distinctive pattern of business representation on Highland LECs reflects
local economic structures. Since there are few large trans-national business operating
in the region, HIE LECs - unlike SE LECs which are often dominated by 'big capital' -
tend to be led by representatives of small business, often drawn from tourism and the
service sector, who live locally (chapter four, note 21)2 This 'local dependence' means
that LEC directors are often involved in community activity, making it difficult to
draw clear boundaries between sectors:
You find ... that in smaller LECs, just because of the nature of communities, that the
division between private, public and voluntary sector breaks down a bit, and somebody can
come along to a LEC as a director and it's hard to know what sector he represents because ... he
may be active in voluntary activity as well as business, and that's very much the case in a lot
of our LECs ... Because its much more localised even the distinctions between hard private-
sector ... and if you like softer, community sector ... breaks down a bit.3
We're very conscious of our remit in terms of ... we have a social remit... so we have ... a lot of
dealings with the community. And again this is the nature of the beast here ... if we go through
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our board in particular and this is reflective of everyone in our environment ... there's a wide
variety of involvements, so I think that the social and community remit always comes through
... in an area like this ... We've got three out of the eleven staff... on community councils in their
own right... people are very much involved in communities here.4
Notions of 'community' appear to be deployed to reject claims that LEC boards are
unrepresentative and dominated by a self-interested business elite. They are
underpinned by notions of local uniqueness with the nature of small close-knit rural
communities demanding that business people on LEC boards also show their
commitment in other areas. Local uniqueness, a product of the combination of discrete
communities and the dominance of small locally-orientated business, is defined
against the 'otherness' of urban-industrial areas in the Central Belt, where LECs are
dominated by 'big capital' distant from community agendas. This emphasis on local
'embeddedness' is reinforced by the social remit of Highland LECs, enabling them to
have more extensive and sustained contact with community groups.
Debates about the local accountability and representativeness of LECs reflect
the changing relationship between state and community at a time of continuing
resource constraints and a continuing suspicion of centralised forms of administration
(Arkleton Trust, 1997: 31). The increasing emphasis on community self-help (Rose,
1996a, 1996b; Murdoch, 1997) is manifest, in rural policy, in the promotion of new
forms of partnership and community initiative which typically involve co-operation
between state agencies and community groups.3 These new forms of community
involvement and development are fundamentally conditioned by the structures and
priorities of the agencies promoting them. This raises crucial questions about the
democratic accountability and legitimacy of new institutional arrangements.
As Bryden (1994: 223) observes, state agencies need legitimacy to act on
behalf of others. Notions of strategic selectivity suggest that the state's openness to the
demands of social groups is mediated by the particular strategies that those groups
adopt towards it (Jessop, 1990b, 1997b). Chapter five showed that while institutional
practices and rules impose certain requirements, applicants approaching LECs for
financial assistance or advice can adopt strategies that appeal to LECs' own concerns,
thus enabling applicants to exert pressure in subsequent negotiations. The thesis has
emphasised the specific mechanisms and practices deployed in the regulation and
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governance of local and regional spaces over notions of hegemony. This chapter
extends that analysis, criticising the concept of'hegemonic project' which implies that
community groups either passively consume or actively contest institutional
discourses. It argues that reception is mediated through particular perspectives as
activists seek to harness institutional discourses and practices to their own agendas
(Boyle, 1997). The legitimacy of state agencies depends, in part, on whether
community groups and businesses can unlock their resources and capacities to help
achieve pre-existing objectives.
While accountability is an important source of legitimacy, it is unclear whether
organisations need to be accountable to their local communities in order to function
effectively. The establishment and design of HIE reflects policy preferences
decisively rejected by the Highland electorates in successive elections. Consequently,
the activities of LECs as unelected 'quangos' has sparked controversy. The clash
between competing claims of managerial authority and local democracy provides the
discursive ground upon which debates on the accountability of LECs in the Scottish
Highlands are being played out. The next section considers the impact of HIE and
LECs' efforts to increase local political accountability at a time when LECs are
increasingly acting as channels for the introduction of new forms of partnership and
community representation (LEADER, local rural partnerships, etc.).
7.3. The Local Accountability of LECs
In both Scotland and Wales, distinctive institutional arrangements added extra
controversy to general debates on the legitimacy of unelected quangos. The basic
imbalance between a well-developed system of administrative devolution, centred on
the Scottish and Welsh Offices, and a complete lack of legislative devolution through
a directly-elected assembly, allowed a minority Conservative Party to govern
unchecked by effective democratic scrutiny (Morgan and Roberts, 1993: 22).
'Quangos' became a particularly heated issue in Scotland and Wales because of the
perception that the Conservatives were relying on patronage and imposing policies
rejected by voters through a network of unelected bodies dominated by a narrow band
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of supporters. This made the 'democratic deficit' particularly pronounced.
The problem of accountability can be seen as a manifestation of underlying
features of the modem state (Giddens, 1985; Day and Klein, 1987; Rose, 1996a). The
popular experience of bureaucratic forms of service provision has increased the
distance between authority and the people, creating disinterested publics that are
sceptical of organisational claims (Day and Klein, 1987; Rose, 1996a). Conservative
reforms have addressed this issue by promoting the rights of'consumers' over those of
service providers. While these reforms have introduced a new rhetoric of 'openness'
and customer care into the public sector, there is little evidence of real 'empowerment'
overcoming long-standing apathy.
LEC officials and directors tend to be acutely aware that problems of
accountability are exacerbated by public disinterest:
The main problem is to try and get people to take an interest in it... On a famous day we had an
open day ... which was publicised right, left and centre ... I think at the end of the day we had
about four people that came into the local village hall ... Sometimes we get really awful turnouts
... you're up against a ... degree of apathy, but it's like everything else in life when a crisis
arises then, or particularly when ... we do something that people don't like ... then all hell
breaks loose and we get plenty of public participation.6
One issue which tends to spark public criticism concerns business owned by, or
associated with, LEC directors receiving funding.7 This problem is particularly visible
and acute in the Highlands where the business community is small and close-knit.
Providing they meet the criteria, businesses owned by directors are just as eligible as
any other businesses. Making them ineligible for grant aid would undermine the
fundamental rationale of business leadership since few business people would be
willing to join LEC boards.* However, the fairly widespread unease felt towards a
system based essentially on a group of business representatives providing funding to a
wider community of businesses is an expression of underlying contradictions. Giving
private business leaders a key role in running a public service inevitably creates
conflict between their private interests and the wider public interest. LECs represent a
fundamental blurring of the boundaries between public and private in that the same
constituency which forms the 'market' for the service also provides it, or is at least
involved in its provision. In this sense, the 'consumers' become the producers. The
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standard defense that a project associated with a board member received assistance
because it met the relevant criteria, whilst no doubt technically correct, does little to
dispel the perception of a self-interested organisation. It clashes with underlying
structures of expectation9 which assert that development agencies are there to serve
the wider community interest, stressing the legitimate claim of'local' people on public
resources.
LEC officials and directors tend to be acutely aware of criticisms that they are
unaccountable bodies, in some cases recognising that this problem affects operational
matters.10 Local political pressures require that LECs, in association with HIE as the
statutory authority responsible for awarding contracts, respond. Measures to increase
local political accountability have been taken at three distinct levels. First, there are
the formal requirements specified by the government and incorporated into annual
contracts by HIE, involving publishing an annual report, holding an Annual General
Meeting, and registering and declaring members' interests. Second, there are the
initiatives introduced by HIE which all constituent LECs are required to implement.
The key strand of this is the Accountability Through Openness (ATO) policy, together
with the more recent introduction of an Appointability Through Openness (APO)
policy. In addition, there are the initiatives taken by individual LECs themselves, of
which the most significant are the introduction of membership schemes and the use of
working or consultative groups. Table 7.1 shows how these three levels of
accountability come together in the structures of individual LECs.
Table 7.1. Forms of LEC Accountability




AIE X X X X X X
CASE X X X X X
INE X X X X X f
LL X X X X X
MBSE X X X X X
RACE X X X X X f
SALE X X X X X X X
WIE X X X X X X
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LECs: AIE is Argyll and the Islands Enterprise; CASE is Caithness and
Sutherland Enteprise; INE is Inverness and Nairn Enterprise; LL is Lochaber
Limited; MBSE is Moray, Badenoch and Strathspey Enterprise; RACE is Ross
and Cromarty Enterprise; SALE is Skye and Lochalsh Enterprise and WIE is
Western Isles Enterprise.
x= in operation; f= formerly in operation.
Source: Interviews and LEC Annual Reports.
The formal procedures for ensuring accountability appear rather minimal,
reflecting a system primarily based on 'upwards' accountability to central government.
As a form of accountability, Annual Reports address two audiences: offering an
account to government and parliament whilst providing information to the local
community. The balance ofHIE and LEC Reports is different: the former focus more
on government whereas LECs seek to promote their activities locally. As such, LEC
Reports can be seen as a key channel for the circulation of LEC's 'official discourse',
providing a key means of justifying and legitimating policies and programmes to a
range of local 'stakeholders'. They are structured to a common fonnat, offering a
summary of'progress' across the main programmes, increasingly organised in terms of
HIE's three strategic objectives of 'growing businesses', 'developing people' and
'strengthening communities'." The emphasis is very much on performance as LECs
highlight their successes in key areas, increasingly by listing 'achievements' and
'outputs' against key targets in boxes separated from the main body of Reports
(Lochaber Limited, Fifth Report; MBSE, Third Report, Fifth Report, Sixth Report;
SALE, Sixth Report; WIE, Fifth Report, Sixth Report). This is an important discursive
practice, used to persuade local 'customers' of the efficiency and productivity of LEC
operations. Thus, while Annual Reports are an important means of giving an account
to local communities, they do so in a form that is structured by internal concerns and
priorities. 'Success' is measured against criteria specified by another audience (HIE
and the Scottish Office), the assumption being that these somehow match local
priorities. The muted local reception of Annual Reports seems to reflect this external
determination of the principal measures of effectiveness and performance.
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The second key aspect of the first layer of accountability concerns rules for
dealing with conflicts of interest, a major political problem for LECs. TECs and LECs
were generally slow to develop clearly-defined procedures for resolving conflicts,
reflecting the low priority given to local accountability in the initial phase of
development (Nolan Committee, 1996: 65). Subsequently, standards based upon
established public sector practices have been put in place. LECs are required, as a
contractual obligation, to maintain a register of members' interests which the public
are able to inspect, and to declare any conflicts of interest. Cases of assistance to
business with which directors are associated must be published in Annual Reports.
Chief Executives are responsible for ensuring compliance. A related issue is that of
'competitive conflict', referring to situations in which applications for assistance from
businesses who may be in competition with companies linked to board members.
There was a strong perception among businesses and the public that confidential
information relating to commercial performance could be accessed by potential
competitors on LEC boards.12 Rules have been developed to address this tension,
mainly by extending procedures for dealing with direct conflicts of interest. As with
many aspects of LEC accountability, however, the basic fact that boards continue to
meet in private, meaning that the operation of these procedures cannot be observed,
makes it difficult to dispel lingering suspicions.
The persistence of claims that LECs were secretive and unaccountable bodies
demanded a response from the HIE Network. The basic contractual requirements that
made up the first layer of accountability were unable to silence those within local
authorities and sections of the local press who saw it as their task to defend local
democracy against the 'quango' state. One particular source of criticism against the
HIDB concerned its refusal to release information about who has received grant aid,
citing the need to maintain 'commercial confidentiality'. HIE's initial adherence to this
position fuelled perceptions of secrecy. In Caithness and Sutherland, the hostility of
key figures in the local authority and local press meant that CASE was forced to
operate in a particularly turbulent political environment. In early 1994, CASE
decided, with the backing of HIE, to release a monthly list of businesses and
individuals assisted, in an effort to address criticism.13 This experiment faced some
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opposition within the HIE Network from those who feared that going public would
prevent people from applying for assistance. It soon emerged, however, that
disclosure was actually encouraging applications by acting almost as a marketing tool
with lists of approvals in the local press increasing public knowledge of the types of
assistance available.14 After reviewing these effects and undertaking consultation
within the Network, HIE decided in February 1994 to extend CASE's initiative, re¬
packing it as the central strand of a new ATO policy (HIE, Fourth Report, 1994-95:
66). All LECs are required, as a common minimum standard, to prepare a monthly list
of approvals for public release.
ATO marked a fairly radical departure from the previous policy, based on the
need to avoid disclosure in the interests of'commercial confidentiality'. The associated
risk was deemed to be worth taking because of the need for a credible initiative to
address criticism and improve LECs accountability and legitimacy. Revealingly,
HIE's Chief Executive conceded, when announcing the new policy, that commercial
confidentiality had been used very loosely, without anybody really defining what it
meant." It had become an automatic response, applied to a range of situations where it
had little real relevance. While it is important to maintain the confidentiality of
commercially sensitive information used in the appraisal of applications,16 this does
not mean that making approvals public after the decision has been taken would be
damaging to the business concerned. Using 'commercial confidentiality' as a reason
for not releasing information is commonplace across the public sector. In this case, it
reflected a desire to maintain and protect established institutional practice rather than
any external effect on business viability.
In launching ATO, HIE demonstrated a capacity to anticipate emergent policy
themes and act decisively and effectively. ATO is framed by a managerialist
discourse, successfully appropriating the language of 'openness' and 'transparency'
which structured Conservative policy. It has been commended as setting standards for
other public bodies both by the Scottish Affairs Committee (1995, vol 1) and the
Nolan Committee (1996: 66), giving credibility to HIE's claims that it is, in fact,
highly accountable and open.
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ATO is certainly an improvement on previous practice. In many respects,
however, it shares the limitations and assumptions of Conservative reforms. It
constructs its public as consumers rather than informed citizens, viewing them as
autonomous individuals able to query decisions and request information on
application procedures and criteria. Whilst ATO does seem to have increased local
interest in and knowledge of LEC activities, it stops well short of opening up
decision-making processes and, more importantly, the policies which underpin these
decisions to public scrutiny and involvement (Stewart, 1995). Indeed, there is
evidence that ATO was designed to deflect attention away from underlying 'political'
issues by focusing on service provision and operational efficiency. Although many
external representatives welcomed the extra information, ATO does little to enable
local communities to become more actively involved in shaping policy:
HIE and the Local Enterprise Company are refusing to hold a public meeting, they're saying
that there's nothing to be gained from it but I think they're just frightened ... there's no
consultation with the people here, you see their bumpfand they say they're accountable through
openness, well not here they're not.17
Although it requires LECs to give an account on a monthly basis, ATO does not
significantly enhance local groups' ability to hold them to account on key policy
matters. Given that LECs effectively exercise a monopoly over the provision of key
forms of business development assistance, local residents are unable to go elsewhere
and, therefore, lack effective sanctions. It is best seen as a management tool
introduced in response to damaging criticism that increases LECs' answerability
without necessarily increasing their accountability or legitimacy.
As this thesis has emphasised, the self-perpetuating nature of LECs has
generated widespread criticism. The initial expectation - fostered by those promoting
the LEC initiative - that LECs would face competition for contracts from other groups
of local business operators has failed to materialise. Instead, the original board appoint
new members through informal mechanisms in a process that appears closed and
secretive to external observers :
You see the LEC is a bit of a mystery, the way that it's evolved, it's just a bit ofmystery. There
should be new bids going in from a new company here eveiy three years, that's as I understood
the original intention anyway, but that's not happened. How it has evolved and how the Board
just seem to stay on is a bit ofa mysteiy, although ofcourse they'd say it's all perfectly open.'8
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This again is a damaging perception which reflects widespread unease over
appointments to 'quangos' (see Scottish Affairs Committee, 1995). Typically, LECs
informally approach a prospective director, usually someone active in the local
business community, after they have been identified as an appropriate candidate by
the board. This recruitment process, then, works through informal social networks in
the absence of any formal procedures. It is easy to see how it can lead to LECs being
dismissed as "self-perpetuating cliques" run by unrepresentative elites out of touch
with community needs.
HIE was quick to respond to the Nolan Committee's recommendations on
appointments. Early in 1997 it announced the introduction of a new APO policy
which, like ATO, would require LECs to conform to certain minimum standards. The
key elements of this follow Nolan's recommendations closely, involving the
preparation of job descriptions, published advertisements, and the establishment of a
nominations panel. The latter is the most important aspect, incorporating independent
representation from the local business community. Its function is to assess
applications and prepare a short list for consideration by the board of directors. The
initiative is designed to address criticisms of secrecy and self-interest by boosting the
credibility and legitimacy of LECs:
Introducing this process does mean that a public perception of it being a closed-shop and the
old-boy network is hopefully dispelled because anyone can apply and this independently
represented panel actually puts forward the short-list, so it does encourage perhaps a wider field
of people to come forward and hopefully gives it as more robust accountability as far as the
public are concerned.19
APO represents a significant improvement in methods of recruitment, giving people
the opportunity to put themselves forward as prospective directors. It should broaden
the field of applicants beyond those informally approached by the existing board,
opening up the process to groups marginalised and excluded by previous
arrangements.20 Fundamentally, however, LECs remain self-perpetuating
organisations. Since they remain subject to the Companies' Act, the board retains
ultimate responsibility for appointing new members. Although candidates are
identified and assessed by more formal and open mechanisms, this will not make
board of directors more representative of the communities they serve without an effort
to accommodate candidates from marginalised groups.
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The third 'layer' of accountability refers to initiatives taken by individual
LECs. Membership schemes form one important mechanism for increasing the
accountability of hybrid bodies which are formally constituted as private companies
but deliver public services. They have been adopted by a number of TECs and LECs
(Hart et al., 1996). Essentially, they replicate the structure of private companies based
on the concept of shareholder accountability. But applying this to LECs and TECs,
which are non profit-making companies that lack share capital and shareholders, is
contradictory (see p. 196-97).21 It involves LECs trying to recruit a wider membership
of interested individuals. The key element is that the members elect the board at an
AGM, with all members being eligible to put themselves forward.
Two HIE LECs operate membership schemes: WIE and SALE (Table 7.1).22
While directors are, in theory, accountable to a wider constituency, there are practical
problems in operationalising membership. These make it difficult to attract members
and explain its slow take-up by HIE LECs. It is difficult for LECs to offer tangible
benefits to members. Since they have no share capital, there are no financial gains to
be made and they cannot as public agencies be seen to offer advantages such as
privileged access to services. WIE's membership scheme has been faced with the
problem of apathy, attracting only about 60 individuals, while SALE's more recent
scheme, launched in the summer of 1997, attracted only five applications in response
to the first round of advertisements.23 After re-considering its scheme, INE decided to
work more closely with the local Chamber of Commerce, one of the more active in
the Highlands, providing the closest example in the Highlands to the mergers between
TECs and Chambers that have taken place in England and Wales (Hart et al., 1996).
While these arrangements potentially make LECs more responsive, working closely
with business organisations brings the danger that the exclusiveness of the board is
reflected in the wider 'membership' (Nolan Committee, 1996: 69). In this way, LECs
lack of representativeness could be accentuated. While membership schemes
potentially make LECs accountable to a wider constituency, the tension between their
formal structure as private companies and their substantive function in delivering a
public service makes it difficult for them to achieve this objective. As hybrid (part
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public, part private) organisations, LECs fail to meet the requirements of either public
or corporate systems of accountability.
Another approach taken by LECs to improve their local accountability
involves the development of sub-board structures, usually working groups or
consultative groups, arranged on a sectoral or geographical basis. They are made up of
interested members of the local community drawn from key sectors such as business,
local authorities, and voluntary groups. They can be seen as another key arena in
which accountability can be nurtured and developed, offering interested individuals an
opportunity to hold LECs to account regarding their polices towards particular sectors
or geographical areas. Two of the eight HIE LECs currently run working groups
(Table 7.1). AIE runs 13 groups on a geographical basis, a response to the problems of
serving a large and fragmented area, while SALE runs a similar number on a sectoral
basis that meet twice a year.24 One official argued that they help accountability as
people demand responses to particular issues or problems they have with LEC
policies.20 From their survey of TECs, Hart et al. (1996) report a widespread
confusion, however, over the function and influence ofworking groups. There is some
evidence of this for HIE LECs: are working groups a forum for local residents to
question and scrutinise aspects of LEC policy or is their function more consultative in
providing LECs with ideas to inform strategies? The emphasis seems to be on the
latter. For one participant, working groups benefit the LEC rather more than business
in providing ideas for policies, though once these policies are formulated they benefit
businesses.20 Working Groups are valuable largely for this reason: they provide a
mechanism for feeding the priorities of local groups into LEC policies. In contrast to
ATO, which reports 'outputs', they offer scope for participation at the crucial 'input'
end of the process. While working groups enhance accountability, their key
contribution lies in their capacity to make LEC policy more representative of local
priorities. Again, however, working groups are not strongly developed in the
Highlands, largely due to a combination of public apathy and some LECs' tendency to
rely on more informal consultative mechanisms.27
In addition to the formal mechanisms discussed above, respondents tended to
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stress more informal and personalised aspects of local accountability. These reflect
underlying conceptions of local distinctiveness stressed earlier. Board members are
active members of their communities, forcing them to give accounts, to justify and
explain decisions to members of the public, as they go about their day-to-day
business:
We're a size of community where ... you just cannot hide, if you go onto a LEC board ... then
everybody knows and they know that they can come to you, and if they've got a complaint
about the LEC then you're going to get it in the neck. That's accountability, if someone can
come up to you in a pub ... on a Friday night and lambast you about the LEC that's
accountability, it doesn't get more accountable than that, believe me ... I mean formal
accountability and informal accountability amount to pretty much the same thing, and informal
accountability in my opinion is more important ... because you're actually accountable to the
people who are using your service as opposed to a couple of bureaucrats.28
I would tend to suggest ... there is more accountability in an area such as Skye and Lochalsh
than in Glasgow because we've to walk down the street ... you're personally accountable in an
environment such as this, half of us are on social committee, village hall committees ... There's
no hiding place in a community such as this, which is a very good discipline and it's a very
distinct advantage in an area such as the Flighlands and Islands as compared with the Central
Belt where you can be extremely anonymous ... These 12 individuals we've got on our board ....
give freely a lot of time but they're publicly held to account a lot in the local environment, ... it's
a good discipline.29
The nature of small close-knit communities thus gives LEC activity an immediacy and
visibility lacking in urban areas. The first quote draws a clear distinction between this
informal accountability and fonnal mechanisms, asserting the greater importance of
the former as it makes LEC members and officials accountable to the people actually
using the service as opposed to the state. This emphasis on personal contact and
informal social networks is reinforced, according to one respondent, by the tendency
of people with complaints or inquiries to approach LEC personnel that are personally
known to them in the first instance.30 This reinforces the previous chapter's argument
that informal contact is crucial in generating the trust and understanding required for
sustainable partnerships. An effective system of local governance depends upon close
relations between organisations and communities in addition to inter-agency co¬
operation. These comments also indicate one of the ways in which LECs govern
through communities, seeking to harness their capacities by mobilising established
relationships and networks. The emphasis placed upon this almost 'subjective' sense of
accountability, embedded in local social contexts (Day and Klein, 1987: 229-30),
suggests that LEC directors and officials are motivated by a sense of public service to
local communities.
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This leads to the question of whether these informal processes can overcome
the limits imposed by formal structures. This prospect seems to founder, however, on
the issue of representativeness: if unelected boards are dominated by one particular
constituency, then no matter how open they are to individual queries and complaints,
the policies underlying individual decisions are unlikely to reflect the priorities of
their communities. There is a sense in which a reliance on local contact and networks
can shade into paternalism and elitism. Informal networks are likely to be dominated
by already active groups who are close to board members, thereby reinforcing the
exclusion of marginalised groups and reflecting established inequalities back into
institutional structures.
This section has focused on a range of measures introduced in an effort to
increase LECs local accountability. While these measures have encouraged LECs to
explain and justify decisions to those affected - to offer accounts - at a fundamental
level they make them answerable rather than accountable to local communities who
continue to lack both significant policy input and effective sanctions over the services
LECs provide. In the absence of local political accountability, the emphasis on the
personal accountability of directors through informal networks threatens to reinforce
LECs lack of representativeness. It is important, however, that the focus on efforts to
strengthen accountability procedures does not lead to a neglect of more radical
proposals to democratise unelected agencies, usually by making them subject to direct
election (Stewart, 1995).
7.4. Institutional Practices and Community Action
Recent initiatives have strongly promoted 'bottom-up' or indigenous forms of
development, emphasising local empowerment and community participation.
Increasingly, this has come to reflect a general policy approach, set out in the Scottish
Office White Paper of December 1995, and manifest through LEADER, the Scottish
Rural Partnership Fund and the CAG (Community Action Grant) programme run by
LECs.31 Discourses of local development, produced by and circulated through official
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institutional networks linking the Scottish Office, HIE, LECs, and European funding
bodies, mobilise and celebrate notions of local uniqueness, cultural specificity and
community identity (Ray, 1996; Burnett, 1998). This emphasis reflects wider shifts in
the orientation of development discourses, away from the traditional 'top-down'
emphasis on external investment and modernisation towards a focus on mobilising
endogenous capacities (Ray, 1997; Edwards, 1998; Day, 1998). These unifying
discourses appeal to the entire community in the name of the 'local', constructing a
general interest which masks the claims of particular groups. In concealing the
contestation of concepts of 'local' and 'community' beneath a veneer of consensus,
these discourses seem to function as part of a wider hegemonic project (Jessop,
1990b: 207-18, 1997b). Institutional practices invariably favour, however, the
interests of some groups over others, though the prospects of particular groups are
conditioned by the strategies they adopt. This section explores the impact of
institutional rules and practices on community groups, arguing that the accessibility of
state resources and capacities to groups pursuing their own distinct agendas is an
important source of legitimacy.
Local fieldwork again uncovered substantial variations in relations between
LECs and local communities. LECs were generally regarded as more open to
community development in Skye and Lochalsh and the Western Isles. In the former in
particular, local activists acknowledged LECs' support for community initiatives,
although they often expressed concern at other aspect of the LEC's operations. In
Easter Ross, however, the LEC was more heavily criticised for focusing on large-scale
developments, inward investment and national training programmes. Whilst these
findings do lend support to the idea that there is more community participation in the
activities of island LECs (Arkleton Trust, 1997: 31), the distinction is far from
absolute with respondents in the two island areas also expressing concerns about the
structure and practices of the LEC network. Broadly, this pattern reinforces the pattern
of local variations in inter-organisational relations discussed in Section 6.4, suggesting
that the informal trust and co-operation required for effective partnership also
promotes harmonious relations between public agencies and local communities.
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HIE views social development as an important support for economic
development in tenns of developing skills and boosting confidence (HIE, 1991; First
Report: 56) (Section 5.2). The vitality of community activity is stressed in HIE's
efforts at regional 'boosterism' as an important part of 'quality of life' considerations
used to promote the Highlands as a dynamic area and attract small-scale investment.
The use of its powers for social and community development in an effort to create an
'entrepreneurial society' in the Highlands reflects HIE's origins as part of a Thatcherite
project promoting business values and practices. LECs impose certain conditions on
community groups seeking to gain access to state resources through the CAG
programme, requiring them to raise their own funds and demonstrate an ability to
finance their own activities in the long-term. These institutional rules and practices
allow LECs to affect the behaviour of community groups by encouraging commercial
practices. Again, applicants are not passive actors in this process; they retain some
scope to adapt these practices to their own purposes.
The most basic rules structuring the delivery of CAGs, devised by the HIDB in
the 1970s, require that groups are properly constituted and have open memberships.32
The CAG budget is 'ring-fenced' in block six of the funding regime (Section 4.5),
giving LECs little capacity to vire funds in (or out) after the annual budget has been
determined through the business planning process. CAGs are generally available for
groups incurring capital expenditure on new buildings or equipment. Beyond these
basic requirements, community groups are increasingly required to produce financial
projections and plan future activities. For some activists, these requirements are
making things more difficult for community groups:
I think it does put people off.... we applied to the LEC for money and they told us that we
needed to do a business plan, though they did offer us a member of staff to help prepare the
business plan. But it's quite frightening really ... they want a business plan and we're there
what's a business plan? Community groups made up of volunteers aren't really geared up to
business plans?2,
I don't think the agencies are veiy good at... working with communities, they seem to prescribe
more and tell communities how things should be done ... They're veiy strong on the economic
side at business development but they don't really understand communities and how they work
and the same with voluntary organisations, they don't understand them either ... The pressures
on voluntary organisations are increasing all the time ... they're going to be required to produce
business plans and all that rot that's in at the moment, and the legal specifications are
tightening all the time?''
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Thus, the formalisation of these commercial practices demands more of community
groups at a time when the burdens on the voluntary sector are increasing. The first
respondent did recognise, however, that LECs are more accessible than other funding
bodies, offering staff time to advise on the preparation of business plans and other
requirements. The accessibility and approachability of LECs in providing advice as
well as financial assistance was regarded as a crucial means of support for community
activity.35 It is important in granting the HIE Network the level of credibility and
legitimacy it requires to operate effectively.
Another key way in which institutional priorities structure the process of
community development is through the requirement that projects and initiatives are
financially viable. In general, LECs do not offer long-term revenue funding, requiring
that initiatives can at least cover their costs and preferably generate a profit:
We have to make a profit, that's one of the conditions of the thing, ... we're not getting any
funding, we have to cover our costs and make a bit... we have to bring money in, otherwise
we're not meeting the agreement and the flinders, the Enterprise and others, can sort ofpull the
plug, and we have to give money to the Trust... no one's going to bale us out ifwe're struggling
... But it's all locally owned, we're not tiying to make a big profit and it all goes to local
development.36
This could be seen as another way in which commercial norms which are not
necessarily appropriate for all community projects are imposed on the voluntary
sector. For one observer, the emphasis on profitability means that LECs do not
support certain activities that would have received funding in the past:
They're not as open as the HIDB were ... there's a big difference between the two for social
projects and social care things, for example way back we got a grant for Crossroads [a social
care scheme] from the HIDB, there's no way you'd get that from them now, yes it's far more
business orientated, it's all about value for money ... things have to make a profit, and the wider
service angle is going31
This reluctance to support 'social' projects reflects the impact of managerial
'technologies' in requiring that specific targets and outputs be attached to each project
funded. In some respects, this has reduced LECs discretion to award funding to
projects that address local priorities but which lack a clear spin-off in terms of
economic development. The allocation of 'social' funding also reflects HIE / LECs
readings of the extra-economic conditions for growth, favouring those projects that
promise to boost local confidence and develop 'entrepreneurial' skills.
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One key way in which rules limiting revenue funding are manifest is through
"exit strategies" (Chapter five: 153-53). These refer to arrangements in which LECs'
funding contribution to a project progressively declines over a specified period,
usually three years. To avoid being seen as a source of'subsidy', LECs work to ensure
that projects are financially sustainable before making a financial commitment. The
requirement for community groups to raise a share of the overall funding themselves
ensures that only those projects with the commitment and organisation required to
make them work in the long-term receive public funds. The first quote above (p.216)
is referring to the Callanish Visitor Centre, established at a well-known historic site in
West Lewis. This project has specified targets, in terms of visitor numbers required to
generate the turn-over that would see it break even, attached to it. It is run by a
community trust which uses the profits to fund other development projects in the
area.38 If it fails to meet these targets, there is no obligation for the funding bodies3 ' to
continue supporting the Centre. Another important initiative in the Western Isles is
Harris Development Limited (HDL), established in 1994 as a partnership between the
main public agencies and the local community in an effort to identify development
opportunities for the depressed island of Harris. While HDL was jointly funded for
the first three years by the WIC and WIE, the latter has an exit strategy in place for the
second period with its contribution decreasing from 75 per cent (of half the total cost)
in the first year to 50 per cent in the second year and 25 in the third. This is forcing
HDL to search for alternative sources of funding to secure long-term sustainability.
While it has been able to secure additional monies from the Rural Partnership Fund,
these come with similar conditions as LEC funds.40 The requirement to become self-
financing make onerous demands on fragile communities which, after decades of
underdevelopment, lack the capacity for self-sustaining development.
Managerial procedures also affect community groups through the pressure on
LECs to ensure that all projects they fund contribute towards achieving key targets.
For groups that are successful in accessing state resources, the need to achieve
specified targets imposes on-going demands:
It does have an impact certainly, the targets and business plans that the LECs work with do
sometimes impair community work and development, and we're campaigning on this at the
moment to the big boys, just trying to get them to make their targets and expectations more
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realistic, because at the moment it creates real problems and a lot of worries for community
groups ... Because their money has become attached to these totally unrealistic targets ... they're
concerned that if they're not achieving these then they're going to lose their fundingfi
Targets are 'filtered' through institutional networks, with each level in the hierarchy
setting targets for the subordinate level. Thus, the Scottish Office sets targets for HIE
which, in turn, allocates these targets among the ten LECs (see Chapter five: 156-64).
LECs then allocate these targets amongst the projects they fund through the year,
requiring business, training providers and community groups to achieve specified
outputs. Targets not only 'squeeze' the scope for local initiative at the HIE/LEC
interface, then; they also structure the activities of voluntary groups, imposing a
distinct managerial rationality that constrains their freedom of action. The continual
pressure to 'up' targets and maximise value-for-money in the context of underlying
resource constraints means that community groups are often confronted with
unrealistic and unsustainable demands.
Of crucial importance in furthering community development is the role of the
activists who mediate between communities and state agencies like LECs.
Increasingly, official conceptions of this mediating role are shifting way from a focus
on 'advisors' with its connotations of professional expertise and authority towards an
emphasis on 'animators' employing more facilitative and enabling methods (Arkleton
Trust, 1997: 55). This is bound up with the shift towards 'indigenous' models of
development focused on capacity-building and the mobilisation of local resources.
The crucial role of a small number of key people in running community organisations
was stressed by a number of respondents:
I mean it boils down again to being able to work with ... key individuals ... without the people
you have nothing, you must have the right people who are ... happy enough to progress these
things ... Other ... areas that are lacking perhaps somebody who's very active in the community
nothing happens, it's very difficult then to go in and get things ... rolling ... So you really need
key people, people who are active in the community who can take the initiative and with a bit of
assistance can progress things and get other people involved.42
What you find too is that it's always the same people on these bodies, you have overlapping
membership almost all the time, there's always a few key individuals that are getting things
done ... There's about three different committees here ... I suppose altogether the three
committees cover about a dozen people so it's not that few for a small place like this, but then
the active people tend to be few and that's what important I suppose because it's them that do
thingsfi
There's a lot ofoverlap in membership, it's the same people in them or it tends to be quite a lot,
so yeah there's a lot ofexchange and the different organisations work quite closely together. ...
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It varies a bit over time depending on who's involved, on the membership, it's an individual
personality thing again, sometimes you'll get one or two strong personalities who'll keep things
back, you always tend to get these clashes in small communities like this and it can be very
frustrating44
The specific organisations being referred to here include community councils which,
although organised on a voluntary basis, have a semi-official representative role as the
lowest tier of the local authority structure, community associations and ad hoc
committees and bodies set up to undertake specific initiatives and raise funds. People
active in community groups are often seen as 'powerful' and 'unrepresentative' by less
active members of the community (Shucksmith et al., 1996: 449-61; Arkleton Trust,
1997: 44-5). However, while both the representativeness and the effectiveness of
community organisations is often questioned, it is clear that, in the context of
widespread apathy and scepticism, the knowledge and contacts possessed by key
activists is often crucial in determining whether or not projects succeed (Arkleton
Trust, 1997: 44-5).
Community activists do not passively respond to the requirements of state
agencies. The principle of strategic selectivity suggests that although they are forced
to engage with dominant institutional practices, their ability to gain access to state
resources will be shaped by the strategies they adopt towards those practices (Jessop,
1990b, 1997b). For one activist, there is a certain 'knack' required to work the system
and minimise the impact of organisational rules:
It's also just finding a way through the maze, a lot ofgroups can get frustrated quite early ...
There's ways round these, I'm getting experience, and you find ways of working around their
rules, not quite ignoring them but certainly getting round them.45
Another way in which community groups can work the system to their advantage is
by emphasising the potential role of projects in addressing LECs own priorities. This
kind of appeal is undoubtedly more difficult for community activists than business
applicants who can appeal to LECs core objectives, emphasising new job creation or,
perhaps more persuasively, the jobs likely to be lost if funding is not forthcoming.
HIE is keen to emphasise the importance of the voluntary sector, however, in
generating employment and economic outputs (HIE, 1991/92, Community and
Economy, 1996a). These claims provide activists with material that can be
strategically deployed to argue for more resources. They can, for instance, argue that
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actual patterns of resource allocation undermine HIE's strategic statements and
emphasise the economic contribution made by the voluntary sector. This pressure has,
for one activist, prompted one particular LEC to revise its attitude:
I also think the LEC in the area has improved enormously, they're much more open to the
community side of things now ... I think they've improved a lot, they're not so business
orientated now. / think they've had to realise now that the voluntary sector employs people too
and brings a lot ofmoney into the area, and that they have to support it.Ab
The accessibility of LECs in terms of offering such support and guidance to
community groups is a key way in which they generate credibility and legitimacy
within local communities.
Activists' ability to adapt institutional practices to their own purposes suggests
that there is some scope for local initiative and community involvement in LEC
activities. Section 7.3 showed that there were few opportunities for communities to
participate in policy-making. At the individual project level, however, LECs largely
respond to ideas and initiatives of community groups. The Callanish Visitor Centre,
widely cited as a successful 'model' of a new kind of partnership between agencies and
communities, is the product of community action:
There was always a need for this being here, that was recognised ...It was really x [one key
individual] from the community, it was from the community that the initiative came, you see it's
no use... the Council or the Enterprise, they'll give you money for it all right, but you have to
go to them, they won't start it off someone from the community needs to get involved to start it
off and get things to happen, and it was really x that got thing going with this... It was veiy
much a vision x and the community had... but there was a lot ofconsultation too.41
The establishment of HDL owes rather more to institutional practices as the local
authority became increasingly aware of the need to target resources on Harris, though
the pressure exerted by a group of concerned residents seeking to mobilise the
community and claim a larger share of public funds was also crucial.48 While the
above quote stresses that public agencies work on a fundamentally reactive basis, it
is clear that the rules and procedures they deploy to respond to applications for
assistance actively structure both specific initiatives and the wider process of
community development. Consequently, only those projects which can meet LECs'
criteria of viability and value-for-money have a realistic prospect of gaining funding.
By adopting strategies that highlight certain aspects of projects consistent with these
principles, however, community activists can use institutional practices and resources
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to help them achieve their own objectives (Boyle, 1997).
Other local initiatives are the product of a more top-down process of
mobilisation led by the agencies. This is particularly the case for those partnerships set
in response to large-scale unemployment which seek to attract investment to
regenerate more 'industrial' areas. Examples include the Easter Ross Initiative, the
Caithness Initiative and the Cowal Initiative, all led by HIE/ LECs with local
authority support (HIE, Third Report 1993/4: 2-6). Agencies efforts to target their
resources for social and community development more effectively, often through the
use of quantitative procedures to identify areas of greatest need, together with some
local consultation, also involve pre-dominantly top-down methods. Even the
increasing use of various forms of community appraisal, sponsored by LEADER in
particular, whilst in some areas being carried out by community activists rather than
consultants, reflects agencies' need to identify community priorities. Although
appraisals can offer a valuable means of participation and empowerment,49 they often
run-up against the problem of delivery in that they may raise expectations which
cannot be met, compounding problems of public apathy and disillusionment that had
prompted the appraisal as a means of'empowerment' in the first place (Arkleton Trust,
1997; 46, 51).50
One long-standing source of controversy concerns the respective capacity of
'incomer' and local' groups to gain access to development funds (Shucksmith et al.,
1996: 219-46; Jedrej and Nuttall, 1996; Burnett, 1998). The perception that affluent
incomers tend to claim disproportionate levels of financial assistance has fuelled
criticism of development agencies since the early 1970s. For one local activist,
echoing long-standing claims, LECs are biased against 'local' claims for assistance
with routine activities, invariably favouring 'fancy' schemes promising clear outputs:
If local businesses try to get a grant they've no chance ... they keep moving the guidelines, it's
veiy difficult to get money now ... They do give support... but its got to be something they see as
having an impact, not minor things like people's livelihoods in agriculture, and that's what
should be supported down to eveiy last dot offunding ...It all depends on who you are ... You
hear the criticism ... that people go along to the LEC with a good plan and get turned down ...
one ... guy ... who applied for a grant, he thought it was a good proposal but he got turned
down, and his friend said to him you don't have an English accent, he was an incomer, I'll do it,
so he went along and he got the grant.5'
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Similarly, it is the inclusion of'non-locals' in lists - released through ATO - of those
who have received financial assistance that often tends to generate controversy.52
There is no clear evidence to support claims that LECs are biased against 'locals'.
Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, cultural differences in responses to
institutional rules and procedures. 'Incomers' tend to be quicker to meet the demands
of LECs for information and outputs than 'locals' who often expect assistance as of
right, and thus seem to find it easier to gain access to state resources.53 Given the lack
of confidence and morale in many remote West coast communities, 'indigenous'
residents are often less able, beyond a core of experienced activists, to adapt complex
application procedures which demand long-term strategies to their own purposes (cf
Shucksmith et al., 1996: 221-34). This controversy can be seen as stemming from a
clash between dominant institutional practices and underlying 'structures of
expectation' - fuelled by official discourses of development that have framed state
intervention in terms of a need to 'redress history' - which emphasise indigenous
'locals' legitimate claim to development funding (see Chapter three).
One major source of community mobilisation in recent years has been the land
issue. Land ownership has re-emerged in the 1990s as discourses of community
ownership have been mobilised to great effect by a small number of communities,
most notably in Assynt and more recently Eigg, who succeeded in raising enough
funds to purchase their estates on the open market. This discourse has recently been
appropriated and transformed by institutional actors seeking to adapt it to their own
purposes. First, the then Conservative Secretary of State, Michael Forsyth, announced
his intention in 1995 to launch a scheme encouraging crofters to take over the running
of publicly-owned estates.54 More importantly, in June 1997, the newly-appointed
Scottish Office Minister responsible for the Highlands, keen to impose the stamp of
the new Labour government on Highland development, instructed HIE to set up a
Community Land Unit (CLU). The support offered by HIE to community ownership
had hitherto been limited, reflecting a marked reluctance, inherited from the HIDB, to
become involved in controversial questions of land ownership, together with a clear
commitment to private-sector fonns of development. In another demonstration of its
impressive ability to anticipate wider shifts and react accordingly, however, HIE won
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praise from the Minister for the speed of its response (WHFP 27.6.97).
The CLU effectively increases the scope for local initiative and community
agendas, though again mainly at the individual project level, by requiring HIE to offer
support and guidance to communities seeking to purchase land. It makes HIE-LEC
resources more accessible to local communities, thereby increasing the network's local
credibility and legitimacy. While HIE actually bought the Orbost estate in North-west
Skye in October 1997 (WHFP 7.11.97) with the aim of creating new crofting
settlements, this is seen as the exception rather than the rule. More generally, standard
procedures are being deployed in support of community land initiatives with advice
and support and assistance with the preparation of business plans being emphasised
over direct financial assistance.35 These practices structure local initiatives, both
enabling them by offering funding and support and constraining them by attaching
conditions which subsequently influence their development paths.
The long-term difficulties of sustaining involvement and ensuring viability
which confront community groups are highlighted by the land purchase issue:
When you think about it purchase is only getting to the ... starting blocks, it's sustaining
community involvement, including the resources over the long term after purchase is a major
challenge, and when you think that some of these communities are very small and they suffer
still from an element of braindrain ... People leave to go to the big cities ... for education or
otherwise ... you've got a fairly fragile community quite often.56
There's another interesting example ofa project I've just remembered... it's been proposedfor it
to move to community ownership ... it seems to be the way things are going, anyway it's been
proposed that ownership should be handed over to the community there as well, and they really
mean to the community council, but the question is ... what happens then? How does the
community manage to take things over and run them successfully? Where does it find the
money? These are all difficult questions, and community groups getting involved in that will
need a lot ofsupport:1
Much of the rhetoric of 'community' ignores these practical difficulties. Crofters
considering proposals for community land ownership have pointed out some of the
difficulties, noting how communities can become divided by internal disputes and
stressing the scale of resources and expertise required for successful development
(Mackenzie, 1998). Communities have different capacities, reflecting varying levels
of cohesion and fragmentation. In particular, problems of fragmentation within
communities, stemming from a recent history of economic decline and social decay
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and sometimes associated with high levels of in-migration, often tend to block
participation and development (Arkleton Trust, 1997: 47-8).
LEC personnel tended to emphasise the importance of performance and
'results' in overcoming negative perceptions and establishing good relations with local
communities. For them, improving local economic conditions took precedence over
abstract discussions on accountability:
The results that are being achieved by this format are the proof of the pudding and what I would
suggest to you is that the commercial rigour introduced by this process is the acid test, that we
are getting successful companies, we're getting growing companies, we're getting fewer
business failures and the dynamic in the economy is that much more powerful. Unemployment
in ... January was 8.9 per cent, I don't know when it was last 8.9 per cent in January but that's a
long-time ago and that reflects a diversifying of the economic base and lots of small-to-medium
sized businesses that are successful, that are growing.58
I think we should be measured by what we do, the impact of what we do, the projects we assist
and the quality of them and the outcomes from these projects ... We don't strive to go out and
build up trust, we strive to do a job right and that brings trust ... I think because of how we've
done our job here people have realised that we're actually quite good at what we do ... and I
think that's given us a degree of respect.59
Thus, trust and respect are seen as by-products of effective perfonnance and efficient
operation, with improvements in unemployment and other economic outputs
providing objective evidence of success. The first respondent stresses the role of the
commercial practices deployed by LECs in generating these outputs. These practices,
introduced as part of a managerialist agenda, privilege economic efficiency over local
political accountability. For performance-based narratives, economic growth is
everything. This "all-encompassing local growth imperative" achieves legitimation
through accumulation, as a by-product of the growth process (Hay, 1994: 20). By
prioritising growth and achieving tangible improvements in economic conditions,
development agencies expect to gain credibility and trust within local communities.
Wider 'social' issues are addressed through the growth process. For instance, several
respondents employed 'trickle-down' metaphors with one official arguing that
investment in businesses is LECs "most significant contribution to social welfare"
because it generates the employment and income needed to improve social facilities
and stimulate community activity.60
There is some evidence that the emphasis on economic growth and the
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recognition of the important role of the voluntary sector is improving relations and
generating trust. Some community activists report that LECs' attitudes towards
community activities have changed considerably:
They've improved on the community side a lot, they've now definitely reversed things, I would
have said in answering that question ... two years ago that they were much more business-
orientated and that the community side was fairly marginal, but that's changed, a lot of the
recent developments have been community led ... I've certainly found the LEC supportive and
helpful and even if they don't fund you they'll say why not which is different from other bodies
like the Lottery who don't tell you anything, the LEC will tell you what you should do to have a
chance ofgettingfunding, ... produce a business plan or do a feasibility study, whateverf
This view was not shared universally, being the product of one activist's frequent
contact with a LEC. The wider public in these areas lack any sustained contact with
LECs and tend to remain more sceptical of organisational agendas and practices.
Other activists felt that LECs were poorly equipped to serve the needs of the
community sector, seeing them as orientated towards business development and
criticising the fragmentation of the public sector which forces groups to move
between a range of public agencies with specialised remits.62 Applicants' frustrations
tend to be expressed through a discourse of 'the people' versus officialdom (Jessop,
1982: 247-52) which mobilises underlying perceptions of public agencies as part of a
self-serving state bureaucracy. The contrasting view of LECs as community conscious
seems to reflect the situation in Skye and Lochalsh in particular where relations
between SALE, other public agencies and community groups are generally positive
(see also Section 6.4).
The above quote represents SALE as accessible to community groups,
stressing that, in contrast to other funding bodies, it offers support and advice on the
requirements groups have to meet to obtain funding and provides explanations if
applications are unsuccessful. While dominant institutional practices impose certain
requirements on community groups seeking state resources, activists do not passively
respond to these requirements as the notion of'hegemonic project' suggests. Rather, as
they gain experience, community activists, like business applicants, acquire the ability
to make creative interventions in the allocative process, adopting strategies that make
projects appeal to LECs own objectives. Consequently, they develop a (limited)
capacity to adapt institutional rules to their own purposes. In the absence of local
political accountability, the accessibility of LEC resources becomes an important
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source of legitimacy, helping successful groups to achieve their own objectives while
at the same time addressing local development requirements.
7.5 Conclusion
I don't think you can argue with that, they are not accountable in the sense that say a local
authority is accountable, personally 1 don't think that a local authority is all that accountable
either, but at least every so often you get a chance to throw the buggers out so to speak ....
which with a LEC you don't. So ... it isn't accountable, and short of having the directors
democratically elected it will never be accountable in a direct sense, no Quango is accountable
in that way.63
This chapter has argued that LECs remain largely unaccountable to local
communities. As part of an unelected local state, their 'representational regime'
privileges the interests of local business elites, displacing and marginalising local
authorities, organised labour and the voluntary sector. As such, LECs remain
fundamentally unrepresentative of the balance of local interests and agendas.
Although a range of measures introduced in response to widespread criticism make
LECs more answerable to local communities, they remain unaccountable as local
residents lack effective sanctions whilst the key policies that underpin individual
decisions are not open to debate. Moreover, the emphasis on informal forms of
accountability through personal social networks threatens to increase the
marginalisation and exclusion of less active groups. In the longer-term, there is a
danger that the withdrawal of the state from certain spheres in favour of community
self-help will reinforce existing lines of marginalisation. Emerging structures of
community governance are likely to be 'captured' by already active groups,
strengthening the elite localism constructed around the mobilisation of business
representatives and community leaders (Peck, 1995).
The scope for community involvement and local agendas exists primarily at
the individual project level. This reflects the lack of mechanisms enabling
communities to participate in policy formation. The local priorities that are fed into
HIE strategy and its implementation through the business planning process are LEC
priorities. Community groups do not, however, passively respond to institutional
practices and rules which, as forms of state organisation, tend to favour the interests of
some groups over others (Jessop, 1990b, 1997b). By developing the expertise to
'translate' these practices and to appeal to LECs in the latter's own language, activists
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can gain access to state resources and capacities. This accessibility allows business
and community groups to use LECs to help achieve their own agendas and thereby
represents an important source of legitimacy in the absence of local political
accountability.
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This thesis has focused on three key questions (p 12-13). These concern
relations between LECs, HIE and the central state, particularly in terms of how
tensions between local initiative and central control have been accommodated and
worked out; the structuring of partnerships between the HIE network and other local
organisations, particularly local authorities; and the scope that local institutional
arrangements allow for local initiative and community involvement. The research has
been informed and structured by a distinctive theoretical approach drawing on
relational theories of the state and writings on governmentality to strengthen its
regulationist assessment of local governance in the Scottish Highlands.
This concluding chapter sets out the principal research findings and considers
their implications for both policy and related academic research. Section 8.2
emphasises that LECs operate within a context of structured flexibility and points to
the continuing importance of government in underpinning local governance. Section
8.3 links the research to policy debates on the local state and economic development.
Section 8.4 assesses the implications for the theoretical perspectives informing the
project. By relating specific findings to on-going theoretical debates, this research
aims to advance the research agenda. Accordingly, the thesis ends by identifying
directions for future research (Section 8.5).
8.2 Managerial 'Technologies', Local 'Translation' and Structured Flexibility
The opening quote (p.l) identified a tension between local initiative and
central control. This reflects the effects of the localist rhetoric deployed to recruit
business elites in fostering expectations of local autonomy which clashed with
established modes of public accountability. The thesis emphasised the 'new
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managerialism' as a central strand of Conservatives' efforts to extend political control
over the public sector. To a considerable extent, the 'new managerialism' involved a
re-modelling of the public sector on private sector practices and discourses. In this
sense, it was part of the same agenda as the appointment of business elites to the
boards of local state agencies. In practice, however, as this thesis has shown, these
aspects of Conservative policy came into conflict as managerial 'technologies'
subjected local business elites to forms of control not found in private companies and
which the rhetoric of business leadership had led them to expect would not be a
feature of LECs and TECs.1
The central finding of the research is that the tension between local initiative
and central direction has been worked out in a way which leaves the HIE network
more centralised than the official rhetoric of local autonomy and flexibility implies.
The impact of 'managerial' technologies of targeting, audit and financial controls
undercuts LECs' localist rhetoric and enables central government to ensure that the
interventions of local agencies are compatible with its political priorities. Together
with its role as the source of finance and in structuring LECs' 'representational
regime', this gives the central state the capacity to monitor and steer the activities of
the HIE network.
Yet, as this thesis has shown, the local impact of managerialism is crucially
mediated by the Scottish Office and HIE as intermediate tiers of the state. Chapter five
showed how the 'authoritative resources' of the HIE core, grounded in the local
knowledge and technical expertise inherited from the HIDB, are deployed to 'translate'
and adapt central priorities. This is one crucial way in which regional institutions
make a difference relative to the situation in England and Wales where the direct
impact of managerial 'technologies' on TECs has fostered competition and cost-
cutting (Peck and Jones, 1995; Jones, 1998b). HIE's role in translating central
priorities illustrates the crucial position of sub-national agencies as key institutional
channels through which regulatory practices are interpreted and ultimately delivered
(Goodwin et al., 1993: 69; Goodwin et al., 1995: 1249-50; Goodwin and Painter,
1996: 645). This thesis has shown how local delivery tends to be mediated by the
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distinct capacities and practices of regional institutions. The autonomy of regional
agencies, however, is only ever relative. This research also demonstrated the limits to
HIE's powers. As the analysis of targeting showed (Section 5.3), HIE cannot resist
such central directives, only mediate and contain their (local) impact. HIE has been
unable to resist the disciplines of output-related funding, although it has deployed
routine institutional practices to contain the threat of 'institutional Darwinism' in the
form of inter-LEC competition.
At the same time as HIE has sought to counter some potential effects of
central directives, the force of the rhetorics of accountability which accompany these
directives has seen HIE internalise key managerial norms. The effects of an
organisational culture that privileges operational efficiency over strategic deliberation
and appraisal makes HIE particularly receptive to the demands of 'managerial'
technologies. Consequently, the structure ofpower relations within the network can be
seen as the product of a merging of internal and external (central) rationalities (see
p. 142, 153-54).
The thesis has argued that managerial 'technologies' force LECs to operate
within a context of structured flexibility. While LECs retain some scope both to feed
local priorities into organisational policy through the business planning process and
then adapt that policy to the requirements of their respective areas, their capacity to do
so is at the same time constrained and regulated by institutional rules and norms.
Targets, audit, business plans and the rules constraining virement between budget
blocks structure the operating regime, limiting LECs' autonomy, while rules on
viability, displacement and additionality subject processes of business appraisal to
underlying managerial norms. Nonetheless, HIE LECs seem to have more scope to
exercise local flexibility than TECs in England and Wales. This capacity is rooted in
the integrated structure of the HIE Network where routine forms of communication
and interaction between LECs and the HIE core have generated mutual
understandings. These understandings have subsequently been embedded and
stabilised within institutional norms and procedures. Local flexibility tends to be
exercised, however, by state managers (HIE and LEC officials) rather than by LEC
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directors, suggesting that the emphasis on the mobilisation and articulation of
business agendas (Peck and Tickell, 1995b; Jonas, 1996; Jessop, 1997b, d) under¬
plays the continuing significance of state rules and procedures in constraining the
actions of local business elites.
The corollary of LECs' dependence on managerial forms of accountability to
central government is a lack of local political accountability. One of the distinctive
contributions of this thesis was to examine the relationship between local agencies and
the community, a relationship that is often overlooked by 'institutionalist' accounts
which focus on the production and articulation of organisational strategy without
considering its reception within local communities. Chapter seven showed that,
despite a range of measures introduced in response to public criticism, LECs remain
unaccountable to the local communities they serve. At the same time, however, the
state resources which LECs manage and allocate are accessible to local residents.
While applicants are forced to work though certain institutional practices, they retain,
as strategic calculating subjects, some scope to adapt these practices to their own
agendas and, thereby, to exert pressure on LECs by appealing to the latter's objectives
and pre-occupations. This local accessibility gives the LEC network a (limited)
legitimacy that allows it to operate efficiently and avoids major opposition in a region
where a history of underdevelopment and an official discourse of 'development' has
produced 'structures of expectation' demanding state intervention to support local
development.
This is not say that state procedures do not generate resentment among
prospective applicants. The principle of 'strategic selectivity' emphasises the
differential effects of state rules and practices. It suggests that LECs' resources are
more accessible to some groups that others. Although access is shaped by the
particular strategies that actors and groups adopt, institutional rules such as the need
for applicants to provide a share of their own capital, produce business plans and
approach the LECs themselves favour those already active in business over, say, the
unemployed. Within the business community itself, the effects of rules on
displacement in making some sectors ineligible for assistance generates some
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resentment (see Section 5.4). This resentment tends to be expressed in terms of a
discourse of 'the people' versus officialdom (Jessop, 1982: 247-52). Frustrated
applicants mobilise underlying conceptions of bureaucracy to cast LECs as agents of
an unresponsive state whose internal rules and procedures are governed by internal
logics of organisational order rather than by a desire to serve the public. This points to
an important contradiction: while Thatcherism derived much of its initial force from
its capacity to mobilise 'popular discontents' with the Welfare State (Hall, 1988a, b),
and 'Thatcherite' institutions like LECs were instructed to minimise 'bureaucracy',
such reforms have in effect created their own bureaucracy which imposes certain
requirements on 'customers'.2 This research has sought to problematise notions of
local hegemonic projects, arguing that the (local) reception of such projects is actively
structured by the pre-established objectives and orientations of particular groups
(Boyle, 1997). The capacity of such groups and individuals to obtain state resources
and capacities through LECs is an important source of legitimacy.
The thesis also examined the recent refiguring of state regulation which has
emphasised local partnerships and networks. It found that the politics of partnership
are structured and conditioned by the effects of earlier processes of state restructuring.
In particular, the creation of special-purpose local agencies to by-pass local authorities
generated certain tensions and resentments which affect the quality and sustainability
of partnerships. This is not to deny the fact of routine co-operation. Limits on the
remit and capacities of individual agencies within a plural system of local governance
and the perceived pressures for co-operation to promote economic development that
stem from underlying 'structures of expectation' encourage HIE / LECs and local
authorities to work together. At the same time, however, the unequal impact of state
restructuring remains a source of tensions which limit the effectiveness of
'networking' and make it more difficult to generate trust. The analysis of the Objective
1 programme (Section 6.3.3) showed how state agencies (the Scottish Office and
HIE) dominate the decision-making process. As a result, the partnership functions at a
distance from local concerns and priorities. It is wholly reliant on such concerns being
fed in through formal institutional channels. At the local level, the research found
considerable variation in inter-organisational relations. Extensive co-operation and
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informal networking based on an underlying 'reservoir' of trust in districts like Skye
and Lochalsh and Lochaber contrasts with political tensions and personality clashes in
Caithness and the Western Isles. Since the conditions for effective partnership are
locally specific, they cannot be easily created in areas where these conditions are
absent (see Section 6.4). To the extent that state initiatives conceive of partnership as
a set of formal institutional relationships, they neglect crucial underlying determinants
of effectiveness and sustainability.
The emphasis on institutional practices and routine procedures, supported by
notions of govemmentality, points to the continuing importance of hierarchical
mechanisms of control. As such, the evidence presented in this thesis questions the
notion of a linear shift from local government to governance. It points instead to the
on-going refiguring of the relations between government and governance in specific
local and regional contexts ( Jessop, 1997d, 1998a; Goodwin, 1998b). The experience
of the Scottish Highlands demonstrates the presence of governance prior to 1979 in
the sense that a succession of unelected state agencies have operated throughout the
twentieth century in an effort to address the particular demands of political-economic
regulation in a 'problem' region. As suggested above, it also stresses the continuing
presence of government after 1979. While the expansion of the unelected state has
complicated and fragmented institutional structures in the region, 'quangos' like HIE
are accountable to central government rather than to local communities or other local
organisations. Resultant problems of 'horizontal' coordination and local participation
underpin the recent emphasis on partnerships and networks.
The continual re-figuring of the relationship between governance and
government in particular local and regional spaces must be seen as a product of the
nation state's efforts to respond to the demands of economic 'globalisation' (as both
process and discourse). The Conservative Right sought to re-design and re-scale the
state in response to the crisis of Fordist-Keynesian modes of intervention (Hay, 1995;
Jones, 1998b: 982). As an 'external' interest, business was incorporated into the state
structures to enhance the state's capacity to promote growth by expanding its
repertoire of techniques of intervention and introducing new commercial norms into
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the public sector. The effect was to forge a new 'representational regime' that
privileges the interests of business as a key element in the 'social base' of the
Conservative state whilst marginalising groups like organised labour and elected local
authorities who were identified as responsible for state failure in the 1970s.
The rise of local governance, manifest in a series of unelected local agencies
led by business elites, is a product of this process. Official discourses construct local
agencies as necessary responses to the demands of economic competitiveness in a
global economy. By unleashing the drive and enterprise of business leaders, these
institutional forms promote the flexibility and innovation required for survival in a
turbulent social and economic environment (Jessop, 1998a). As this thesis has shown,
however, the flexibility and autonomy of local agencies is constrained and channelled
by the centre's continuing need to ensure that their interventions do not clash with
national policy. Specific managerial 'technologies' such as targeting, audit and
budgetary structures give the central state the capacity to monitor and steer local
institutional networks. The effect is not one of simple 'hollowing-out'. While the
relativisation of scale has seen certain functions devolved to the local level, this has
not been accompanied by a corresponding shift of power and influence (Goodwin,
1998b). The much-proclaimed rise of the 'local' is as much rhetorical as real, and the
nation-state retains its importance as the key site for the regulation of economic and
social relations.
8.3 Towards a 'Local-Democratic' Mode of Representation
After over thirty years of state-sponsored economic development through the
HIDB and HIE, the Highlands' seem to be in stronger economic position. The relative
economic perfonnance of the region has improved, bringing it closer to the Scottish
and British averages (HIE, 1996a: 5).3 While this shows that, on an aggregate level,
'boosterist' discourses have some objective basis, the Highlands remains one of only
three British regions poor enough to qualify for Objective 1 funding in the 1994-1999
period. Aggregate improvement also disguises severe local difficulties. For the
Western Isles and much of the Western mainland, thirty years of development has
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done little to improve their relative position.
Processes of economic change present the Highlands with both opportunities
and constraints. Supra-national integration has seen a centralisation of agricultural and
fishery polices which has diminished local control over crucial resources, while
impending monetary integration threatens to constrain the ability of peripheral regions
to adjust to external economic 'shocks'. At the same time, however, the
decentralisation of routine production and administration functions provides sources
of investment. A number of back-office and call-centre developments have been
attracted to the Highlands since 1991, particularly in the 'inner zone' surrounding
Inverness and extending North to Caithness. Indeed, processes of regional
centralisation, rooted in commercial and industrial development around Inverness and
arguably encouraged by institutional intervention, are deeply implicated in the
continuing difficulties of many outlying areas. The flow of people and resources
towards Inverness increases the 'leakage' of resources from local economies. This
trend also suggests that the effects of broader economic shifts are spatially
differentiated within the region, accentuating and transforming established patterns of
inequality. While these forces are beyond the control of regional development
agencies like the HIDB and HIE, there is little doubt that major investments in the
Inner Moray Firth area which they have supported have contributed to this trend. The
continuing problems of much the West coast after thirty years of development
indicates that the geographical inequalities produced by processes of capital
accumulation present state intervention with fundamental limits.
Recent development policy and practice has emphasised the importance of
fostering indigenous capacity in order to provide sources of innovation and enterprise
(Amin and Thrift, 1994a, 1995; Storper, 1995, 1997; Morgan, 1992, 1998). These
issues take on particular importance in terms of equipping peripheral regions with the
conditions enabling them to compete in a global economy. Development strategy in
the Highlands reflects this with HIE emphasising the need to improve small-and-
medium sized firms' competitiveness and capacity for innovation (Section 5.2). Yet
this thesis has uncovered evidence that these efforts tend to be undermined by the
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impact of 'managerial' technologies. Section 6.3.3 showed that the Objective 1
programme's emphasis on short-term outputs makes it more difficult to support efforts
to build up long-term capacity. The latter would require a change of culture away
from short-term targets, something ruled out by the prevailing emphasis on efficiency
and value-for-money (Morgan, 1998). In terms of the FFB programme also, there is
evidence that the emphasis on outputs creates a bias towards action and delivery that
works against the adoption of more deliberative and strategic approach. This is
compounded by the reactive nature of the regulatory procedures deployed by state
agencies whereby they respond to applications and enquiries for business assistance
rather than taking initiatives themselves. Several respondents stressed the demands
placed on business and community groups seeking assistance by the rigid and
cumbersome nature of LEC's procedures. There is a clear need for the centre to scale
down its 'surveillance' of local agencies in order to encourage local development.
These changes would require an assessment of the function and effectiveness of
'contract culture' (Gray, 1997). It also needs to encourage the adoption of a more
strategic and flexible approach within HIE itself. The emphasis on targets in particular
reflects a lack of trust within institutional networks which seriously undermines the
scope for 'local solutions to local problems'. With New Labour's emphasis on fiscal
prudence requiring it to maintain the managerialist and competitive ethos of
development policy, however, the prospects of a change in emphasis appear remote.
The thesis has also addressed issues of LECs' accountability and
representativeness. These questions have been the subject of considerable political
controversy since 1991 with critics emphasising unelected 'quangos' lack of local
political accountability. While LECs' local accessibility in terms of offering resources
for businesses and community groups gives them limited legitimacy, the 'local elitist'
mode of representation (Peck, 1992, 1995) which they embody privileges the interests
of business over other sections of the local community. Although the 'quango' issue
has lost much of its political heat since the 1997 General Election, this is not the result
of significant reforms. Despite some radical pre-election rhetoric, Labour policy is
channelled through state forms inherited from the Conservatives, reflecting, in part, its
commitment to a neo-liberal accumulation strategy (Goodwin, 1998b; MacLeod and
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Goodwin, 1999).4 It soon became clear that LECs were not going to be abolished, as
some had hoped, and their powers transferred to local authorities. The fact that the
nine Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) to be created in the English regions in
April 1999 are to be business-led shows Labour's commitment to existing modes of
representation and neo-liberal accumulation strategies (DETR, 1997; MacLeod and
Goodwin, 1999; MacLeod and Jones, 1998).
While the structure of representation on HIE and LEC boards remains
unchanged, some significant individual appointments have been made in recent
months. Most significantly, Dr Jim Hunter, a prominent land reformer and crofting
activist, was appointed HIE Chairman on 13 October 1998 (Maxwell, 1998). While
previously involved as an HIE board member and chairman of SALE, Hunter's
appointment to head HIE in many ways represents a bold step for the Scottish Office,
sending strong signals on the importance of land refonn in particular to the
government's Highland 'agenda'. His reputation as the "acceptable face of radicalism"
(WHFP 23.10.97) contrasts with that of his predecessor, Fraser Morrison, whose
appointment was based upon business success as head ofMorrison Construction. As
chairman, his emphasis was very much on offering a positive image of the Highlands
to attract potential investors and satisfy central government.5 In contrast, Hunter is
expected to emphasise 'community consciousness' and early speeches have
acknowledged local economic difficulties and explored the prospect of HIE requiring
assisted companies to improve wages and conditions (WHFP 20.11.98). The
development and implementation of these initiatives is likely to prove difficult,
however, given the prevailing culture of managerialism and the dominant role of
HIE's Chief Executive and senior officials relative to the Chainnan.
Although the focus on the unelected 'quango' state has faded since Labour's
election victory, this thesis has shown that underlying problems of accountability and
representation remain unanswered. Arguably, the lack of post-election reform reflects
the fundamental limits to democratisation within current structures.6 Real 'openness' is
incompatible with the practice of self-selecting boards. But since LECs remain subject
to the Companies Act, new directors continue to be appointed by the existing board.
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And despite some significant improvements, the overwhelming emphasis on
managerial forms of accountability to central government tends to be at the expense of
local political accountability. Statements of democratisation within existing structures
were widely interpreted as signalling an increased role for elected councillors on LEC
boards, though there have been few indications of this actually happening.7 It also
seems as if the transfer of powers over HIE from the Scottish Office to the Scottish
Parliament has discouraged radical policy initiatives in the interim period.
Although critical of many of the assumptions and agendas upon which the
Enterprise Networks are based, this thesis does not recommend that LECs be
abolished and their powers transferred to local authorities which in many cases have a
less than illustrious track record in promoting economic development {Stornaway
Gazette 21.5.1998). It stresses the need to make LECs more accountable and
representative of the communities they serve. The thesis questions the assumption that
that business leaders are blessed with unique insights and experiences that justify a
two-thirds majority on public boards. That is not to say, however, that they have no
valid contributions to offer economic development policy. It is to insist that this
contribution does not justify a 'representational regime' that privileges their interests
over other sections of the community. There is a need for LECs to be made more
representative of public bodies, the voluntary sector and 'ordinary' residents and less
representative of the private sector. To be fully open and representative, this would
probably require that LECs become statutory public bodies. While private company
status effectively means self-selection, there is much to be said for the principle of
local appointment. But this would have to involve a second independent body,
perhaps initially based on the nominations panels recently set up by LECs, though
going beyond them to incorporate a wider range of interests.
There is also a need for central regulation to place relations between LECs and
local authorities on a more equal footing. Closer co-operation is required to ease
tensions and increase the effectiveness of 'partnerships'. Local Economic Forums
provide a basis for this (Section 6.4), but it will be difficult to maximise their potential
in the absence of a statutory framework requiring LECs to consult over their business
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plans and strategies.
8.4 Emphasising the Practice of State Regulation
The arguments contained in this thesis have been informed by a regulation-
centred approach which has drawn upon insights from neo-Gramscian state theory and
writings on 'governmentality'. Section 2.3 drew upon recent contributions to
emphasise regulationism as method, identifying a number of guiding principles for
concrete research. Jessop's writings on state theory were then reviewed and crucial
issues regarding the accessibility of state structures to different social groups and
associated modes of representation emphasised. Both these approaches tend to focus
primarily on the formulation and articulation of projects and strategies and the
national level, though they provide valuable insights for local research. This raises
questions about how such strategies are 'interpreted' and 'delivered' through
institutional networks (Goodwin et al., 1993: 69; Goodwin et al., 1995: 1249-50;
Goodwin and Painter, 1996: 645), and points to the need for conceptual 'tools' to
inform analysis of these processes. This is the role played by notions of
governmentality: they focus attention on the practical mechanisms deployed by state
agencies to regulate local and regional spaces.
This emphasis directly follows Painter and Goodwin's call for research to
focus on the "contingent interaction" of regulatory practices grounded in distinct local
contexts. As part of an emerging 'new' regulationist research agenda, this thesis has
emphasised (regulatory) process and practice over structure (Mode of Regulation). In
conclusion, it argues that there is a need to pay more attention to the practical
mechanisms and procedures of local and regional governance in concrete research.
While it is difficult to over-stress the importance of Jessop's work in re-working
Marxist state theory and generating insights which can be operationalised in local
research, associated research needs to ensure that an emphasis on the social bases of
state power does not lead to a neglect of the effects of institutional forms and practices
in structuring and channelling power relations. In this sense, there is a need to
problematise the constitution and design of local state institutions rather than taking
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them for granted as sites which hegemony is exercised through and from (MacLeod
and Goodwin, 1998). Further, research needs to guard against becoming so pre¬
occupied with the production and articulation of organisational strategies and
discourses that it loses sight of their reception. As this thesis has shown, local
residents are not passive 'consumers' of these discourses. Rather, they actively engage
with institutional practices and strategies as part of their efforts to realise pre-existing
objectives. Thus, local residents are, at most, only partially constituted and
incorporated by particular hegemonic projects (cf Boyle, 1997). More fundamentally,
this argument questions whether, in centralised states like the United Kingdom, local
state institutions actually need to develop 'hegemonic projects'. While themes of
enterprise and self-reliance certainly structured HIE's early interventions, there is no
evidence that these themes have re-shaped the fabric of regional society.8 Although
such themes seem to have been absorbed within local discourses of development and
growth, this is not the product of any calculated 'project'.
It is important to consider how some of these conclusions have been shaped by
the nature of the research project itself. First, there is a sense in which its findings are
regionally-specific. The thesis has focused on one particular region rather than
offering cross-regional comparative research. The emphasis on state rules and
procedures reflects this focus: it is, in part, a product of the weakness of business
representation in a peripheral region and the historic dependence on state intervention.
While in this sense the specific regional focus can be seen as a limitation, it is also a
positive feature of the research design. In particular, the focus on a peripheral region
lacking a strong tradition of business activism (and, arguably, a distinct business
class) is designed to provide a counter to research focusing on business mobilisation
in areas with a strong tradition of business activism (Peck and Tickell, 1995b; Jonas,
1996; Horan, 1997; Flolden, 1998). Second, in focusing on the politics of local
governance, this project has 'backgrounded' economic processes. While this reflects its
substantive concerns, it has arguably led to a neglect of the role of economic
mechanisms in conditioning processes of state regulation (but see Section 8.3). As
such, the thesis reflects the characteristic tendency of 'new' economic geographies to
emphasise how economies are constituted through extra-economic mechanisms over
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the effects of economic processes on politics and the state (and social and cultural
life). Regulationist research needs to consider the role of political and economic
processes in its accounts of uneven development and state regulation (see below).
Third, it is important to recognise methodological limitations. As in all
research projects, the 'outputs' presented here are products of the sequence of
operational decisions taken along the way. More specifically, the nature of this project
as a three-year PhD imposed limits. While conducting seventy interviews enabled this
account to be constructed from a range of perspectives, these interviews offer only
retrospective accounts of how on-going processes are viewed and represented.
'Triangulation' was crucial in gaining access to 'external' voices and enabling the
reception of organisational discourses and strategies within local communities to be
assessed. But the fluidity and contingency of individual roles and organisational
boundaries soon became apparent with community activists' and business leaders'
role in representing their own constituencies mediated by their contacts with state
agencies.9 In no sense does the thesis claim to be based upon some privileged access
to the 'grass-roots' or 'ordinary' people. Rather, the incorporation of 'external' groups
broadened the range of perspectives on the research problem and enabled the thesis to
address key research questions relating to the scope for local initiative and the local
reception of organisational discourses. This points to the importance of maintaining
the 'relational' emphasis of Jessop's work (Jessop, 1982: 252-58; Jessop, 1990b) in the
sense of avoiding a narrow institutional focus on organisational agendas that fails to
explore the local conditions shaping their production and reception. Organisational
rules and norms function, in part, to structure interactions with the 'public', though this
does not mean that the 'public' respond passively to them.
8.5 Future Directions
The final task of this concluding chapter is to suggest directions for future
research. It is important to emphasise that the points below are suggestions: they are
not definitive statements designed to privilege certain questions over others. Further,
the attention is not to build a 'new' regulationist theoretical edifice but to use ideas and
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observations that have emerged from the thesis to identify new research questions.
Four key issues are identified.
1. This thesis has emphasised the importance of state rules and practices in
constituting and structuring the politics of local governance. It has sought to
contribute to the regulationist theorisation of "how governance is produced in and
through local state institutions" (Horan, 1997: 154). There is much work yet to be
done on these issues. In particular, we need more analysis of how regulation is
(locally) 'interpreted and delivered' through institutional networks. This requires that
further attention be paid to the kinds of managerial 'technologies' and mechanisms
emphasised in this thesis - targeting, audit, business plans, financial controls. It is not
these mechanisms per se that are of interest, but their effects in mediating and
structuring relations between social forces contesting power. This echoes Jessop's
remarks that while the state has no power as such, only the power of the social forces
acting through it, their power is crucially mediated by institutional capacities and
liabilities (Jessop, 1990b: 269-70). The qualification is important in avoiding any
tendency to reify and essentialise specific 'technologies' (for example, targets) as neo-
Foucauldian theorists arguably come close to (Section 2.5). With this rejoinder in
mind, theories of governmentality and actor-networks remain useful - as this thesis
has tried to show - in informing analysis of institutional practices in general and, more
particularly, in terms of assessing local and regional actors' capacities to adapt and
'translate' central directives.
2. It is also important to consider how economic relations and economic forms
structure state regulation and local governance. In the absence of this, it will be
difficult for emerging 'new' regulationist research agendas to avoid the tendency to
over-emphasise the autonomy of political forces and political discourses. What is
particularly important here is that regulationist analyses consider the effects of
processes of uneven territorial development, something that may be best served by a
re-assessment and development of 1980s work informed by political economy
(Harvey, 1982, 1985; Massey, 1984; Martin, 1988).
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3. The discursive construction of local economies is a process emphasised in this
thesis (especially Sections 2.3 and 5.2). This is an exciting and innovative research
agenda attracting a range of regulationist-informed research (Leyshon and Tickell,
1994; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Painter 1997b; Jessop, 1997b, d; MacLeod, 1997b:
Holden, 1998). Yet it seems incompatible with the above emphasis on the political
effects of economic processes. In many ways, however, this incompatibility is more
apparent that real. What is perhaps of most interest to regulationists here is how the
production, circulation and reception of 'discourse' is structured by extra-discursive
factors. More specifically, this directs attention towards the ways in which pre¬
existing economic forms structure local economic strategies and the role of underlying
'structures of expectation' in mediating local reception of these strategies. Strategies
are representations of local economies and there is a need to focus on how the
'narrating' process is shaped and conditioned by both the pre-existing structure of the
local economy and underlying patterns of strategic selectivity which lead strategies to
privilege certain sectors and areas as 'targets' for intervention (Section 5.2). As Jessop
(1997d: 30-31) suggests, the local reception of strategies is dependent on their
resonance with the 'personal' narratives and experiences of particular audiences. The
concept of 'structures of expectation' provides one 'tool' for conceptualising how the
expectations and agendas of local groups limit and condition processes of strategy
formulation and implementation.
4. The continuing emphasis on partnership requires further research to problematise
official constructions of partnership, specify conditions for effective partnerships and
consider how partnerships are related to state restructuring, in particular the tendency
for government to withdraw from certain spheres. The latter tendency also raises
questions about the future of local partnership structures given the continuing
constraints on state resources. The consequences of the impending enlargement of the
EU for areas like the Scottish Highlands adds further interest to these questions.
Notes
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1 LEC director, interview 7.7.97, see quotes on page 1 (note 1.1) and page 158.
2
Or, perhaps more accurately, they have transformed existing bureaucracies, re¬
modelling them on neo-liberal principles.
3 Since early 1993, for instance, the Scottish and Highland (HIE area) unemployment
rates have fluctuated around the same level, 8 to 10 per cent. They have both shown a
slight decline towards 8 per cent from 1995/96, though this trend is masked by
pronounced seasonal fluctuations in the Highlands (HIE, 1996a; cf. Table A.2.2.2).
4 From a 'strategic-relational' perspective, this shows the close relationship between
state forms and state strategies (Jessop, 1990b; cf. Goodwin, 1998b).
5 LEC official, private conversation November 1998.
6 This is what Labour was emphasising as the basis of its approach to the Enterprise
Networks in the immediate post-election period.
7 Indeed, none of the councillors who applied for places on HIE board in 1997 were
successful (see Chapter seven, note 20).
8
Arguably, the HIDB was more successful in this respect, reflecting the close organic
relationship between its emphasis on economic modernisation and pre-existing (local)
discourses of development, though this project did provoke considerable opposition in
the late 1970s (Section 3.3).




1.1 Distribution of Interviews by 'Rounds' ofData Collection
Round 1
10 interviews: 7 with HIE; 1 with Highland Council; 1 with Scottish Office; and 1
with European Partnership. 9 conducted in Inverness, 1 in Edinburgh.
November 1996 to January 1997.
Round 2
9 interviews: 5 with LECs; 4 with local authorities. LECs: CASE, INE, MBSE,
Lochaber Limited, AIE. All local authority interviews with Highland Council
(Sutherland, Inverness, Badenoch and Strathspey, and Lochaber areas).
March 1997.
Round 3
Study Area 1- Easter Ross.
12 interviews: 3 with RACE, 2 with Highland Council (Ross and Cromarty area), 4
with businesses, 3 with voluntary and community groups.
May 1997.
Round 4
Study Area 2- Skye and Lochalsh.
15 interviews: 4 with LEC, 2 with Highland Council (Skye and Lochalsh area), 3 with




Study Area 3- Western Isles
16 interviews: 4 with LEC, 3 with Western Isles Council, 3 with other public
agencies, 4 with businesses, 2 with voluntary and community groups.
July/ August/ September 1997.
Round 6
8 interviews: 5 with HIE, I with Highland Council, 1 with European Partnership, 1
with HOST. 6 conducted in Inverness, 1 in Strathpeffer, 1 in Edinburgh.
October/November 1997.
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1.2 Distribution of Interviews by Response Groups
• 16 with LECs.
12 with HIE.
• 13 with local authorities.
• 3 with Area Tourist Boards.
• 2 with European Programmes.
• 1 with the Scottish Office
• 4 with other public bodies (Further Education Colleges, Housing Association,
local development agency, Harris Tweed Authority).
• 12 with local business people.
• 7 with community groups.
For purposes of coding and analysis, the interviews were aggregated into four groups:
• Regional: 18 interviews, rounds 1 and 6.
• LECs: 16 interviews.
• Local authorities: 13 interviews.





For LEC Interviews- from Study Area 1.
- Local formation of LEC 1991, transition from HIDB/Training Agency at local level.
- formation of RACE, why Ross and Cromarty rather than larger Moray Firth LEC:
relationship between local aspirations and central priorities such as need for balance
between areas.
- bid to Scottish Office, role of local business.
- recruitment of staff, transferred from HIDB/ Training Agency area offices.
- founding statements/ documents: strategy, services, etc.
- Internal structure of LEC: divisions and activities.
- change over time, why?
- Problems of integrating training and economic development in practice.




- internal unity, difference between Wester and Easter Ross.
- state of local economy: improved since 1991, role of RACE in this.
- Structure (firm size, etc.) and sectors. Distinctive from rest of Highlands?
- Development of strategy, role ofHIE.
- transmitted downwards from HIE or significant LEC input?
- scope to adapt to local conditions.
- Sectors targeted by HIE relevant to local economy?
- Allocation of funding from HIE.
- based on business plan, three-year or one year?
- outline process, negotiations and priorities.
- allocation among blocks and programmes, extent of virement. Scope to adjust
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according to local circumstances.
- link with setting of targets, performance/output related funding.
- Significance of business leadership.
- relationship between Board and senior staff, division of labour.
- difference from HIDB/ Training Agency
- nature of local business community, extent of mobilisation? Relations with business
organisations.
- Mechanisms for local accountability.
- Formally required: newsletters, publications, ATO.
- Informally evolved: membership schemes, sub-committees, account managers.
- Partnership: commitment, role of key individuals and historical factors in shaping
relations with local authorities.
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For Local Authority Interviews- from Study Area 1.
- Transition from districts and regions.
- Significance of Ross and Cromarty being only district to have economic
development service. Reasons for that.
- Effects of transition on ED service and area.
- Staff.
- Area structure of council: committee and staff for each service, Area committee?
- Local formation of LEC 1991, construction of EEC map, local demands.
- State of local economy: perceptions of this. Structure and sectors.
- Services offered at area level: point of contact or more pro-active role, initiating
projects?
- Strategy for ED: pull-down of regional strategy into areas, scope for local
flexibility?
- Distinctive input of Council to ED relative to LECs: - importance of being
democratically accountable, broaden ED agenda.
- Perceptions of LEC, lack of local accountability- democratic deficit- a problem, give
focus but lack local input. No mechanism to ensure responding to local agendas.
- Different cultures yet common interests?, practical resolution of contradiction.
- Changes to LEC system, COSLA's call. Need for business involvement and
commercial confidentiality impediments to change?
- Relations with LECs.
- Different cultures yet common interests?, practical resolution of contradiction.
- Role of individuals and historical factors in conditioning institutional relations.
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- Partnership, LECs as committed as rhetoric suggests.
- Structure and direction ofpartnerships: unequal with senior and junior partners.
- Evaluation ofprogramme impact: monitoring, measuring, targeting.
- Europe: Objective One and LEADER- European programmes, local take-up of
Objective one, perceptions of programme, problems with it.
LEADER , structure of partnership, local impact
- Training:
- public-sector marginalised?
- constraints imposed by national programmes on local capacity.
- access for disadvantaged, practice of LECs here.
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Appendix 2
Regional and Local Area Profiles.
2.1. The Highlands and Islands: A Regional Profile
Table A 2.1.1. Population, HIE area
1961 1971 1981 1991 1995
304,161 307,532 353,513 369,242 372,788
Source: HIDB, 23rd Report 1988: 64; HIE, 6th Report 1996/7: 102.
Table A 2.1.2 Unemployment and Seasonality, HIE area
Unemployment Seasonality
June 1996 Jan'1997 Difference %points
8.1 9.0 0.9
Source: HIE, Sixth Report 1996/7: 101.
Since the early 1970s, the economic position of the Highlands and Islands
relative to the rest of the country has improved (Geddes, 1984; McCleery, 1991). Over
a century of population decline has been reversed with aggregate population levels
increasing since the late 1960s (Table A 2.1.1). Much of the demographic growth
experienced in the 1970s was attributable to the labour demands of oil-related
industrialisation in Easter Ross and Shetland in particular (McCleery, 1991). In the
1980s, however, a more multi-faceted experience of counter-urbanisation accounted
for much of the population growth. Outlying areas perceived to offer a high-quality
environment such as Slcye and Lochalsh, Wester Ross, parts of rural Argyll and
Eochaber, together with Badenoch and Strathspey have benefited most (Table A
2.2.1) (McCleery, 1991). At the same time, the scale of in-migration in other
peripheral areas like the Western Isles and the North-west mainland has been
insufficient to reverse traditional patterns of out-migration, reflecting the entrenched
structural problems that continue to afflict these areas. And the areas industrialised in
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the 1960s and 1970s such as Easter Ross, Lochaber, Caithness and Nairn have faced
major problems of de-industrialisation and structural adjustment as key installations
have closed or contracted.
A key feature of local labour markets in the Highlands relates to the
seasonality of employment, with unemployment rates typically peaking in January
(Table A 2.1.2). Table 5 shows that this pattern is particularly marked in the most
tourist-dependent parts of the West Highlands like Skye and Lochalsh and Lochaber,
indicating that it stems from the tendency of the tourist sector to shed labour in the
winter. In terms of employment structure, the under-representation of manufacturing
remains a feature of the Highland economy. Despite the industrialisation efforts of the
1960s and 1970s in particular, at 10.5 per cent in 1991 (about 9.5 per cent in 1995)
manufacturing employment remained well below the Scottish and British levels of 19
and 21.2 per cent respectively (Table A 2.1.3) (EDAW CR Planning/ Dep. of Land
Economy, University of Aberdeen, 1995: 59). This is balanced by a high dependence
on the service sector, and public services and tourism (distribution, hotels and
catering) in particular (Table A 2.1.3). The primary sector remains important,
particularly as a source of output as employment falls, while the under-representation
of business services provides another indicator of the Highlands' economic fragility
(Table 2.1.3). The relatively high level of self-employment at 17 per cent in 1991,
having risen sharply since 1981, points to the distinctiveness of the region's labour
markets. It stems from the existence of occupational pluralism in crofting and fishing
and the growth of small businesses in the tourism and craft sectors.
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Table A 2.1.3 Employment Structure, HIE area
SIC (Standard Industrial 1991 1995
Classification)
Agriculture, forestry and 6,361 4,061
fishing
Energy and water 3,196 2,178
Manufacturing 20,293 17,690
Construction 10,943 10,381
Distribution, hotels and 40,742 40,536
catering
Transport and 10,241 8,458
communications
Business services 15,632 16.319
Other services 51,283 50,488




Source: Segal Quince Wicksteed, 1997, Highlands and Islands Objective 1
Programme, Intermediate Assessment, Final Report: 22; HIE, Economic Update,
April 1997; HIE, Sixth Report 1996/7: 102. (data originally derived from 1991 Census
ofEmployment, 1991 Census ofPopulation and 1995 Annual Employment Survey).
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2.2 Local Economic Profiles
Table A 2.2.1. Population change 1981-95 by LEC area
LECarea 1981 1991 1995 1991-95 %
change
Argyll and the 70,118 71,500 69,489 -2.8
Islands
Caithness and 40,949 39,88 39,240 -1.6
Sutherland
Inverness and 67,058 73,090 75,690 3.6
Nairn
Lochaber 19,491 19,310 19,520 1.1
Moray, Badenoch 32,698 33,122 34,209 3.3
and Strathspey
Ross and Cromarty 46,924 49,100 50,700 2.4
Skye and Lochalsh 10,621 11,740 11,940 1.7
Western Isles 31,548 29,400 29,040 -1.2
Orkney 19,182 19,560 19,780 1.6
Shetland 26,347 22,540 23,090 2.4
HIE area 364,936 369,242 372,788 1.0
Scotland 5,180,200 5,107,000 5,136,600 0.6
Source: HIE, Sixth Report, 1996/97: 102.
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Table A 2.2.2. Unemployment and Seasonality by LEC area
Unemployment Seasonality
LEC area Rate Jun-1997 Rate Jan-1998 Difference %
points
Argyll and the Islands 5.8 7.3 1.5
Caithness and 7.2 9.1 1.9
Sutherland
Inverness and Nairn 6.6 7.0 0.4
Lochaber 4.1 6.5 2.4
Moray, Badenoch and 5.1 5.5 0.4
Strathspey
Ross and Cromarty 8.4 8.6 0.2
Skye and Lochalsh 6.9 9.8 2.9
Western Isles 8.0 10.2 2.2
Orkney 3.4 3.8 0.4
Shetland 3.4 3.8 0.4
HIE area 6.3 7.5 0.2
Scotland 6.4 6.2 -0.2
UK 5.4 5.2 -0.2
Source: HIE, Sixth Report 1997/98: 98.
254
Table A 2.2.3. Employment Structure, Ross and Cromarty- Study Areal
SIC 1981 1991
Males Females Total Males Females Total
Agriculture, 1,560 150 1,710 1,1900 260 1,450
forestry and
fishing
Energy and water 330 20 350 480 80 560
Manufacturing 3,570 490 4,060 2,530 630 3,160
Construction 2,740 300 3,040 2,060 180 2,240
Distribution, 1,710 2,170 3,880 1,580 2,490 4,170
hotels and
catering
Transport and 570 2320 800 790 220 1,010
communications
Other services 1,900 2,610 4,570 2,770 4,120 6,890
Total 12,470 6,030 18,500 11,720 8,020 19,740
Ross and Cromarty constitutes two distinct economic units as the industrial
towns of the Cromarty Firth contrast sharply with remote crofting communities on the
West coast (Fig 1.1). The traditional basis of the economy has been in agriculture,
with Easter Ross in particular offering some of the best land in the Highlands. In
Wester Ross, in contrast, small crofting/fishing communities have struggled to survive
as their traditional industries have declined, leading to depopulation. Easter Ross
benefitted more than any other part of the Highlands from the industrialisation efforts
of the 1960s and 1970s as the development of North Sea oil offered a range of on¬
shore opportunities at a time when the HIDB was prioritising the development of the
Moray Firth area. Projects such as the Invergordon smelter and Nigg platform
fabrication yard attracted labour from outwith the region. The resultant influx of
population transformed the social structure of the area, causing considerable
dislocation.
In the 1980s a serious down-turn in oil-related fabrication followed the closure
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of the Invergordon smelter in 1982 (reflected in fall of manufacturing employment
1981-91, Table A 2.2.3). Easter Ross became an unemployment blackspot with
industrial dereliction and associated social deprivation blighting its economic
prospects. In response to these entrenched problems, the Invergordon-Alness area was
designated a Enterprise Zone by the Scottish Office in 1983, allowing it to attract a
range of industrial investments (RACE, 1990, First Business Plan). The rural areas of
Wester Ross benefited from counter-urbanisation in the 1980s with the re-population
of places like Gairloch and Torridon bringing considerable regeneration. The new
'light' industries attracted to Easter Ross in the 1980s and early 1990s proved unable
to fully absorb the labour shed by the smelter and oil-related sectors, and a further
wave ofmajor redundancies at Nigg in 1992/3 intensified the difficulties of the area.
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Table A 2.2.4. Employment Structure, Skye and Lochalsh- Study Area 2
SIC 1981 1991
Males Females Total Males Females Total
Agriculture, 430 0 430 550 90 640
forestry and
fishing
Energy and water 110 10 120 90 0 90
Manufacturing 150 80 230 220 40 260
Construction 610 20 630 630 20 650
Distribution, 330 630 760 420 870 1,290
hotels and
catering
Transport and 260 100 360 320 120 440
communications
Other services 470 310 780 610 920 1,530
Total 2,400 950 3350 2,850 2,090 4,940
Skye and Lochalsh experienced more than a century of de-population,
reflecting the protracted decline of traditional activities like agriculture and fishing.
However, the strength of crofting has allowed the retention of a larger population than
would otherwise have been the case (Macmillan, 1996). After being by-passed by
industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s brought dramatic
economic and demographic growth (Table 4) as 'quality of life' in-migration injected
capital and entrepreneurial skills into the area, resulting in the expansion of tourism
and craft industries in particular. While Table A 2.2.4 appears to underestimate the
importance of tourism, Table A 2.2.2 reveals that Skye and Lochalsh as the most
tourist-dependent economy with the greatest seasonal range of unemployment (2.9 per
cent). Local sources have estimated that about 60-65 per cent of the area's GDP is
directly or indirectly related to tourism (LEC Chief Executive, June 1997). While this
represents a considerable economic strength, such dependence also brings a certain
vulnerability to external changes in tourist demand, illustrated by the impact of the
recession of the early 1990s on visitor numbers and spending. In terms of the structure
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of the local economy, Skye and Lochalsh is dominated by small businesses in tourism,
crafts, the primary sector and local services with manufacturing in particular and
business services heavily under-represented (Table 12).
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Table A 2.2.5. Employment Structure, The Western Isles- Study Area 3
SIC 1981 1991
Males Females Total Males Females Total
Agriculture, 500 20 520 670 70 740
forestry and
fishing
Energy and water 140 20 160 350 10 360
Manufacturing 1,640 400 2,040 980 280 1,260
Construction 1,330 40 1,370 1,450 60 1,510
Distribution, 690 880 1,570 710 970 1,680
hotels and
catering
Transport and 840 90 930 580 130 710
communications
Other services 1,410 1,870 3,280 1,560 2730 4,290
Total 6,610 3,320 9,930 6,340 4,250 10,590
According to the first Chairman of WIE, the new agency inherited
responsibility for the most "economically fragile and structurally disadvantaged" part
of the United Kingdom (WIE, 1st Report: Foreword). While it is economically the
most marginal of the LEC areas, the Western Isles is, at the same time, the heartland
of crofting and the Gaelic language. The twentieth-century history of the islands has
been one of depopulation. Compared to other parts of the West Highlands, however,
the Western Isles has maintained, particularly on Lewis, population density in rural
areas. Central to this has been the system of occupational pluralism whereby crofting
has been combined with other activities, most importantly fishing and the weaving of
Harris Tweed (Mewett, 1977). In recent decades, these traditional industries have been
in decline. This has been partially offset by the expansion of 'modern' service sector
employment and small-scale manufacturing. In the 1970s, re-organisation of local
government in 1975 which created the all-purpose Western Isles Council and the
establishment of a fabrication yard at Arnish near Stomoway provided the local
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economy with a boost sufficient to slow population decline during the 1970s and early
1980s (Table 4).
A survey conducted by the Fraser of Allander Institute in 1988-89 (published
in 1991) provides, in combination with Census figures, useful insights into the
structure of the local economy. Local government (included in other services in Table
A 2.2.5) was the most important sector, accounting for 27.4 per cent of employment
and 26.5 per cent of output. It was followed by fisheries with 17 per cent of
employment, construction and textiles. While tourism has expanded in recent years, it
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